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Abstract 
This thesis focuses upon the abilities of children with severe learning 
difficulties to contemplate the psychological states of other people, what 
is often referred to in the literature as 'mindreading' (Whiten and Perner, 
1991). 
The first section contains a review of the literature on children's 
developing understanding of the mind and their conceptual 
representational abilities. This is followed by two studies investigating 
non-learning disabled children's abilities to attribute first-and second- 
order false belief. The first of these uses an adaptation of the Sally-Anne 
test (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985). The second study uses an original false 
belief story scenario, which involves children in drama. The researcher 
uses a technique called 'split-briefing' to provide children with first-hand 
experience of first-and second-order false belief. 
Simplified versions of the two false belief story scenarios are then used 
with children with severe learning difficulties to investigate their abilities 
to represent first-and second-order false belief. The relationship between 
children's scores on belief attribution tasks and their scores on tests of 
non-verbal intellectual reasoning (Ravens Coloured Matrices) and 
receptive language ability (TROG) is also examined in this study. 
The third section outlines the findings of a questionnaire-based study 
examining parental reports of spontaneous internal state use by two 
groups of children: non-learning disabled children aged 1-5 years and 
pupils with Down's Syndrome aged 4-19 years with severe learning 
difficulties. 'Internal state language' is language which refers to 
intentions, cognitions and feeling states (Bretherton and Beeghly, 1981). 
This is followed by a further investigation of internal state language 
among a group of students with severe learning difficulties. This study 
uses a series of playlets written by the author to provide students with an 
interactive, participatory medium in which to draw their attention to 
people's internal states. 
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The thesis concludes with a final statement on research into the social- 
cognitive development of children with severe learning difficulties, with 
recommendations for future research and intervention. 
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Preface 
This thesis is perhaps best seen as a research journey into relevant ways 
of finding out about children's social-cognitive awareness, particularly 
their understanding of psychological states. Throughout the thesis, there 
is a movement of enquiry from non-learning disabled children to learning 
disabled children. The author believes that an improved understanding of 
the social-cognitive abilities of non-learning disabled children has 
informed, focused and refined his work with children with severe 
learning difficulties. The experimental work begins using what might be 
described as more conventional research methods and ends up with more 
interactive and participatory styles of enquiry. It is felt that these 
different approaches were appropriate to the tasks in hand. In teaching, a 
teacher's methodology and style depend upon what it is he or she wants to 
teach and what is to be achieved. For both teachers and researchers, 
perhaps, those who employ a mixture of methods have a greater chance 
of realising their aims. 
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Chapter I 
Children's social-cognitive development 
1.1 What is social cognition? 
Social cognition is a person's knowledge and understanding of 
themselves and other people. Flavell (1977) states that "Social cognition 
means cognition of human objects and their doings. It includes 
perception, thinking and knowledge regarding the self, other people, 
social relations, social organizations and institutions, -in general, our 
human, social world. " (page 49). 
This thesis centres upon children's growing understanding of people's 
psychological states, i. e., both their own and other people's beliefs, 
desires, intentions and feeling states. Much of young children's 
understanding of the mind comes with the emergence of language. 
Durkin (1986) writes, "the availability of vocabulary about mental and 
personal properties is central to the development of social 
understanding", (pagel7). However, significant development in young 
infants' social-cognitive awareness takes place prior to speech; indeed, it 
is proposed that their social-cognitive development provides the 
foundation for language and communication. Macnamara (1972) states: 
"Infants learn language by first determining, independent of 
language, the meaning which a speaker intends to convey to them, 
and then by working out the relationship between the meaning and 
the language. " (page 1). 
The young child first understands the speaker (by means of social 
cognition) and then comes to understand the accompanying speech. 
Infants understand their mother's angry facial expression and intonation 
of voice before they infer the meaning of the word "No! ". The 
development of language in the human race generally must have followed 
a similar sequence: "..... inferential communication had to exist before 
external languages developed: human external languages are of adaptive 
value only for a species already involved in inferential communication. " 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1986, page 68). 
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The experimental work described in chapters 4 and 5 concerns children's 
abilities to 'mentalise', i. e., their developing abilities to represent and 
predict other people's intentions, beliefs and desires. This work 
commences with non-learning disabled 3-and 4-year-olds and moves on 
to similar work with older children with severe learning difficulties. 
However, the following few pages focus upon the social-cognitive 
development of the younger child. This is important, for it reveals the 
tutorial environment in which children's social-cognitive awareness is 
fostered, i. e., within social interaction. For the very young child, 
dynamic participatory social exchanges with care-givers provide the 
foundations for later social-cognitive development. It is easy to lose sight 
of this essential principle, that children's social-cognitive awareness 
develops through social interaction, in partnership with more expert 
adults and other family members and friends. It is this principle which 
guides the author's work with children with severe learning difficulties in 
the penultimate chapter. 
The roots of social cognition are buried firmly in social interaction. 
Forgas (1981) states: 
"Cognition, when taken as a domain concerned with all processes 
of knowing, is intrinsically, inevitably and profoundly social. Our 
knowledge is socially structured and transmitted from the first day 
of our life. " (page 2). 
In the first few weeks of life children begin to see people as perceivers 
and agents. This awareness culminates in children's recognition that 
people are able to perceive and respond to relevant information in similar 
ways to the way that they themselves respond. Joint visual attention, or 
what Scaife and Bruner (1975) called 'shared reference', is one of the 
earliest examples of this: the child first becomes aware that other people 
perceive objects or events in the environment, begins to follow their line 
of gaze, and becomes aware that their attention to things and people in 
the environment is, in some way, significant. The important point here is 
that joint attention is 'modelled' by the care-giver. Schaffer's (1984) 
research indicated that the majority of episodes of joint attention arise as 
a result of the mother monitoring the infant's line of gaze. Butterworth 
(1991) states that adults closely monitor the focus of infants' attention and 
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adjust their own gaze to maintain shared experience. He notes that care- 
givers vocalise at appropriate moments when they see that the infant is 
attending to a particular object or event. Children's early social-cognitive 
understanding is mediated by the mother, but the infant's participation in 
this process is critical, - the tutorial environment can only operate under 
conditions of reciprocity. 
Hobson (1993) calls this early person understanding 'intersubjective 
relatedness', what he defines as early "experience of affectively patterned, 
intersubjectively co-ordinated relations with other people. " (page 5). He 
believes that infants are "prewired" to relate to and experience other 
people in 'special ways'; that they are innately disposed towards another 
person's attitudes to what he or she regards as socially significant (see pp. 
36 &39 of this thesis). 
Very young infants have been shown to be engaged with and affected by 
care-givers' expressions of feeling; 3 month-old children have been 
shown to perceive and react to the affective attitude expressed in another 
person's facial, vocal, and other bodily gestures. Brazelton et al (1974) 
traced 4-week old infants' strongly differentiated relations to objects 
(small cuddly toys) and people in relaxed face-to-face contact. Their 
videotaped observations of mother-infant interaction revealed predictable 
patterns of interpersonally regulated 'affective attention'. The young 
infants' eyes and face would brighten as they looked at the mother, and 
their bodies would typically extend towards her. When the mothers 
responded by smiling, the bodily movements of the four week-old infants 
became more active and there were often fleeting smiles and 
vocalisations. 
There is evidence of motor-affective responses by infants at even earlier 
ages. Meltzoffs studies of imitation by newborn babies (Meltzoff and 
Moore, 1983; Meltzoff, 1990; Meltzoff and Gopnik, 1993) indicated that 
infants under two days old showed widened eyes and mouths in imitation 
of people showing surprised expressions, tightened mouths accompanied 
by furrowed brows when shown sad expressions, and lip widening when 
shown happy faces. 
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Walker's (1982) research presents further evidence for young infants' 
sensitivity for and responsiveness to other people's emotions. She 
presented 5-and 7-month-old infants with two filmed facial expressions 
side-by-side, accompanied by a single vocal expression matched to the 
emotion expressed by only one of the faces. The infants were 
consistently observed to increase their looking time to the facial 
expression corresponding with the emotion expressed by the voice. 
The work of Stern (1977,1985) and Trevarthen (1977) focussed upon the 
finely tuned patterns of face-to-face co-ordination between care-givers 
and their infants. Their extensive research illustrates how infants in the 
first few months of life make an active attempt to establish harmony in 
their interactions with care-givers. An important dimension to their 
research, like Brazelton's, is that the young infant appears to perceive and 
relate to 'persons' very differently than to 'objects'; there is what Hobson 
(1993) calls 'interpersonal linkage of subjective experience'. 
Haviland and Lelwica (1987) asked mothers of 10-week-old infants to 
express a range of affective states in their facial and vocal expressions 
with their children. They found that the infants responded to and often 
mimicked their mothers' emotional states, for example, in response to 
expressions of joy, the infants also demonstrated expressions of 
happiness and interest, with a decrease in mouthing. This was contrasted 
with an increase in mouthing and other signs of distress when mothers 
showed expressions of sadness. 
The work of Sorce et al. (1985) also demonstrated young infants' 
awareness and response to the affective states of their care-givers. They 
placedl2-month-old infants on the 'shallow side' of a 'visual cliff' and 
positioned their mothers, holding an attractive toy, on the opposite, 'deep 
side'. Under a number of conditions, the experimenters were interested to 
see if the infants were willing to cross a perspex surface, situated over 
what looked like a sudden drop, towards their mothers. When noticing 
the 'visual cliff, the majority of infants spontaneously looked at their 
mothers' faces. When the mother expressed a happy face, 74% of the 
infants crossed to the deep side; when the mother posed a fearful 
expression, none of the infants ventured across. When the mothers posed 
an angry face, only 11% of the infants crossed the cliff; 78% actively 
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retreated back to the shallow side. This study suggests that infants aged 
12 months seemed to actively seek out their mothers' affective 
expressions, relate this to their current situation, and respond accordingly 
with feeling and action. 
Hornick et al's research (1987), reminiscent of the work of Bandura, 
indicated that 12-month-old children's play behaviour is influenced by 
their mothers' expressions of emotion. Hornick and his colleagues 
showed how infants' motivation to play with toys was affected by 
maternal facial, vocal and gestural expressions. Infants played less with 
toys towards which the mothers showed disgust and more with the toys 
which parents had expressed positive feelings for. 
These studies show that it is through finely tuned relations with the care- 
giver that children first learn about 'person-related' meanings (Hobson, 
1993), and that it is their early engagements with other people's 
emotional attitudes towards people, objects and events that constitute the 
building blocks for children's understanding of psychological states. 
Hobson states that it is through the experience of "reciprocal, affectively 
patterned interpersonal contact" that a young child comes to learn about 
minds. He adds that it is from this starting point that children follow a 
"social developmental pathway" to the time when they acquire concepts 
about people's internal states. 
The role of social interaction as the foundation for children's social- 
cognitive development is, of course, central to Vygotskian theory. 
Vygotsky's social-semiotic view of cognitive development is 
encapsulated by the following quote: 
"any function in the child's cultural development appears twice or 
on two planes. First it appears on the social plane, and then on the 
psychological plane..... First it appears between people as an 
interpsychological category and then within the child as an intra- 
psychological category. " (Vygotsky, 1934, p163)1. 
1 Although Vygotsky can be firmly aligned with the 'social interactionist' 
theorists, like Mead and Hobson, his views on the role of language as a 'tool' 
for self- regulation set his work slightly apart. Mead saw language in a 
different way, as a catalyst for 'arousing' what Hobson calls 'interpersonal 
relatedness'. 
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Central to Vygotsky's view that cognitive development needs to be seen 
as closely tied to its social context is his theory of a zone of proximal 
development. This is the distance between a child's actual developmental 
level and his or her potential developmental level under the guidance of 
more expert adults or in collaboration with more competent (usually 
older) peers. The 'expert' intervention is seen to be at a level beyond the 
child's existing level so that it provides some challenge, but not too far 
ahead so that it is incomprehensible, i. e., within the ZPD. According to 
this theory, the child is seen to learn by jointly constructing her own 
understanding of the world. 
Bruner's theory of 'scaffolding' (Bruner, 1975) is closely related to 
Vygotsky's ZPD: adults are described as erecting 'scaffolds' on which 
children are helped to 'climb' to higher levels of understanding. As with 
Vygotsky's ZPD, effective scaffolds are the ones constructed so that the 
child is not asked to climb too far too quickly. Bruner's original 
reference to 'scaffolding' was in mothers' interpretations of their young 
child's actions, particularly their inferences as to their infants' intentions. 
Bruner writes: 
"Mothers most often see their role as supporting the child in 
achieving an intended outcome, entering only to assist or 
reciprocate or 'scaffold' the action. 'Scaffolding' refers to the 
mother's efforts to limit, so to speak, those degrees of freedom in 
the task that the child is not able to control-, holding an object 
steady while the child tries to extract something from it, screening 
the child from distraction, etc. " (Bruner, 1975; p. 12). 
The term 'scaffolding', as it is now used, refers to many different types of 
strategies that an adult uses in order to help children's learning efforts 
through supportive interventions, all aimed to ensure that children 
achieve goals which they may have been unable to realise unsupported, 
e. g., 'communicative ratchets' in language, where adults gradually 
increase the demands placed on language (Bruner, 1983), 'scaffolding' in 
reading, etc. 
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1.2 Children with severe learning difficulties 
Children with severe learning difficulties are seen to experience 
developmental delay in most areas of development, e. g., language, 
cognition, social and emotional development. Many of these children 
experience 'global' developmental delay, i. e., a general retardation in 
most areas of development; others may be seen to have 'peaks and lows' 
in their development, i. e., their abilities in some areas seem to be more 
developed than in others. It is likely that that their social-cognitive 
development is similarly delayed. The foundations of learning-disabled 2 
children's social-cognitive learning are likely to have been disrupted. In 
the early few months of life, young infants with severe learning 
difficulties are not going to enter into the reciprocal social-cognitive 
patterning described above on an equal footing as non-learning disabled 
infants. Indeed, the lack of responsiveness on the part of the young child 
with cognitive and/ or sensory impairments to the mother's attempts to 
engage the child in 'mutual' exchanges has been shown to disrupt the 
bonding process and has led to reduced expectations on the part of the 
mothers of Down's Syndrome children (Berger, 1990; Cicchetti and 
Beeghly, 1990). Berger states that the majority of infants with Down's 
Syndrome are able to enter into reciprocal interactions with their parents 
soon after birth; however, for many parents, the "ever present, if not 
always manifest, feelings of sadness, inner conflict, and doubt on the part 
of the parents seem to be among the difficulties coloring the early 
interactions. " (Berger 1990, page 137). 
In some schools, teachers working with children at very early 
developmental levels recognise the importance of 'bonding' and 
'intersubjectivity'. Nind and Hewett's (1994) approach to 'intensive 
interaction' draws upon research into care-giver-child interaction to allow 
children to experience some of the reciprocal social patterning that they 
may not have been (developmentally) ready for in their early years. In 
'intensive interaction', the child is allowed to take the lead, and interaction 
centres upon 'dialogues of imitation, rhythm, repetition and expectancy 
(Hewett and Nind, 1992). 
2 For brevity, 'learning disabled' refers to severe learning disabled 
children. 
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The rationale behind Coupe-O'Kane's Affective Communication 
Assessment (Coupe et al 1985) draws upon research into care-giver- 
infant interaction. This provides the structure by which teachers working 
with children at pre-intentional levels of communication can interpret 
their affective responses to various stimuli (e. g., like, dislike, want and 
reject) and place meaning on them; to respond to them as if they are 
communicative signals. Harris (1994) emphasises the importance of 
teachers treating children's actions as having social significance, so that 
children can begin to see their actions as "elements within the web of 
meaning" (page 38). 
There has been little research into the social-cognitive development of 
children with severe learning difficulties. In this thesis, the author 
investigates one aspect of children's social-cognitive awareness, their 
ability to 'mindread' (Whiten, 1991), that is their ability to appreciate the 
psychological states of others. In order for the author of this thesis to 
investigate this aspect of learning-disabled social-cognitive awareness, it 
was first necessary for him to learn more about non-learning disabled 
children's understanding of the mind. The next chapter begins with a 
theoretical perspective. 
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Chapter 2 
Children's developing 'theories of mind' 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses upon one area of children's social-cognitive 
development; their ability to 'mindread' (Whiten, op. cit. ). This relates to 
children's abilities to contemplate the psychological states of others in 
order to predict and understand behaviour. This aspect of children's 
developing social-cognitive awareness is often referred to as children's 
'theory of mind' (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) or 'folk psychology' 
(Dennett, 1978; Olson, 1988). Astington (1991) calls it a "common- 
sense", or "belief-desire psychology", because it provides explanations of 
behaviour and makes predictions about people's actions by appealing to 
their beliefs and desires, to what people think, know, expect, want, 
intend, hope for, etc. 
The chapter begins with a definition of "theory of mind". The peculiar 
properties of mental states are then outlined as are some of their functions 
in terms of relating them to one's own and other people's behaviour. The 
term 'theory of mind', for some authors, is viewed as a misrepresentation; 
Johnson (1988), Harris (1989) and Hobson (1993) do not share the view 
that children's ability to 'mentalise' involves the construction of a theory. 
They propose that children's knowledge of human behaviour is derived 
from their own phenomenal experience. This experiential approach is 
central to the development of this thesis, for it places social-cognitive 
understanding within a participatory framework, i. e., children learn about 
other people's psychological states through the process of social 
interaction and on the basis of interpersonal and affective experience. 
This emphasis upon of 'learning about people, through people' informs 
the experimental work with children with severe learning difficulties in 
chapter 6. 
Johnson and Harris's theory of 'simulation', Hobson's (1993) views about 
'interpersonal subjectivity' and Nelson's (1981) 'scripted knowledge' all 
provide an alternative perspective to the 'theory of mind' or 
'computational' orientation to the way children develop psychological 
understanding. 
21 
2.2 Mental States and "Theory of Mind" 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) were among the first authors to coin the 
term "theory of mind". They used the term in their investigations into the 
appreciation of intentionality among chimpanzees. The authors write that 
an organism or person is said to have a "theory of mind" if: 
it... he imputes mental states to himself and others (either to 
conspecifics or to other species) as well. A system of inferences of 
this kind is properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states 
are not directly observable and second, because the system can be 
used to make predictions specifically about the behavior of 
others.... Purpose or intention is the state we impute most widely; 
several other states are not far behind, however. They include all 
those designated by the italicised term in each of the following 
statements: John believes in ghosts; He thinks he has a fair chance 
of winning; Paul knows that I don't like roses; She is guessing 
when she says that; I doubt that Mary will come; Bill is only 
pretending. " (page, 515). 
Wellman (1990) discusses the non-observability of mental states and 
describes such ascriptions of mental states as 'inferences'. He writes: 
"In part, mental states cannot be simple empirical generalizations 
because there is no set of observable activities in self or other that 
consistently correlates with inferred mental states. There are no 
actions inevitably connected to having a desire, no consistent 
introspectable state of conviction essential to having a belief. If no 
neutral observational or experiential data dictate the inferences of 
mental states, what does? Observation and experience play their 
parts but, in addition, some intervening conceptual filter seems to 
stand between observation or experience and knowledge of mind, a 
theoretical lens that organizes the latter out of the former. " 
(Wellman, 1990: pp94-95). 3 
3 Hobson appears not to have such problems with unobservable mental 
states. He writes "I suggest children's understanding of unobservable 
mental states is not so mysterious once one sees that they begin by 
understanding mental states that are observable" (Hobson, 1993: p. 122). 
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Whiten and Perrier (1991) state that the process of mental state attribution 
is tied inextricably with actions in two ways. Firstly, they state that 
attributions are made on the basis of observations of behaviour in social 
contexts, and secondly, the utility of the mental attribution is testable 
through its predictive power. Whiten and Perser (1991: p. 1 1) state that 
'theory of mind' can be regarded as a type of theory, in so far as it is "an 
elaborate system of theoretical constructs, generating testable predictions 
on which it stands or falls". 
There has been great interest in whether such a system of theoretical 
constructs can be extended to animals (see Bryne and Whiten 1991, 
Cheney and Seyfarth, 1991, Gomez, 1991, Whiten, 1993) or indeed 
computers (see Shultz, 1991 and Schmidt and Marsella, 1991). 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) were not only the first researchers to 
articulate whether children's understanding of the mind amounts to a 
'theory', but were the first to investigate 'theory of mind' in primates. 
They were interested in the question of whether chimpanzees can impute 
states of mind to others and use this ability to predict behaviour. To 
investigate this, the authors showed an adult chimpanzee, "Sarah", a 
series of videotaped scenes of a human struggling with a variety of 
problems, e. g., a man struggling to reach a banana hanging from the 
ceiling. After the video, the chimpanzee was shown some photographs of 
the man engaged in a continued action, one of which was a solution to the 
problem, i. e., in the example above, the man stepping onto a box. The 
hypothesis was that if the chimpanzee knew that the man wanted/ desired 
the banana then she would predict that he might step onto a box in order 
to reach it. The chimpanzee passed on 21 out of 24 of the trials. 
However, there seems to be a methodological problem in this experiment. 
In the abstract, Premack writes that with each videotape, the chimpanzee 
was given several photographs. This is rather misleading, because close 
examination of the procedure shows that after each video, the 
chimpanzee was given -a choice of two photographs, one of which 
provided the solution to the problem. The authors write that the left-right 
position of the correct alternatives was counterbalanced over problems 
and over trials, but this does not seem to eliminate the 50% chance rate of 
success. It may have been preferable to have presented a choice of four 
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photographs instead of two. Whether it was valid to claim that the 
chimpanzees were imputing mental states to the man is outside the 
concern of this thesis. However, the authors themselves speculate that 
the chimpanzee could have been led to the correct response by 
"associationism" rather than by imputing the human's mental state. 
Associationism refers to the chimpanzee's familiarity with the sequences, 
i. e., when the chimpanzee was shown an incomplete sequence that she 
might recognise, she might have chosen the element that had the effect of 
completing the sequence. 
Other more recent studies, referred to above, offer some compelling 
examples of primates in the wild exhibiting examples of behaviour such 
as might suggest that they have at least a rudimentary understanding of 
the minds of animals, especially in their own species. 
Central to Premack and Woodruff's concept of 'theory of mind' and the 
distinction between the mental world and the physical world is 
'intentionality' in relation to mental attitudes. Brentano (1874/1973) 
maintained that all phenomena are either physical or mental, and that 
mental phenomena have certain unique qualities. He wrote that mental 
state terms such as believe, desire, expect, hope, pretend, imagine, etc., 
are all directed to something (their intentional content), e. g., a person 
believes that something, intends to do something, etc. Thus, mental 
processes are internal processes that are directed to the external world. 
This quality of directedness has been called "Intentionality" (Dennett, 
1978; Searle 1983). Brentano stated that propositions predicated by 
mental state terms do not have the same logical properties as any other 
type of propositions. Their main unusual logical properties are: 
1) Non-entailment of existence or non-existence, e. g., "I believe in God" 
can be true without entailing that God actually exists, 2) Non-entailment 
of truth or falsehood, e. g., "John believes that I am rich" can be true even 
if I am, in fact, poor. The content of mental states as expressed in 
embedded "that... " clauses ("x thinks that... ", "x pretends that... ", etc., ) are 
seen to have special logical status, i. e., they are independent of states of 
affairs in the external world in terms of existence, truth and reference, 
and this is highly significant to Perrier's theory (see page 76 of this 
thesis). 3) Referential opacity, e. g., (Dennett's example, 1983) "Suppose 
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you think your next-door neighbour would make someone a good 
husband and suppose, unbeknown to you, he's the Mad Strangler. 
Although in one, very strained, sense you could be said to believe that the 
Mad Strangler would make someone a good husband, in another more 
natural sense you don't, for there is another, - very bizarre and unlikely- 
belief that you surely don't have, which could better be called the belief 
that the Mad Strangler would make a good husband. The third unique 
quality of mental state terms is the facility that they offer the beholder to 
take "the intentional stance" (Dennett 1987) i. e., - attributing mental 
states to other people (and oneself) allows us to explain and predict their 
actions (and our own). Dennett (1978) provides the following example: 
"Why did the man stand under the tree? Because he thought it was 
raining and he wanted to stay dry and he believed the tree would shelter 
him. " So, only reference to the man's beliefs explains his actions, not the 
fact of whether it was raining or not, or whether the tree would in fact 
shelter him. Dennett emphasises that the predictive power of this form of 
explanation is highly reliable. He calls such mental state attribution 
explanations "folk psychology". Dennett writes: 
"We use folk psychology all the time, to explain and predict each 
other's behaviour; we attribute beliefs and desires to each other 
with confidence, - and quite unselfconsciously- and spend a 
substantial portion of our waking lives formulating the world, - not 
excluding ourselves- in these terms...... Every time we venture out 
on a highway, for example, we stake our lives on the reliability of 
our general expectations about the perceptual beliefs, normal 
desires and decision proclivities of the other motorists. " (Dennett 
1978, page 569). 
Olson (1988) states that a "theory of mind is a set of explicit and 
interconnected concepts for representing those representational states". 
He sees children as having to go through three stages of development 
before they acquire a folk psychology. He sees the infant as being at the 
first stage, describing him as "essentially behaviouristic", i. e., behaviour 
is to be explained without recourse or appeal to intentional states. Olson 
describes the child's next stage as "intentional". He writes, "children who 
have learned to talk, to make assertions and requests, may be credited 
with the corresponding intentional states: If they ask for x, they desire x, 
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if they say that p, they think that p, and so on. " He adds that at this stage, 
they may not, yet, think of their utterances and actions in terms of mental 
or representational states. At the third stage, Olson sees the child 
acquiring a folk psychology, that permits them to think of their own and 
other's talk and actions in terms of mental states. Olson writes that it is 
then that the child begins to see his utterances as expressions of belief 
and begins to distinguish beliefs from utterances, to distinguish beliefs 
from reality, etc. 
Dennett (1978) calls these beliefs, desires, etc., about other people's 
beliefs, desires, (e. g., "I think that Jim's deceiving me") second-order 
beliefs/ desires, and says that they are dependent on second-order 
representations4. Dennett writes that third-order mental states, e. g., "I 
think that Mary thinks that John thinks.... " require third-order 
representations, and so on. Miller (1970) called this "recursive thinking" 
(see page 80 of this thesis). The author of this thesis believes that 
second-order representations are a critical ingredient in the ability to 
think and reason about the content of our own minds and the minds of 
others. This will be expanded upon in the light of experimental evidence 
presented in chapters 4,5 and 6. 
Happe (1994) gives a compelling account of the consequences of not 
being able to represent the beliefs and intentions of others. She writes 
that everyday sophistications such as deception and bluff would be 
incomprehensible. She writes that the inability to impute mental states to 
others would have a devastating effect on one's sociability, e. g., one 
could not "read between the lines" of conversations, guess and anticipate 
what the listener wants to hear, know what not to say, know to avoid 
embarrassing remarks, know not to repeat what the listener already 
knows, etc. 
These pragmatic features of language are part of a person's metalinguistic 
awareness. This, in the opinion of the writer, is an aspect of recursive 
thinking which has been neglected in the literature. Metalinguistic 
knowledge (knowledge of language) involves reflecting upon or adopting 
4 Other authors (e. g., Penner and Wirnmer, 1985) would call this first- order 
belief. In the author's experimental work in chapters 4,5 and 6, Dennett's 
example would be taken as first- order belief. 
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a stance towards the functions of language. Cazden (1983) defines 
metalinguistic knowledge or awareness as "the ability to make language 
forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves. " 
According to Gopnik and Wellman (1994), our everyday conception of 
the mind is a formulation of a succession of naive theories, what they call 
a 'theory theory' which makes significant developments during a person's 
first 5 years of life. Gopnik and Wellman propose that children's 
understanding of the mind is a theory, involving very similar theoretical 
constructs to those held by adult scientists. They substantiate this as 
follows: 
1) Children's theoretical understanding involves general constructs about 
the mind that go beyond any direct evidence. By this they refer to the 
distinction between layers of experience and the theories themselves. 
Gopnik and Wellman distinguish between two methods of organising 
experience, firstly using 'empirical topologies and generalisations', which 
are the 'orderings, partitionings, and glosses of evidence and experience' 
and secondly using theoretical structures. Gopnik and Wellman state that 
theoretical structures contrast with empirical topologies and 
generalisations, in that theories propose theoretical constructs-'abstract 
entities' and these provide causal explanations that account for 'evidential 
phenomena'. This brings us to their second criterion. 
2) Children's theoretical constructs feature prominently in explanation. 
Gopnik and Wellman propose that theoretical constructs are designed to 
explain empirical phenomena and that these theoretical explanations are 
typically phrased in vocabulary quite different from evidential 
vocabulary. One such difference is their 'abstractness'. They state that 
'theories postulate abstract entities and 'laws that explain the data'. 
Gopnik and Wellman add that theoretical constructs work together in 
systems characterised by lawlike structures and this 'coherence' further 
distinguishes them from empirical generalisations. 
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3) Children's theoretical constructs allow them to make predictions about 
behaviour in a wide range of circumstances, including perceptions about 
behaviour they may have never experienced and incorrect predictions. 
Empirical generalisations allow predictions, but Gopnik and Wellman 
state that these predictions are not far removed from the evidence itself. 
They propose that the 'abstractness' and 'coherence' of theories permit 
predictions about a' wider variety of evidence than empirical 
generalisations, including evidence that played no role in the theory's 
initial construction. Gopnik and Wellman use theory from medicine as 
an analogy. They state that medical theory allows us to predict that 
antibiotics will inhibit many bacterial infections, including some that 
were unknown when the theory was formulated. Medical theory also 
allows us to predict that such drugs will be ineffective against viral 
infections, even when, the symptoms of viral infections may be identical 
to bacterial ones. 
Gopnik and Wellman state some of these predictions may be incorrect 
because theories go beyond the evidence, and because theories are never 
completely right-some of their predictions may be falsified. 
4) Children's theoretical constructs lead to distinctive interpretations of 
evidence. 
According to Gopnik, and Wellman, theories produce interpretations of 
evidence, not 'descriptions and topologies of evidence and generalisations 
about it'. 
5) Children's theoretical constructs are 'defeasible' and 'dynamic'. 
By this Gopnik and Wellman mean that theories are open to defeat or 
revision via evidence. They say because of this defeasibility, theories 
change due to the accumulation of counter evidence, the creation of 
auxiliary hypotheses, and the formulation of alternative models to the 
original theory. This means that there may be a transition from one set of 
theoretical constructs to another. 
Ir- 
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In summary, Gopnik and Wellman propose that all the above 
characteristics of theories ought to apply to children's understanding of 
mind, 'if such understandings are theories of mind'. They state: 
"Children's theories should involve appeal to abstract unobservable 
entities, with coherent relations among them. Theories should 
invoke characteristic explanations phrased in terms of these 
abstract entities and laws. They should also lead to characteristic 
patterns of predictions, including predictions about new types of 
evidence and false predictions. Finally, theories should lead to 
distinctive interpretations of evidence; a child with one theory 
should interpret fundamental facts and experiences differently than 
a child with a different theory. This distinctive pattern of 
explanation, prediction, and interpretation is among the best 
indicators of a theoretical structure. " (Gopnik and Wellman, 1994, 
page 262). 
Gopnik and Wellman refer to the wealth of experimental work (reviewed 
in the next chapter) on children's representational abilities to justify their 
contention that children's understanding of the mind is theoretical. They 
propose that children's understanding utilises a succession of theories, 
and that changes in children's theories of mind can be described as a 
gradual transition from one view of the mind to another. They state that 
the 2 year-old child has an early theory of mind including a conception of 
mental states, such as desires and perceptions, but this understanding 
does not extend to the existence of representational mental states, namely 
beliefs. Gopnik and Wellman regard the 3 year-old child as being in a 
transitional stage in her theory of mind. They see children of this age 
beginning to understanding representational aspects of their notions of 
perception and desire and developing a 'non-representational account of 
belief'. Several researchers propose that children understand 
representations of desires and perceptions earlier than representational 
aspects of beliefs. Indeed, as Gopnik and Wellman demonstrate, desire 
and perception can be construed either nonrepresentationally or 
representationally, - when a person is satiated with something, e. g., after 
a glut of strawberries, he may temporarily no longer desire them, but the 
strawberry itself has not changed for the person as an object of desire. In 
the same way, experimental work in appearance/ reality tests children's 
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understanding of the representational nature of perception (see page 59 of 
this thesis). When children see the same object through different 
coloured filters, their perceptions of these objects may change, but the 
perceived objects remain the same. 
In Gopnik and Wellman's third phase of children's developing theories of 
mind, -4 year-olds reorganise their central explanatory theory. They 
'begin to realize that what actors think, - their representation of the world 
rather than the world itself- inevitably determines their actions' (page 
264). Along with several other researchers (Flavell, 1988; Forguson and 
Gopnik, 1988; Perner, 1993), Gopnick and Wellman state that this is 
when the child develops a 'representational model of the mind', - when 
psychological functioning is mediated by representations. Gopnik and 
Wellman state: 
"Desires, perceptions, beliefs, pretences, and images all involve a 
fundamentally similar structure, a structure sometimes described in 
terms of propositional attitudes and propositional contents. These 
mental states all involve representations of reality, rather than 
realities themselves. In philosophical terms, the child's view of the 
mind becomes fully intentional. " (page 273). 
Significant to Gopnik and Wellman's thesis is children's reformulation of 
their theory of mind. They propose that the 4 year-old child's 
'representational model of the mind' provides her with new predictions, 
explanations, and interpretations, but it also eventually "provides a 
revised view of the very phenomena that were accounted for earlier by 
the desire-perception theory. " (page 267). 
This third phase of children's developing theories of mind, when they are 
between 4 and 5 years of age, accounts for their emerging ability to 
understand 'false belief' see page 64 of this thesis) which involves an 
understanding that people's cognitive relations to the world may differ in 
significant ways even when both their ultimate beliefs and the objects in 
the world remain the same. 
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2.3 Simulation and experience-based models of the mind 
Johnson (1988) believes that children's early understanding is intuitive, 
not theoretical. He says that children's understanding is limited to 
practical knowledge and action and what the child understands is his own 
phenomenal experience. Johnson interprets Wellman and Estes (1986) 
findings that children become aware of what can or cannot be done with 
thoughts and real objects (e. g., thoughts of biscuits and real biscuits) as 
not appealing to a theory, but to intrinsic, first-order knowledge of what 
thoughts and things are. Johnson believes that children have experiences 
with representational states, just as they have experiences with perceptual 
states. He adds that from such experiences, they simply discern that 
representational states are not among the things that they can perceive. 
Thus Johnson believes that the mentalism of children has its roots in the 
structure of experience and the structure of experience provides a wealth 
of information for differentiating overt and covert intentional states. 
According to Johnson, intentional states are not abstract and inferred, but 
are directly experienced. 
Central to Johnson's "experience based model of the mind" (Johnson, 
1988a, 1988b) is his theory of simulation which he believes enables 
children to predict the behaviour of different people in different 
situations. Johnson writes : "By simulating the status of people in the 
world, children are able to make generative predictions from their own 
simulated states in the absence of any abstract theory. " (Johnson 1988b, 
page 49). Johnson cites Gordon's (1986) description of simulation, that 
in order for the child to understand how someone will think, feel, act, 
etc., he need not access some theoretical principles for deduction, but 
simply imagines himself in their situation and directly "reads off" his 
own experience. This can be seen as the antithesis of the "theory of 
mind" view, which states that in order to predict human behaviour, one 
needs to impute people's mental states. Johnson sums up the difference 
in standpoints quite neatly: he writes that in order to predict a person's 
behaviour, "there is no need to... project ourselves into someone's mind, 
we need only to project ourselves into their situation. And there is no 
need to abstract some general rules or laws; these are inherently given by 
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the structure of our own experience, i. e., the actual structuring of the 
situation by our minds. " (Johnson 1988a, page 2). 5 
There are two fundamental constructs in his model: intentionality and 
affordance. Johnson uses the term "intentionality" in the same manner as 
Dennett and Searle i. e., intentional states are psychological modes with 
properties of "direction of fit" and/ or a "direction of causality". The 
direction of fit can be two-way: either the person adapts or fits the mind 
to the properties of the world, or, he is orientated to fit the world to the 
goals of the mind. So, intentional actions are mind-caused acts directed 
toward fitting the world to the intentions of the person (or animal), 
whereas perceptual modes, such as seeing, are world-caused experiences 
directed toward fitting the mind to real properties of the world. Johnson 
proposes that mind-caused and world-caused experiences are integrally 
related. He writes, "seeing a ball, touching a ball, or remembering a ball 
all mark experiential modes of apprehending a ball. In each case the self 
and the object are distinct, yet integrally related: It is the self which sees, 
touches and remembers, but it is the ball that has the properties that are 
seen, touched and remembered. " (Johnson 1988a, page 5). 
This brings us on to Johnson's second fundamental construct: affordance, 
taken from the work of Gibson (1950). Affordance is the object side of 
the intentional relation described above. Johnson writes (1988a) that 
people's intentional experiences with the world are organised with 
reference to the subject, but are not subjective. He states that in seeing an 
object, the person discerns the "seeable properties of objects" (Johnson, 
5 This is very similar to Chandler and Helm's (1984) idea of social role- 
taking. There seems to be a distinction, here, between simulation and 
empathy. Empathy is about having an affinity with another person's 
experience, being able to place oneself into his or her situation and 
understanding how he or she feels, thinks and acts (often referred to as 
'putting oneself into another person's shoes'). A man may be walking 
along a busy road and correctly attribute anger to a person driving a car 
who is stopped at a pedestrian crossing waiting for an elderly person to 
cross. But the man may not empathise with the driver, indeed, he might 
find it difficult to relate to the driver's feeling of anger, because he would 
not see himself becoming angry in this situation. 
Johnson's quotation also relates to the problems some adults have in 
moving beyond projecting themselves into another person's situation to an 
actual consideration of another person's mindset, e. g., 'If I knew I was 
going to be hanged if I was caught, I wouldn't commit a murder'. (I am 
grateful to Sarah Sandow for this point). 
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1988a, page 6), in wanting an object, the person discerns its desirable 
properties, etc. He writes, "In discerning affordances, the child is 
immediately provided a handle for thinking about how a given objective 
property in the world will be perceived by a subject. " (Johnson 1988a, 
page 6). Johnson adds that the 2 year-old child begins to understand that 
a given object affords other people the same experiences as himself and 
conceives the objective properties of persons in terms of affordances: 
hands afford picking up, eyes afford seeing, etc. At around this age, 
Johnson proposes that children's experience expands beyond having 
perceptual experiences of the world, towards having and creating 
representational experiences: thinking, believing, pretending, etc. And as 
stated above, Johnson believes that children become capable of imagining 
people in situations with different affordances, and reading off their 
experiential consequences. 
Forrester (1992) makes a valuable point about Gibson's theory of 
'affordances'. He states that "affordances offer, or have potential for, sets 
of actions; they do not cause or require them" (Forrester's italics). He 
writes: 
"There is an intrinsic relation between perception of an 
environment and action within it. It is the affordance that is 
perceived, defined, that is, as those behaviours which can be 
entered into with respect to the environment. To detect affordance 
is to detect meaning, based here upon a concept of information 
where information is interlinked with both perception and action. " 
(Forrester, 1992: p. 63). 
This alerts us to the importance of the relationship between people and 
affordances; people determine their meaning. Affordances may be 
properly regarded as cultural phenomena, and their significance can only 
be determined through and by the process of social interaction. 
Affordances can only be recognised as dynamic formulations of 
perception and action. This seems to highlight an 'experiential' rather 
than a theoretical model of the mind-where emphasis is placed upon 
intuitive and exploratory activity (what Forrester calls "the 
complementary and reciprocal nature of action and perception") in 
socially meaningful contexts. 
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In his experimental work with students with severe learning difficulties 
(chapter 6, study 4), the present author uses the medium of drama in an 
attempt to offer students dynamic formulations of perception and action. 
The methodology used is more interactive and reciprocal; the 
experimenter is more responsive to the students' understanding and there 
is an emphasis upon intuitive and exploratory activity. It is proposed that 
this way of working with young people with severe learning difficulties 
in a 'participatory' framework is more akin to the ways that people learn 
about the social world. 
2.4 Mental simulation 
Harris (1989,1991,1993,1994), like Johnson, argues against the child 
acquiring a theory of mind. He proposes that children do not think in 
theoretical terms, but on the basis of 'working models' or 'concrete 
paradigms' that serve as a basis for prediction and explanation. Harris 
draws on Kuhn's concept of a 'scientific paradigm' (Kuhn, 1970), in 
which Kuhn defines a paradigm as a "concrete puzzle, - solutions which, 
when employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a 
basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science. " Harris 
(1994) states that this notion of a paradigm has similarities to young 
children's thinking. He writes, 'the child assimilates a new situation to a 
previously encountered instance or to a prototypical model of those 
instances, and then uses the instance or prototype to extrapolate forward 
to likely outcomes in the new situation. Similarly, the scientist 
assimilates the outstanding puzzles of normal science back to the 
paradigmatic exemplar. ' (Harris, 1994: page 303). 
Harris proposes that children make predictions about other people's 
actions, thoughts and emotions by engaging in 'imaginative enactment' or 
'mental simulation'. According to his simulation account, children have 
privileged access to their current mental states. He states that privileged 
access is not available in the case of other people's mental states, and in 
order to identify or make predictions about their mental states, the child 
utilises a simulation strategy. Harris (1994) states that children must 
'reconstruct in their imagination the causal sequences in which such 
mental states are embedded'. 
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Harris believes that children are equipped from birth with a working 
model of the other person. He proposes that the construction of all 
children's minds are similar, and that, provided that children have some 
awareness of their own mental states, and of the conditions that they face, 
"they can arrive at a set of generalizations about the links between 
situations, mental states, and action" (Harris 1991, page 300). According 
to Harris, these regularities allow the child to make predictions about 
other people by a process of 'analogy'. Harris states that these 
generalizations are supplemented by the process of simulation. Even 
predictions about novel situations can be entertained in this process. He 
writes: 
"Asked what someone will do, it is important for the child to 
consider the situation as conceived by the other person. That 
situation may not correspond to what the child wants or believes, 
either now or in the past. Effectively, therefore, the child is 
required to make a prediction about a novel situation. However, so 
long as the child mimics the conditions that obtain for the other 
person, - imagines the desires and beliefs that the other person 
brings to the situation- the analogy between the self and the other 
person can be re-established. " (Harris, 1991: page 300)6. 
These points were borne in mind by the writer when he devised the 
narratives for children with severe learning difficulties in chapter 6. He 
wanted to provide dramatic contexts which the children could relate to, in 
order to facilitate children's appreciation of different characters' internal 
states. 
Hobson (1993) sees this process of analogical reasoning as problematic. 
He says that this presupposes that children can conceptualise their own 
mental states prior to and as a precondition for ascribing similar mental 
states to others. Hobson is unsure of whether children can engage in such 
self-reflection, in their identification of their own thoughts, feelings and 
intentions, before they ascribe similar mental states to others. He 
6 Children's predictions about novel situations by 'analogical modelling' 
may only be possible if the child can identify him/herself with the other 
person. 
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believes that children would need to have some way of checking that they 
are correct in identifying that their own mental states are the same as 
those at work in the other person. Hobson writes: 
"... there must be behavioural criteria for at least some mental 
states, in order that I can reach agreement with others about how to 
apply mental state concepts to 'my own case'. For agreements in 
judgement and correcting to be possible, there have to be 'public' 
criteria for the mental states that (sure enough) correspond with 
particular kinds of subjective experience. " (Hobson 1993, p. 113). 
Hobson proposes that his theory of interpersonal engagement and 
personal relatedness offers the child such 'public' criteria. (This is 
described in detail on page 39). However, Hobson concedes that such 
analogical reasoning, as reflected in the simulation account, must afford 
the child some understanding and ability to predict other people's 
behaviour. He believes that because the young child can see that other 
people have bodies similar in make-up to their own, and that they behave 
and utter sounds in similar ways, then it is probable that children infer 
that other people have minds-and can therefore draw an analogy from 
their own experience, and conclude that other people are similar in being 
subjects of experience. He writes: 
"... Once I have made the inference that people have minds, I can 
judge what people feel, think, and so on from what they say, or 
from 'cues' provided by their bodily expressions and behaviour. I 
can even take the role of the other person and imagine myself in 
the other's shoes. Then I shall understand at least the kind of thing 
the person is thinking, feeling, and so on. " (Hobson, 1993: p. 112). 
Harris (1989) proposes that mental simulation depends on the capacity to 
engage in two successive steps: 1) to entertain imagined premises such 
as having a particular desire or belief and, 2) to simulate the actions, 
thoughts or emotions that would ensue if one were to actually have those 
desires or beliefs. The product of such a simulation can then be attributed 
to other people who do possess the desires or beliefs that have been 
simulated. Thus, according to Harris, by 'feeding in' another person's 
desire or belief into the child's planning system, it becomes possible to 
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derive an 'as if output, - what Harris (1994) regards as a 'hypothetical 
plan of action, which can be used as a prediction of the person's likely 
behaviour'. 
Harris (1989) believes that when children imagine other people's mental 
states, they do so against a background of "default settings". He sees the 
default setting as the current state of the world and the current state of the 
self. He writes, "Unless the child or animal engages in a mental 
simulation that involves the temporary conjuring-up of an imagined 
desire that is different from what the self wants, the default setting 
corresponding to what the self wants will be operative. Similarly, unless 
the subject conjures-up a state of affairs that does not correspond to the 
current state of the world, the default setting corresponding to the current 
state of the world will be operative" (Harris 1991, page 284). 
Harris states that the greater the number of default settings that require 
temporary suspension, the more difficult the simulation. Harris believes 
that in the initial step of simulation (1 above), it is often easier to imagine 
a state of desire that one does not have than a state of knowledge or belief 
that one does not have (see also Perner, 1988). Harris states: 
"Imagining a desire that one does not have may simply require 
imagining a different intentional stance toward current reality, 
(e. g., "This container has milk in it. I do not want it. He does. I 
can imagine how he feels"). Similarly, imagining another person's 
beliefs may also simply involve imagining a different intentional 
stance toward the same facts, ("This container has milk in it. I 
know that it does. He does not know that it does. I can imagine 
his ignorance"). However, it may also involve setting aside the 
facts as one knows them, and conjuring-up a different set of make- 
believe facts. ("This container might have milk in it. I know that it 
does not. He believes that it does"). This brief analysis shows 
how a simulation may simply call for a change in the default 
setting specifying one's intentional stance toward current reality. 
Alternatively, it may require a change in the default setting 
specifying the current state of the world as well as one's current 
intentional stance. " (Harris 1991, page 284). 
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In his later writings, Harris (1993,1994) tends to regard this temporary 
suspension of one's intentional stance as a process of 'overwriting'. In 
his discussion of the difficulties children experience in tests of false 
belief, e. g., predicting that in a story, a protagonist will look for a 
chocolate where she put it, rather than where, unbeknown to her, it had 
since been moved, Harris describes the process of overwriting. He states: 
(In standard false belief tests) "a more sophisticated simulation 
strategy is to feed in not just the doll's desire, but in addition, the 
now contrary-to-fact situation (i. e., the chocolate in its original 
location), which the doll 'witnessed' before its departure. If these 
twin inputs are fed into their own planning system (and allowed 
temporarily to overwrite facts within the knowledge base), children 
will pass the false belief task because on this simulation the 
desired chocolate is to be found (contrary to fact) where it was in 
the first place. " (Harris 1994, page 298). 
Harris sees children's improvement in their ability to accurately represent 
false belief between the ages of 3 and 5 years as being due not to a 
revised theory of mind but to an increasing ability to improve the 
accuracy of their simulation, particularly, he states when such simulations 
demand temporary overwriting of facts. Harris states that the difficulty 
of false belief tasks lies in the demand that children must imagine, not 
just an intentional stance that is not their own current stance, but a 
situation that they know to conflict with what they currently take to be 
the case. Harris states that they must imagine a story character believing 
in a reality that conflicts with what they know to be reality. He states "an 
accurate simulation can only be achieved by feeding in as input a 
counterfactual reality and allowing it temporarily to overwrite what is 
known to be the case" (Harris 1994, page 299). 
Harris's account of the conceptual difficulty of false belief brings to mind 
Flavell's (1985) argument. Flavell states that children's difficulty with 
many first-order belief attribution tasks, such as false belief and 
appearance/ reality, rests with their difficulty in appreciating 
simultaneously two alternative and contradictory models of reality. 
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In summary, Harris believes that children make predictions about other 
people's actions, thoughts and emotions by running a simulation. The 
child imagines having the desires and beliefs of others and projects him- 
or herself into their situation and 'reads off his or her own experience7. 
Harris states that a simulation calls for a working model of the other 
person, but not a theory. 
The next chapter examines how appearance/ reality and false belief tests 
involve difficult simulations. According to Harris (1989), these tasks 
require a double adjustment to the default setting: 1) that reality must be 
set aside, 2) that a non-existent reality must be conjured up, 3) that the 
current mental stance toward that non-existent reality must also be set 
aside, and 4) the substitution of a different stance. 
2.5 Interpersonal Relatedness 
Hobson (1993: p. 5) believes that children develop a conceptual grasp of 
the nature of minds through their "experience of affectively patterned, 
intersubjectively co-ordinated relations with other people" (Hobson's 
italics). He proposes that children begin with innately constituted 
propensities and capacities to relate to and experience other people in 
what he regards to be 'special ways'. He believes that infants are 
"prewired" to relate to people in ways that are "special to people" (as 
opposed to infants' relations with objects), and that it is through the 
experience of "reciprocal, affectively patterned interpersonal contact" that 
a young child comes to learn about people with minds. He states that it is 
from this starting point, that children follow a "social developmental 
pathway" to the time when they acquire concepts about people's internal 
states. 
Hobson believes that it is out of what he calls the "primary forms of 
relatedness" that children develop "perceptual", "cognitive", "conative", 
and "affective" psychological functions. His theory rests upon the 
7 It is feasible that for some children with severe learning difficulties 
whose thinking may rely more upon visual spatial than audio- sequential 
domains, simulation may represent an important channel of human 
understanding. For children who are unable to think in words, observing 
how people react in certain situations, paying particular attention to facial 
expression, body language, etc., may represent important sources of 
information processing within the social sphere. 
39 
distinction between Buber's (1958) I -Thou (interpersonal) and I -It 
(person-with-things) relations. Hobson sees the I -It developmental line 
as roughly incorporating the sensori-motor abilities as described by 
Piaget. In the I -Thou developmental line, Hobson sees the infant 
perceiving and responding to 'person-related' meanings, which in turn 
facilitate 'psychological connectedness' with others. Hobson proposes 
that through social interaction, for example in sharing experiences 
between infant and care-giver, there is the potential for cross-linkage 
between the I -It and the I -Thou pathways. He believes that when these 
pathways become integrated, important channels for person-person- 
object interaction open up. This affords the infant valuable opportunities 
to relate to another person's relation with the world. Hobson states that 
these more elaborate modes of intersubjective relatedness are soon to 
launch the infant into a cognitive revolution. He writes: 
"Through new-found capacities to relate to another person's 
relation to the world, and through the ability and propensity to 
assume another's attitude and psychological stance towards a 
visually-specified and shared environment, the infant begins to 
learn'through other people'. " (Hobson 1993, p. 155). 
An important component of Hobson's theory of interpersonal relatedness 
is his discussion of the way infants take a certain stance or set of attitudes 
towards other people's attitudes. He states that typical instances of infant 
behaviour which demonstrate 'intersubjective relatedness', e. g., joint- 
attention, sharing, showing, etc., are "manifestations of the infant's 
attitudes towards another person's attitudes towards the world and 
herself. " (Hobson, op. cit.: p. 116). 
In the same way that Leslie (1987) talks about children's developing 
representations and 'metarepresentations', the latter being children's 
ability to represent the mental representations of others and herself, 
Hobson discusses the significance of attitudes and 'meta-attitudes', 'meta- 
attitudes' being the child's psychological engagements with other people's 
attitudes. He writes: 
"I believe there is a great deal in an infant's capacities to perceive 
and react to the bodily-expressed attitudes of other people, that 
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lead the infant towards an understanding of what it means to 
communicate and to 'share', what it is to be a 'self with attitudes of 
one's own, and what are the implications for a human being's 
capacity to 'represent' the world in different ways. " (Hobson op. 
cit., p. 209). 
Hobson believes that the infant's appreciation of and attitudes towards 
people as centres of consciousness have been undervalued in 
developmental research. He states that 9-month-old infants "have the 
requisite forms of attitude well before they can conceptualise the nature 
of mental states. These infantile attitudes are the source of interpersonal 
understanding; it is not that understanding or 'theory' comes first" (page 
122). 
2.6 Script or event based knowledge 
Nelson's work on children's development of script knowledge seems to fit 
in with Johnson and Harris's contention that young children's 
understanding of the mind is intuitive and based on experience. Nelson 
(1978,1981) proposes that representations of personally experienced 
events constitute young children's primary knowledge base and this 
enables them to impose some predictability on the world, to behave 
appropriately, and to interpret and predict other people's behaviour. 
Nelson (1981) believes that children's knowledge of the social world is 
script based and probably remains at this level into adulthood. She 
defines a script as a "general event representation derived from and 
applied to social contexts. It is basically an ordered sequence of actions 
appropriate to a particular spatial-temporal context, organized around a 
goal. " (Nelson 1981, page 101). 
Nelson notes that a script can also be about a non-social sequence of 
actions, e. g., getting dressed, but she maintains that even this routine 
derives from social experience. Her research indicated that 3 year-old 
children's script knowledge is "general in form, temporally organized, 
consistent over time and socially accurate". Nelson believes that young 
children's script knowledge is acquired from experience and is in fact "a 
kind of map or model of experience". She says that young children's 
scripts are learned within contexts that are highly structured for them by 
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adults. The child's part in the script is determined, and he or she must 
learn the script, particularly his or her part in it, e. g., what he or she does 
at lunchtime. 
Nelson believes that the automaticity of the way children can engage in 
scripted activities frees processing space for concentration on non-routine 
or problematic issues. She writes: 
"Basically, scripts serve as a guide to routine encounters with the 
world. They enable the individual to predict what will happen next 
in a familiar situation, to infer unstated propositions in a given 
context, and when well established, to run through a sequence of 
actions and interactions more or less automatically. In other 
words, scripts tell people what to do in familiar situations, thus 
freeing them from constantly attending to the ongoing action. The 
cognitive space so gained can be used in the consideration of 
elements of the situations that are problematic, - variations from 
the routine, obstacles to the completion of a goal, negotiations 
between individuals engaged in an activity together, problem- 
solving activities of all kinds. " (Nelson 1981, page 104). 
Other authors have looked at the functions of children's script knowledge. 
French et al (1985) examined children's scripts in relation to discourse. 
She regards children's scripted knowledge as shared knowledge, and 
when children's shared knowledge forms the focus of conversation, a 
number of shared presuppositions are called into play, reducing the need 
for the explicit negotiation of meaning and allowing for rich 
interpretation of a partner's statements. For example, her research 
indicated that children's "kitchen" scripts in the play school Home Corner 
provided children with opportunities to practise their emerging 
communication skills without having to rely entirely on their own and 
their partners' linguistic abilities to sustain interaction. 
Of particular interest to nursery school teachers are the results of one of 
French et al's studies examining communicative interaction of 2-5 year- 
old children. French et al., (op. cit. ) found that the complexity, duration, 
and cohesiveness of children's interaction varied as a function of the type 
of play being engaged in, which in turn varied as a function of the 
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physical setting in which the play occurred. The authors found, as in 
some of their earlier studies, that the longest, most cohesive interactions 
took place in the kitchen corner. 
According to Nelson (1981), through scripts, children acquire 
expectations about the structure of common events, and, in order for 
children to interpret and predict other people's actions, they search for a 
general plan to fit the situation. However, this is not to say that children 
are not also predicting other people's behaviour in terms of their desires 
and beliefs. It seems plausible that both ways of understanding behaviour 
may be regarded as complementary and that children's scripted 
knowledge may offer them greater cognitive space to consider other 
people's mental states. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed some theoretical (and philosophical) 
perspectives concerning children's ability to 'mindread', i. e., appreciate 
other people's psychological states. It was established that, according to 
some authors, the ability to attribute mental states with propositional 
content to others has been called a 'theory of mind' because it involves the 
person postulating the existence of mental states and then using these to 
explain and predict another person's behaviour. Some authors prefer to 
talk about 'folk' or 'common-sense' psychology and others object to the 
word 'theory' being used at all. 
The next chapter reviews a number of experimental paradigms which 
investigate children's abilities to represent other people's psychological 
states. 
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Chapter 3 
Young children's understanding about the mind 
3.1 Introduction 
It was stated earlier that analysis of non-learning disabled children's 
social-cognitive development should precede, and hopefully inform, 
understanding and investigation of the social-cognitive development of 
children with severe learning difficulties. This chapter looks at children's 
representational abilities, in particular the way children understand their 
own beliefs and desires and those of other people. Children's ability to 
'mentalise' clearly involves representation of other people's psychological 
states. The chapter includes a review of significant research into 
children's representational abilities, particularly in relation to belief, often 
called 'metarepresentation'. It also briefly examines children's abilities to 
represent other people's desires and intentions. 
Much of children's early representational ability is evident in their early 
behaviour, i. e., such as can be inferred from what they spontaneously say 
and do, e. g., in their play. The chapter begins with Leslie's (1987,1988 
and 1993) hypothesis that pretend play demonstrates children's first 
manifestation of second-order representation, or "metarepresentation". 
More 'experiential' perspectives on play are then considered. Johnson 
(1988) and Harris (1989) are critical of Leslie's claims that 
metarepresentation is necessary in order to engage in symbolic play. 
Other evidence of children's understanding about the mind is inferred 
from their behaviour in experimental paradigms. Children's early 
perceptual perspective-taking abilities are described within the 
framework of Flavell's (1981) model of perceptual role-taking. 
Children's conceptual role-taking abilities are reviewed in more detail, as 
success in tasks which tap children's understanding of 'appearance/ 
reality' and 'false belief' depends upon first-order belief attribution 
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983) or second-order representation (Dennett, 
1978; Pylyshyn, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Leslie, 1987,1988). 
The child's ability to make first-order belief attributions, e. g., the ability 
to distinguish one's own beliefs from another person's beliefs, is seen by 
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the author of this thesis to be critical for the child's social-cognitive 
development. The argument which the author wishes to develop is that 
children's failure in many of the tasks reviewed in this chapter may be 
more due to the tasks' computational complexity than to deficiencies in 
children's representational abilities (i. e., their insufficiently developed 
'theories of mind'). 
The main aim of what is to follow, then, is to examine critically the 
experimental methodology of many of these belief attribution tasks. This 
will prepare the reader for the author's experimental work, the first part of 
which attempts to reduce the inferential demands of a first-order belief 
attribution task (study 1, chapter 4). The author's second study provides 
an original story scenario in which to explore mainstream children's 
second-order belief attribution through drama. The third study 
investigates the same metarepresentational abilities of children with 
severe learning difficulties (chapter 5). The fourth study is a 
questionnaire-based investigation of the spontaneous use of internal state 
terms by non-learning and learning-disabled children (chapter 6). The 
fifth study provides a participatory framework in which to explore 
learning-disabled children's representational abilities. This final study 
places greater emphasis on the importance of dynamic and participatory 
aspects of social-cognitive contexts (Forrester, 1992). 
The impetus behind exploring more participatory contexts in which to 
explore children's social-cognitive understanding, for example drama, 
arises from the author's dissatisfaction with the plethora of research 
studies utilising rigorous 'test' methodologies to investigate. children's 
representational abilities. In most of the recent studies, the researcher 
sets a rigid procedure in which children either pass or fail a series of 
belief questions. It is proposed that an alternative framework, in which 
children actively (and equally) participate in the procedure, may offer 
researchers new methods of investigating children's social-cognitive 
understanding; perhaps more importantly, it may offer practitioners 
working with children who may have developmental delay in 
metarepresentational abilities, strategies with which to help develop their 
social-cognitive awareness. The author believes that, in special 
education, there still exists a divide between research and practice. The 
author's empirical work with children with severe learning difficulties 
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described in chapters 5 and 6 is an attempt to provide a basis on which 
teachers may intervene in developing children's social-cognitive 
awareness. 
3.2 Children's symbolic play 
Piaget (1952) regarded the onset of representational thought at the end of 
the 'sensorimotor' phase (viz. when the child is between 18 months and 2 
years) as marking a major change in the child's cognitive functioning. He 
saw representational thought as enabling the child to go "beyond the 
present, extending the fields of adaptation both in space and time.... it 
evokes what lies outside the immediate perceptual and active fields" 
(page 41). 
Piaget regarded imitation and play as two forerunners to symbolic 
function. In imitation, children made their actions conform to the real 
world; in play, they made the real world conform (in their minds) to the 
demands of their imagination. 
Vygotsky emphasised the importance of pretend play in children's 
developing representational abilities. Vygotsky (1978) wrote, "When a 
young child uses a stick as a horse, the child's action is inspired and 
regulated by his or her own ideas more than by the properties of the stick 
itself. " (p. 108). 
Leslie (1987 and 1988), believes that early pretend play is a primitive 
manifestation of a child's theory of mind. Leslie proposes that pretence 
involves first-order representations. He cites a2 year-old who watches 
her father pretending to fill a cup with (pretend) water and sees him 
upturn the cup; if she then pretends to clean the carpet, then she is 
attributing a mental state of pretence to her father. To understand 
pretence, according to Leslie, the child must have the capacity to 
appreciate simultaneously two alternative models of a situation. When a 
child picks up a banana and talks to it as if it were a telephone, she is 
seeing it one way and thinking about it in another. Leslie writes that 
underlying object substitution and some other forms of pretence is a 
primary representation of the object: - 
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"a veridical representation based on current perception and a meta- 
representation, -a representation of the object decoupled from its 
normal meaning. " (Leslie 1987, page 417 ). 
The idea of "decoupling" is central to Leslie's hypothesis because it 
prevents representational abuse. He states that given that the primary 
purpose of representation is to accurately represent the world, then 
pretence threatens to undermine this, e. g., when a child sees someone 
pretending that a banana is a telephone, he or she could come to confuse 
a banana with a telephone. He writes that decoupling "suspends the 
normal reference, truth and existence implications of expressions in the 
language of thought and renders internal representations opaque. " (Leslie 
1987, page 417). 
Leslie describes three manifestations of pretend play, which bear a 
striking resemblance to Brentano's (1874/1973) three ways in which 
statements about the content of people's beliefs, knowledge, desires etc., 
are detached from the external world in terms of reference, truth and 
existence (see page 24 of this thesis). Object substitution is the first 
manifestation, and according to Leslie allows a child to represent a 
banana as a telephone; the word "telephone" is detached from its usual 
referent and is used to refer to a banana. Leslie's second form of 
pretence: attributing pretend properties to an object, e. g., a doll's face is 
said to be dirty, involves non-entailment of truth or falsity, (the pretence 
that "the doll's face is dirty" is neither true nor false). His third form of 
pretend play, pretending that absent objects are present, involves non- 
entailment of existence, e. g., the pretence that "the doll is eating the 
cake", does not entail that the cake exists. Leslie proposes that this 
parallel between pretence and statements referring to mental states is 
explicable in terms of a common underlying mechanism, namely the use 
of second-order representations. 
Johnson (1988) is strongly critical of Leslie's model of pretence. He 
maintains that the child's differentiation between representational states 
and reality is not limited to pretence, but is essential to the young child's 
developing representational capacities as a whole. He cites the following 
example: 
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"... when a parent points to a picture in a book and says "dog", how 
does the infant know that the referent is the animal and not the 
picture itself, or even more basically, how does the child know that 
the acoustic sound "dog" refers to anything at all? The entire 
representational edifice, including any ability of the child to 
pretend, talk about, remember or imagine something not present is 
dependent on the child's awareness that representations are not 
reality. Failure to understand such distinctions would leave the 
child hopelessly confused: Life would be a hallucination; all things 
imagined would be taken as real. " (Johnson, 1988a, page 12). 
Johnson states that infants are evidently not so confused and says that his 
or her differentiation of representational states from reality does not 
demand some metarepresentational capacity, but is given by experience 
itself. He justifies this by the following two reasons. Firstly, he proposes 
that the structure of experience is "irreducibly intentional". He states that 
just in the same way as the child experiences his seeing as being about 
something, so does he experience words, pictures and pretence as being 
about something. Johnson says that in this way, children know that 
pretending that a banana is a telephone is about telephones, not bananas, 
in the same way that they know that seeing a dog is about a dog, not a 
dog percept, or that the word "dog" is about a dog, not the sound "dog". 
(Johnson, 1988a, pages 12-13). 
Secondly, he draws on Gibson's theory of "real world affordances" 
(Gibson, 1979). Johnson says that representational states are readily 
distinguishable from their referents in terms of their real world 
perceptible affordances. He maintains that a picture of a dog affords real 
information about a dog, yet is not a real dog. A child pretending to be a 
dog affords information about the behaviour of dogs, but considerably 
less about the way a dog actually looks. The word "dog" affords 
referring to dogs and beckoning dogs, but unlike a picture, the word does 
not in itself provide information about dogs; words have to be learned 
and the meaning associated with the word. Johnson writes that "young 
children should be readily able to differentiate signs from things in the 
same way that they differentiate things from things, directly on the basis 
of their affordances. " (Johnson 1988a, p. 13). 
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Forrester (1992) is also sceptical of Leslie's metaphor of 'de-coupling'. 
He states that in Leslie's playtime 'banana-telephone' example, what is 
overlooked is the fact that for the child the banana only attains 
representational status through the responses and reactions from other 
people to her use of it as a telephone. Forrester states that when the child 
puts the banana to her ear (perhaps in imitation of how other people have 
done this with different objects) what is significant is the reaction of 
people around the child. He writes, "what is significant is the fact that 
others around the child point this Out, that is laugh and so on, in a way 
which socially produces the status of banana as a justifiable 
representation of a telephone" (Forrester's italics, Forrester, 1992: p. 24). 
This is reminiscent of Hobson's (1993) theory of 'interpersonal 
relatedness', where children's grasp of conceptual representation is 
developed through their experience of "affectively patterned, 
intersubjectively co-ordinated relations with other people" (Hobson's 
italics, page 5). 
Forrester's work emphasises the effect that social interaction has upon 
children's representational abilities. He seems to be saying that children 
learn about people through people, - they learn about the way people act, 
the way that they think, through participation in the process of social 
interaction. It is this acknowledgement of the social aspect of social 
cognition that guides the author's experimental work in chapter 6. 
In his account of simulation theory, Harris (1989) does not see a single 
decoupling mechanism at work in children's pretence, but potentially, an 
adjustment to the default setting, - which, as was described on page 37, is 
set at the assumed state of the world. Object substitution or attribution of 
pretend properties in play requires the child to first set aside reality or 
make a single adjustment to the default setting, e. g., the simulation of "a 
cup is empty" becomes "a cup contains (pretend) tea" or "this is a stick" 
becomes "this is a (pretend) horse". Harris believes that this single 
adjustment to the default setting in pretend play is not problematic for the 
2 year child. 
Although Harris rejects Leslie's theory of decoupling, his description of 
the way children adjust default settings in simulation does have 
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similarities to Leslie's 'decoupling' mechanism. Both theories propose 
that in pretence, children must 'set aside current reality', i. e., they must 
adopt a different intentional stance towards reality, for example, when 
pretending an empty cup is full of tea. 
Harris (1992) proposes that children will occasionally slip back into the 
default setting during pretend play. He describes the puzzlement on 
children's faces when mothers may take pretend episodes rather further 
than children expect. For example, when the child knocks over a cup 
containing pretend tea, the mother may invite the child to wipe up the 
(imaginary) mess. At this point the child may become confused and look 
for tangible signs of spilled tea. In this example, Harris would see the 
child as slipping out of the pretend mode-where the child falls back on 
the default setting (current reality) and interprets his mother's comment as 
a reference to that reality, which induces him to look for real tea instead 
of pretend tea. 
In the present author's experimental work (investigation 1, study 1) the 
author makes a modification to the procedure in his replication of the 
Baron Cohen (1985) traditional false belief task in an attempt to prevent 
the young subjects from 'slipping back to the default setting' (Harris 
1992). This is found in the second trial, when unlike in the Baron-Cohen 
task, the experimenter refrains from making Mike transfer the marble into 
his shirt pocket (which, from the child's perspective, makes an 
unnecessary allusion back to reality), and instead makes him place it 
under the table (which keeps the action within the pretend scenario). 
This minor modification in the change of location is to prevent the 
temporary suspension of the pretend scenario, when the child may slip 
back to reality, what Harris calls 'the default setting'. 
In Harris's example of the spilled tea, he states that children are most 
likely to slip out of pretend mode if the mother's intonation of voice (in 
her request to clear up the pretend spillage) does not indicate that she is 
still in pretend mode, in other words, if the mother does not indicate to 
the child that her comment is a continuation of the pretend episode. In 
experimental contexts, Dias and Harris (1988) found that young children 
could be prompted to adopt the make-believe mode if the experimenter 
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expressed significant statements or questions using a dramatic intonation 
of voice. 
In the author's experimental work with both young mainstream children 
(chapters 4 and 5) and children with severe learning difficulties, he 
emphasises the 'pretend' intonation of voice when he manipulates the 
puppets. He also uses a sinister intonation of voice when he gives an 
anticipatory prompt of future foul play in investigation 3 (page 102), 
"She (Sally) can't see or hear what's going to happen next. " It will be 
seen that intonation of voice and body language are given great emphasis 
in the drama work with children with severe learning difficulties in 
chapter 6. This is to facilitate children's engagement with the 'narrative 
mode of thought', (Bruner 1986). 
Harris's example above also brings to mind the difficulty young children 
have in making the meaning-message distinction, e. g., in appreciating 
irony. It is feasible that the representational flexibility in many 
exchanges between mother and child in pretend play may offer the young 
child valuable opportunities to 'take communications as cognitive objects 
and critically analyze them' (Flavell, 1981). In the example above, if the 
child is to continue in the pretence in response to the mother's instruction 
to clear up the imaginary milk, the child must not construe the mother's 
words simply in terms of their linguistic meaning. The child must 
interpret what the mother intends to mean in reference to her mental state, 
i. e., she is pretending that the overturned cup contained milk. 
3.3 Children's perspective-taking abilities 
Children's visual perspective-taking abilities have been researched 
thoroughly over the years. Although these representational abilities do 
not necessitate an understanding of the mind, they are generally viewed 
as forerunners to conceptual perspective-taking abilities (Flavell 1986, 
etc., ). Pillow (1989) proposes that level 1 perceptual perspective-taking 
skills, i. e., children's ability to infer what objects are perceptible to 
another person, may be sufficient for rudimentary level 1 conceptual 
perspective-taking, i. e., children's ability to infer what another person 
does or does not know. 
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Flavell conducted numerous seminal studies on young children's 
perceptual perspective-taking. He postulated the following four levels: 
Level 0: when "internal psychological processes like seeing are simply 
not yet objects of cognition" (Flavell 1981). 
Level 1: when the child starts to develop the ability to represent 
symbolically the visual experiences of himself and other observers. 
However, at this level, he can only represent which objects each person 
sees. 
Level 2: when the child begins to represent how different observers see 
objects, in terms of their orientation or arrangement vis-a-vis one another. 
Level 3: when the child can represent the apparent shape and size of 
objects viewed by different people. This development occurs quite late, 
probably not until the child reaches 8 years. 
Masangkay, Flavell et al (1974) used a picture task in which the 
experimenter held a card vertically between himself and the child. A 
picture of a dog was stuck on one side of the card and a cat on the other. 
After the child had inspected both sides of the card, he or she was asked 
questions such as "Do you (I) see a cat or a dog? " Their results showed 
that all children from 3 to 5 1/2 years demonstrated the level 1 ability 
correctly. However, in a level 2 task, the same children were shown a 
profile picture of a turtle mounted on a card placed horizontally between 
the child and experimenter. The child was asked, "Do you (I) see the 
turtle rightside-up (upside-down)? " Children did not respond correctly 
until they were 4 1/2 years old. A much reported problem with this task 
is the linguistic difficulty of the terms 'rightside-up' and 'upside-down'. 
Also, it might have been preferable to use the same pictures in each task, 
i. e., the dog and cat. Flavell et al. (1981) subsequently attempted to sort 
out the problematic variables in the experiment and found evidence in 
support of the level 1- level 2 distinction. 
A problem with Flavell's earlier studies centres on what he actually 
considers as symbolic representation-in this case, representation of a 
visual perspective. In some of his earlier studies, Flavell was reluctant to 
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accept language as a means of symbolic representation. His studies 
showed a strong bias towards the visual response mode. Ives (1980) 
found that 89% of 3 year-olds and 92% of 5 year-olds could describe 
verbally which side of an object (front, back or side) could be seen from a 
particular position of a camera, whereas only 38% of 3 year-olds and 
51% of 5 year-olds could select an appropriate picture. In a more 
complex task using five possible views with 5 year-olds, the 
experimenter spoke the five possible verbal descriptions. 83% were 
correct with the verbal mode of response, but only 47% were correct with 
the visual response mode, (Ives 1983). 
Several other writers have been interested in children's understanding of 
visual perception. Hughes and Donaldson (1979) found that most of their 
3 1/2 and 4 1/2 year-olds could successfully hide a doll from model 
policemen who were positioned around an arrangement of intersecting 
walls. Hobson (1980) obtained similar results. Thus children of both 
these ages were demonstrating Flavell's level 2 abilities-earlier than 
children in Flavell's studies. 
3.4 Conceptual perspective-taking 
More recently a similar level 1-level 2 distinction has been applied to 
conceptual perspective-taking abilities. Taylor (1988) describes the two 
levels: 
Level 1: refers to the ability to infer what another person does or does 
not know. More precisely, Taylor says children at this level "have 
difficulty separating their own knowledge or interpretation of what they 
see from the perceptual information that is given in their environment. 
Children at this level would understand that if someone does not see an 
object, then that person does not know about it ; however, they would 
tend to believe that if two people both see an object or event, their 
knowledge or interpretation about it is identical. " (page 208). 
Level 2: refers to understanding that different interpretations of the same 
information are possible. 
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Understanding perception as a source of knowledge is critical in 
conceptual perspective-taking tasks, and difficulties with the level 1 
distinction may be an important underlying cause of children's failure in 
false belief tasks. Children's difficulties with this level 1 distinction 
prompted the author to provide a perceptual control question in the 
procedure of his second investigation (study 1, page 98) and a perceptual 
prompt during investigation 3 (study 1, page 102). The intention was to 
eliminate this possible variable for children's failure to predict a story 
character's behaviour according to her first-order false belief. 
The results of several studies have shown that level 1 conceptual 
perspective-taking abilities appear between the ages of 4 and 6 years. 
Mossier, Marvin and Greenberg (1976) showed children the same 
videotape twice, first with the soundtrack turned on while their mothers 
were absent, and then with the soundtrack turned off in their mothers' 
presence. Almost all the 3 year-olds claimed that their mothers knew 
information that was available only in the audio portion of the recording, 
but the majority of 4 and 5 year-olds and all of the 6 year-olds understood 
that their mothers were not aware of this information. In another study, 
Marvin et al. (1976) found that 4 year-old children could also keep track 
of who has learned a secret depending on who was whispering to whom 
and whose eyes were covered in a three-person interaction. 
Hogrefe et al. (1986) put 3-6 year olds into real-life situations or read 
them stories in which another person or story character was excluded 
from certain information. They found that about 50% of their 2/3 year- 
olds and about 80% of their 4 year-olds were able to understand that 
another person was ignorant of a fact known to the child. 
Wimmer, Hogrefe and Perner (1988) argue that prior to the age of 4 or 5, 
children have little understanding of the origins of knowledge. 
According to their view, children younger than this do not understand the 
connection between perceptual experience and knowledge and do not use 
information about a person's past perceptual experience to assess that 
person's knowledge. Their two studies explored children's understanding 
of perception and communication as sources of knowledge. Two 
children sat facing each other on opposite sides of a table. In each trial, 
one child served as subject and had to assess the other child's knowledge 
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and his or her own knowledge of the content of a closed box placed in the 
middle of the table. In each plain-coloured box was a familiar object. 
The specific questions were: "Does (name of other child) know what is in 
the box or does she/ he not know that? " and "Do you know what is in the 
box or don't you know that? " Before these questions were asked, either 
the other child or the subject had informational access to the content of 
the box. One kind of access was visual perception i. e., either the other 
child or the subject looked in the box. The other kind of access was 
verbal information. Here the experimenter looked into the box and then 
informed one of the children by whispering the content in the child's ear. 
As the two children were facing each other, the subject was fully aware 
of whether the other child did or did not look into the box and of whether 
the other was or was not informed of its contents. Although most 3 and 4 
year-olds were able to report their own knowledge or ignorance, they 
often claimed that the other child did not know what was in the box even 
though they had seen the other child look in the box a moment earlier. 
(This could have been an egocentric response, of course. ) Wimmer et al. 
propose that the correct assessment of the child's own knowledge 
indicates the mere functioning of perception and communication as 
origins of knowledge, while the correct assessment of the other's 
knowledge would indicate an understanding of these origins. Thus 
Wimmer et al. propose that most 3 year-olds and some 4 year-olds do not 
understand how informational access induces knowledge. It is worth 
noting that their findings do not imply that perception and 
communication are not functioning as sources of knowledge and belief in 
the young child; they merely show that young children do not understand 
from where and how they got their beliefs. 
A point made by Flavell (1985) is relevant when looking critically at the 
methodology used in Wimmer et al's study (and in others where the child 
has to represent another child's visual perspective or knowledge inferred 
from the other's visual perspective). He states: 
".... our own perspectives produce clear signals that are much 
louder to us than the other's, and they usually continue to ring in 
our ears while we try to decode the other's. It may take 
considerable skill and effort to represent another's point of view 
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accurately through this kind of noise, and the possibility of 
egocentric distortion is ever present. " (Flavell 1985, page 46). 
This represents a serious consideration when evaluating the findings of 
many perceptual and conceptual role-taking investigations. This point is 
returned to later. 
A study by Gopnik and Graf (1988) also investigated children's 
understanding of perception as a source of knowledge. 3,4 and 5 year- 
old children learned about the contents of a drawer in three different 
ways: they saw the contents, were told about them, or inferred their 
identity from a clue. Children were then asked, immediately and after a 
short delay, how they knew about the contents. Gopnik and Graf found 
that 3 year-olds had difficulty identifying the sources of their knowledge, 
while 5 year-olds did not. The 3 year-olds who could correctly identify 
the source immediately had difficulty remembering the source after a 
delay. Explicit training in identifying sources was found not to improve 
the 3 year olds' performance. 
In contrast to Wimmer et al. 's findings, Pillow (1989) found that both 3 
and 4 year-olds did understand that perceptual experience is a source of 
knowledge. In his first experiment, 3 and 4 year-old children sat 
individually facing each other across a table. The experimenter 
introduced a puppet and familiarised the child with a bag full of different 
coloured toy dinosaurs. The experimenter then took a dinosaur out of the 
bag, concealing it in his hand, and put it in an opaque plastic container, 
where it was hidden from view. Next, either the child or the puppet 
looked into the container. When the puppet looked, the Experimenter 
said, "(Puppet's name) is going to look in here. " The role of the viewer 
alternated between the child and puppet from one trial to the next. On 
each trial, children were questioned about their own knowledge of the 
hidden dinosaur's colour, the puppet's knowledge, their own ability to see 
the dinosaur, and the puppet's ability to see it. Half of the children in 
each age group were asked the pair of knowledge questions before the 
pair of perception questions on each trial and half received the perception 
questions first. The hidden object was a toy dinosaur for the first two 
trials and a toy car for the last two. Results showed that performance for 
perception and knowledge questions did not differ significantly by age. 
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Therefore data for the two groups were combined. Of the 16 children 
who received the perception questions before knowledge questions, 15 
assessed their own knowledge correctly and all 16 assessed the puppet's 
knowledge correctly. Of the 16 who received the knowledge questions 
before the perception questions, 15 assessed their own knowledge 
correctly and 15 assessed the puppet's knowledge correctly. The close 
parallel between the children's pattern of responses to the knowledge and 
perception questions suggest to Pillow that both the ability to report what 
objects another person can or cannot see (level 1 perceptual perspective- 
taking) and the ability to attribute knowledge or ignorance to others on 
the basis of recent perceptual experience (level 1 conceptual perspective- 
taking) are present at 3 years of age. He also proposes that his study 
provides no evidence for a developmental lag between these two abilities. 
Pillow's second study (op. cit. ) replicated these findings. He asked 3 
year-olds to indicate which of two puppets would be able to tell them a 
hidden object's colour. One of the puppets had looked at a hidden object 
and one had not. Although Pillow did not reach the level of performance 
he achieved in his first experiment, the 3 year-olds chose the correct 
puppet more often than would be predicted by chance. Thus the results of 
his two experiments suggested to Pillow that understanding of perception 
as a source of knowledge is present by 3 years of age. 
The literature seems to indicate that level 1 conceptual perspective-taking 
abilities appear to develop between the ages of 3 and 5. The age at which 
level 2 conceptual abilities are acquired rather depends on the abilities 
required in the task. However, the literature indicates that level 2 
competence appears later than level 1. 
Generally speaking, studies of level 2 abilities have focused on children's 
understanding that a person with only partial information about some 
event or object is likely to interpret that information differently than does 
the child who possesses more complete information. Taylor, (1988) 
expanding on the restricted view work done by Chandler and Helm 
(1984), found that 4 and 5 year-olds often claim that a naive observer 
shown a small, uninformative part of a picture, will know what a picture 
is. That is, "they appear to be poor at evaluating the information 
available from a particular perceptual experience and over attribute 
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knowledge on the basis of uninformative perceptual access. " (Pillow 
1989, page 121). 
In Taylor's studies, children from 3 years to 8 years were shown three 
pieces of information about animals depicted in line drawings: (1) their 
identities, e. g., a giraffe, (2) what they are doing, e. g., sitting down, and 
(3) personal information, e. g., the giraffe's name. They were then 
questioned about another person's knowledge of each type of the above 
information with (1) no part of the animal visible, (2) with a tiny edge of 
one line visible, (3) with a small, non-descript part of the animal visible, 
(4) with two small non-descript parts of the animal visible, and (5) with 
an uninformative part of the picture visible. The results of her study 
indicate that, prior to 6 years, the majority of children failed to indicate 
that a naive observer would not know the animal's identity when shown 
an uninformative region of the picture. 4,5, and 6 year-olds attributed 
action and personal knowledge to the observer less frequently than they 
did identify knowledge. 8 year-old children performed near ceiling to all 
questions. A subsequent training study involving 4 and 6 year-olds 
indicated that, following training designed to make them aware that there 
may be many interpretations for the same information, 4 year-olds' 
performance on the original perspective-taking task improved relative to 
that of controls. Relevant here, are Pillow's (1989) studies of young 
children's development of beliefs about selective attention. Pillow found 
that 6 year-olds, but not 4 year-olds, believe that listening selectively to 
one message implies not listening to and not obtaining complete 
knowledge of other messages occurring at the same time. Pillow takes 
this belief to indicate that the older child has a conception of listening as 
a psychological activity that influences the reception of information from 
the environment. In contrast, Pillow found that the 4 year-olds seemed to 
regard their focus of attention as having little or no consequence for the 
acquisition of information. Thus Pillow concludes that most 4 year-olds 
do not conceive of listening as a psychological activity, that they "will 
have full knowledge and understanding of audible messages reaching 
their ears, as if the occurrence of audible events by itself guarantees full 
knowledge of those events". (Pillow 1989, page 125). 
Pillow draws a similarity to Chandler and Boyes's (1982) claim that 
young children have a "copy theory" of knowledge: "Children seem to 
58 
proceed as though they believe objects to transmit, in a direct line of sight 
fashion, faint copies of themselves, which.... impress themselves upon 
anyone who happens in the path of such 'objective' knowledge". 
Chandler and Boyes claimed that until the age of 6 years, the child 
adheres to his or her copy theory of knowledge where he or she regards 
knowledge and beliefs as products of perceptual information passively 
received from the environment. At 6 years and older, Chandler and 
Boyes see the child as having a "constructivist" theory of knowledge, 
when he or she realises that psychological processes may also contribute 
to one's knowledge and beliefs. However, while not disputing the general 
transformation of the child's developing metacognitive abilities, the 4 
year-olds' correct performance on appearance-reality tasks and false 
belief tasks suggests that the 4 year-old must have a more sophisticated 
conception of the mind than a mere copy theory. 
3.5 Children's understanding of Appearance and Reality 
Another level 2 conceptual perspective-taking task widely reported in the 
literature concerns children's distinction between appearance and reality. 
Flavell has been studying children's understanding of this distinction for 
20 years. He has found that 3 year-olds do not understand how something 
can look different from what it really is. For example, children were 
shown a sponge which had been designed to look like a rock. On its first 
presentation, the children succumbed to its rock-like appearance (as 
indeed adults did). Once they handled it, and discovered it was really a 
sponge, they then said that it looked like a sponge. However, 4 year-olds 
did not do this, they said that it looked like a rock. 
Flavell (1986) discusses the significance of the appearance/ reality 
distinction in children's social-cognitive development. He describes the 
distinction as ".... probably a universal outcome in our species. This 
knowledge seems so necessary to everyday intellectual and social life that 
one can hardly imagine a society in which normal people would not 
acquire it..... Knowledge about the distinction seems to presuppose the 
explicit knowledge that human beings are sentient, cognizing subjects..... 
It is part of the larger development of our conscious knowledge about our 
own and other minds. " (pages 1-2). 
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Over the years, Flavell has tried to make the task simpler. For example, 
if a white card is placed under a blue filter, 3 year-old children will say it 
looks blue and really is blue, even when they see the white edge sticking 
out. Flavell (1985) found that training in appearance/ reality knowledge 
did not improve children's performance. Flavell also found that the same 
error patterns were present in a cross-cultural replication in China 
(Flavell et al., 1983) using Chinese children of the same age. 
It seems puzzling that 3 year-old children have difficulty with 
appearance/ reality when at 2 1/2 years, their pretend play demonstrates 
an ability to differentiate between real and pretend identities, e. g., making 
a banana serve as a make-believe telephone. When one considers that 3 
year-olds can distinguish between real and mental entities, e. g., the child 
appreciating the difference between someone having a biscuit and 
someone thinking about a biscuit (Wellman and Estes, 1986), children's 
difficulties with appearance / reality seem even more curious (and seem 
to indicate that the experimental context may be suspect). However, 
Flavell identifies the basis of the child's difficulty with the appearance/ 
reality distinction as being his limited capacity to appreciate 
simultaneously two alternative and contradictory models of reality. 
Flavell writes that, to solve an appearance/ reality task such as the rock 
task, the child has to attribute: - 
"... mutually incompatible and contradictory properties and 
identities to the same object at the same moment in time. As 
adults, we easily resolve the seeming contradiction by identifying 
one representation of its property or identity with its present 
appearance and the other with its reality. We identify the one with 
what we see and the other with what we know. This resolution is 
easy for us because we are all well aware that people are sentient, 
cognizing subjects who have internal representations of external 
things and can represent singular things in multiple ways. 
Although we are aware that external objects themselves cannot 
simultaneously be two different things at once, we are also aware 
that we can represent them as simultaneously looking like the one 
thing ('that's what it looks like') and really being the other ('that's 
what it really is'). " (Flavell 1986, pages 1-2). 
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Flavell et al's later study (1989a) supports this hypothesis. In this study, 
Flavell et al compared the competencies of 5 year-olds and adults on the 
appearance/ reality task. The authors found that, although the 5 year-olds 
could pass the standard task, they were not as sensitive to the distinction 
between appearance and reality as adults are, and that they required more 
prompts to access and use this distinction. Some additional questions 
were included in this study. The procedure was as follows for the 
appearance and reality of a cut-out white butterfly that looked red behind 
a red filter: a) appearance -"when you look at the butterfly, does it look 
red or does it look white? ", b) reality -"for real, is the butterfly really and 
truly white or really and truly red? ", c) right now, for real-"Right now, 
for real, is the butterfly red? " (as the child looked at it behind the red 
filter). Flavell's results showed that the 5 year-olds, even after having 
been alerted to the appearance/ reality distinction and after having 
correctly answered appearance reality questions, were still more likely 
than adults to give an affirmative answer to question c) above. Flavell 
proposes that this may be because the 5 year-olds construe the situation 
sequentially and on a single, undifferentiated level. This means that for 
the 5 year-old, the butterfly "is" red now (in response to question c), not 
white (the "is" meaning neither appearance nor reality specifically), 
whereas it was white before and will be white again when the filter is 
removed. On the other hand, Flavell writes, the adults can conceive the 
butterfly as simultaneously red in appearance right now and white in 
reality right now (as well as at other times-whereas the child would tend 
to think of it only sequentially, as red now and white at other times). The 
adults construe the situation hierarchically, on two levels simultaneously, 
- the butterfly both looks red (one level) and really is white (another 
level), - both of these being true simultaneously. Flavell proposes that 
this is precisely what the 5 year-old is unable to do. This gives 
convincing support for the view that children find it difficult to appreciate 
simultaneously two alternative and contradictory models of reality. We 
shall see in the next section how this representational problem has great 
bearing on why young children fail false belief tasks. 
An additional study by Flavell et al. (1989) indicated that 3 year-old 
children could appreciate the appearance/ reality distinction using tactile 
tasks. In this study, the children were shown an ice cube and a wet towel 
(the children had seen the experimenter dip the towel into water). The 
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children were asked, "Is this ice-cube cold? " or "Is this cloth wet? " Most 
of the children spontaneously touched the object before answering. Then 
the experimenter put an insulated finger glove on one of the child's 
fingers and asked him or her to simultaneously touch the ice with the 
gloved finger and with his or her other hand. As the child did this, the 
experimenter asked, "Really and truly, is this a cold ice-cube? " and "Does 
this ice-cube feel cold to this finger? " (the gloved finger). The children 
were scored as having passed a task if they correctly answered both of the 
task's two questions. Of the 36 3 year-old children, 29 (81 %) passed the 
appearance/ reality task, -a much better performance than 3 year-olds 
had shown on visual appearance/ reality tasks in previous studies. 
Flavell et al., (1989) proposed that tactile experiences might be easier 
than visual perceptual experiences for young children to reflect upon and 
differentiate for the following reasons: 1) In the tactile mode, the child 
has the sense that the experience is taking place "out there in one's hand 
rather than up here in the head region, the place where one's senses or the 
cognitive self resides" (page 202). 2) The child can see his or her own 
hand touch the object. Thus, according to Flavell, the child can see his 
"subordinate- experiencer", i. e., his hand, contact the object and can 
witness the resulting sensory experience almost as if he were an outside 
observer. The child cannot observe and reflect upon his own visual 
experiences in the same way. 3) In this experiment, the child 
simultaneously touches the object with gloved finger and ungloved hand. 
Flavell proposes that these two simultaneous but different experiences 
may lead the child to do a kind of level 2 perceptual perspective-taking 
evaluation within the self. This within-self perspective-taking may help 
the child distinguish between the two experiences and may highlight the 
appearance/ reality distinction. 4) When the child touches the object, the 
object causes a tactile experience by making direct physical contact with 
the "subordinate experiencer" (the hand). The "executive experiencer" or 
"cognitive self" also sees this contact occur just before or just as the 
resulting sensation is experienced. Flavell, citing Piaget, says this is the 
prototypical causal sequence in which object a causes effect b in object c 
by contacting c directly. Flavell writes that, in contrast, the way an object 
causes a visual experience of that object is much more mysterious -as one 
cannot see either one's eyes or anything that makes direct physical 
contact with them. Flavell proposes that the more easily attributable 
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causal effect in the tactile case may make the distinction between the 
nature of the object and the nature of one's experience easier for the child. 
Although it is not mentioned in this article, it seems plausible that when 
the child simultaneously touches the single ice-cube with-gloved finger 
and ungloved hand, he is made aware that the ice-cube cannot be two 
different things at once. The child may then realise that a single object 
can be represented simultaneously as feeling one way and really being 
another. 
Johnson (1988), who, at the beginning of this chapter, proposed that 
children's model of the mind was "experience-based" is predictably 
critical of the significance that Flavell places on the appearance/ reality 
distinction. He proposes that at level 2 conceptual perspective-taking, the 
child merely becomes aware that phenomenal experiences of objects, 
what something "looks like", exist autonomously from the reality of the 
object itself. Johnson implies that he would apportion greater 
significance to Flavell's appearance/ reality tasks if the distinction 
contained therein constituted a new awareness of truths which are not 
experience-dependent. Johnson writes that such truths are not assessed in 
Flavell's tasks. He writes: 
"The real color of an object, for example, is determined 
experientially. The same is true for other such items, such as a 
sponge that looks like a rock, or a candle that looks like an apple. 
The child's task in such cases is not to distinguish between 
appearance and underlying reality, but between a real appearance 
and mere appearance. What the level 2 child understands is not that 
the mind mediates the apprehension of reality, but that there are 
different experiences of the world, some which give reality, and 
some which give the mere appearance of reality. " (Johnson, 1988a, 
page 20). 
Das Gupta and Bryant's (1989) studies of 3 and 4 year-old children's 
abilities to make causal inferences about sequences of events offer an 
alternative reason why 3'year-old children fail the appearance/ reality 
test. Gupta and Bryant tested children's ability to use the difference 
between an object's initial and final state to work out what happened to it 
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in the meantime. For example, if a child sees a photograph of a dry but 
unbroken cup and then the same cup wet and broken, if he or she infers 
that the cup has been put into liquid or liquid has been poured over it by 
choosing a correct photograph showing a possible causal agent, then the 
child is making a genuine causal inference. The results of Das Gupta's 
studies indicated that 4 year-olds but not 3 year-olds could use the 
difference between an object's initial and final state to work out what had 
happened to it. Das Gupta and Bryant propose that the 3 year-old 
children's difficulties with causal inferences may well explain their poor 
performance in appearance/ reality tasks. These tasks necessarily involve 
a transformation and therefore an initial and a final state. The authors 
write that the child can only appreciate the appearance/ reality distinction 
if he or she can reason about the difference between the two states and 
about what has caused that difference. For example, in the white 
butterfly and red filter task described above, in order for the child to 
appreciate that the butterfly's real colour is still white, he or she must 
understand that causal sequence and be able to infer what would happen 
if the filter were taken away. Das Gupta and Bryant's study suggested that 
precisely this sort of reasoning is particularly difficult for the 3 year-old 
child. 
3.6 Children's understanding of false belief 
In chapter 2, it was established that Premack and Woodruff (1978) were 
among the first authors to coin the term 'theory of mind'. They defined a 
'theory of mind'. as the ability to impute mental states, to oneself and 
others. Wimmer and Perner (1983) devised the first false belief test, -a 
test which they believed provided strong evidence for children's ability to 
conceive mental states. This task is significant, for the conceptual 
demands contained within it have influenced a great many research 
studies investigating young children's representational abilities. Many of 
these tasks and variations are described below, for they have great 
influence upon the author's own empirical work with mainstream children 
and children with severe learning difficulties. 
The original Wimmer and Perner false belief task utilised dolls and toys 
and proceeds as follows. A doll' called "Maxi" puts some chocolate in 
cupboard x and goes away. In his absence, his mother moves the 
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chocolate to another cupboard, - cupboard y. Then Maxi comes back, 
hungry for his chocolate. The subject is asked where Maxi will look for 
the chocolate. Wimmer and Perner found that most 3 year-olds predict 
that the boy will look in the new place, cupboard y, where the chocolate 
actually is. These children did not appreciate Maxi's false belief. In its 
original form, Wimmer and Perner found that only 57% of 4-6 year-olds 
passed the test. 
Several authors have written about the complexity of this task (Wellman 
and Bartsch 1988, Chandler et al, 1989, Leslie and Roth, 1993) and 
several adaptations of the original experiment have appeared over the last 
decade. Baron-Cohen (1985) simplified the scenario for use with autistic 
children. He found that compared to control groups of Down's syndrome 
and non-learning-disabled children matched for mental age and linguistic 
ability, the group of autistic children had striking difficulty predicting a 
puppet's actions based on a false belief. The performance of Baron- 
Cohen's non-disabled 4 year-olds was better in his simplified version than 
Wimmer and Perner's 4 year-olds in the original task. Baron-Cohen's 
task lends itself well to experimental work with children with learning 
difficulties because it makes few demands on children's expressive 
language difficulties. Children can respond to the control and 
experimental questions by pointing. It is this false belief task which is 
used in the author's empirical work with mainstream children and 
children with severe learning difficulties (chapters 4,5 and 6). 
In his experimental work, the author investigates further some of the 
adaptations to the false belief task applied by Perner, Leekam and 
Wimmer (1987). Perner et al. (1989) tried to help 3 year-olds attribute 
false beliefs to others by having them actually experience a false belief 
themselves in real-life. In one of their experiments, they used a technique 
developed by Hogrefe, Wimmer and Perner (1986). Perner et al. showed 
3-year-olds a well-known sweet packet and asked them what they thought 
it contained. Not surprisingly, they answered, "Smarties. " They were 
then shown that the packet actually contained a pencil. After this, most 
of the children were able to remember and report what their own false 
belief had been and that it was false. Despite this, when asked what their 
friend would think when he saw the box, nearly half of them were unable 
to predict the false belief they themselves had just experienced and said 
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instead, "A pencil. " These results might be taken to indicate that 
understanding representational change (change in one's own belief) 
precedes understanding that others' beliefs may differ from one's own. 
In a similar study, Gopnik and Astington (1988) found different results. 
They found that understanding representational change was more difficult 
than attributing false belief. Their results also indicated that questions 
concerning the other person's belief were significantly easier than the 
questions concerning the subject's own belief. They also found that 
children's success rate in questions concerning appearance/ reality 
improved at an age when they were also succeeding in false belief and 
representational change. The children's performance in reporting their 
own previous false belief was very different in the two studies. Perner et 
al (op cit. ) found that 72% of their 3 year-olds succeeded whereas in 
Gopnik's study only 20-47% succeeded, depending on the task materials. 
Gopnik and Astington believe that Perner et al's subjects may have been 
helped by a control memory question that did not appear in their own 
study. This question, "Can you remember what's inside here? " had to be 
responded to correctly ("a pencil") before the child's data were included 
in the study. Also Gopnik and Astington point out that in Perner et al's 
study, the "but" in the following question, "But what did you think was in 
here? " gave a clue that the required answer was not "a pencil". However, 
despite these clues, it is worth noting that as many as 8 out of 27 of 
Perner's 3 year-olds still said that they had thought there was a pencil in 
the box. 
Gopnik and Astington's study is interesting because it indicates close 
correlation between the development of children's understanding of 
representational change, appearance/ reality and false belief. Their 
results show that development in these three areas progresses more or 
less concurrently between the ages of 3 and 5 years. The correlation 
between development in these areas is not surprising when one examines 
the similar conceptual demands of the three tasks. Understanding 
representational change, appearance/ reality and false belief all involve 
the ability to consider two alternative conflicting representations of the 
same object or situation. Flavell puts the child's representational 
difficulty in this way: 
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"... young children assume as we do that each thing in the world has 
only one nature or 'way that it is' at any given moment but, unlike 
us, do not understand that each thing may nevertheless be mentally 
represented in more than one way. This assumption together with 
this ignorance of representations may lead them to believe that 
things and the way they are described must stand in one-to-one 
relationship to each other. That is, in many situations, at least, they 
may assume (a) that things can only be characterized in one way 
(because they have only one nature), and (b) that one 
characterization can only characterize one thing or type of thing. " 
(Flavell 1988, pages 253-254). 8 
Placing children in contexts in which they directly experience false 
belief, e. g., the 'smarties' task described above, is central to the 
development of the author's experimental work in studies 2,3 and 4. In 
the studies reviewed above, this approach to investigating children's 
ability to attribute false belief was not shown to significantly improve 
their performance. However, in these studies, and most of the others 
reviewed in this section, the experimenters provide children with rigid 
experimental contexts in which children's understanding of false belief is 
tapped only by a series of test questions. Typically, children are first 
asked control questions (usually testing their understanding of memory 
and reality conditions) and then they are asked the experimental question, 
the (false) belief question. Investigations of this type represent test 
situations; children either pass or fail (usually in two trials). The 
limitations (and strengths) of the research methodology and the 
experimental contexts offered to young children in many of these studies 
8 Flavell (1988) states that this representational difficulty can be seen in 
children's communication monitoring. Young children often tend to think 
that one verbal message can only characterise or refer to one thing. 
Consequently, they may have difficulty understanding that some messages 
may be referentially ambiguous (see Whitaker and Robinson, 1987; Beal 
and Flavell, 1985). Young children often fail to make the meaning/ 
message distinction, i. e., they fail to realise that they may be interpreting 
the speaker's message differently from how the speaker intended 
(Donaldson, 1978). Also as speakers, young children often fail to realise 
that their listeners may interpret their message differently than they 
intended. So, similar to conceptual perspective- taking tasks, children's 
difficulties with communication monitoring may be to do with their 
incomplete understanding of mental representations; they may not be 
aware that people may be interpreting or representing the same thing (in 
this case, the message) in two or more different ways. 
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are discussed in chapters 4 and 6. At this point, the author will introduce 
an alternative research methodology, which offers the researcher and 
subjects greater flexibility and reciprocity. The author will describe a 
different experimental context, where the intention is to provide children 
with an intervention-based study, where the emphasis does not solely rest 
upon testing children's understanding of false belief, but also upon 
intervention with the aim of facilitating children's understanding. It will 
be seen that the experiential approach used in the 'Smarties' task can 
represent a powerful agent to children's understanding of false belief. 
Providing a learning context in which children experience false belief 
first-hand, and then encouraging them to reflect upon these beliefs, 
perhaps with the help of video re-enactment, may be a useful 
participatory context in which to investigate children's growing 
understanding of metarepresentation. These ideas are investigated 
further in chapters 4,5 and 6. 
The representational complexity of the false belief task should not be 
underestimated. The metarepresentational demands contained in it are 
perhaps the reason why Dennett (1978) believed that understanding false 
belief constituted a 'litmus test' of a person's theory of mind. Dennett 
argued that in such tests, it is possible to distinguish unambiguously 
between a child's (true) belief and the child's awareness of someone else's 
different (false) belief. In order to pass the traditional false belief task, 
the child has to represent both his knowledge of the world (the object is 
in location x, not in location y) and the deceived actor's false belief (the 
object is in location y). 
Perner, Leekam and Wimmer (1987) believe that it is the 
metarepresentational demands of the task that cause children's 
difficulties, and at the heart of the problem is their inability to assign 
conflicting truth values to a single proposition. 
Zaitchik (1990) also believes that this may be the root of the problem in 
the false belief task. Her research indicated that children's difficulty in 
assigning conflicting truth values to a proposition about the world is not 
specific to mental representations. She designed a "False Photograph" 
task in which a puppet takes a photograph of an object in location x, and 
then another puppet moves the object to location y. 3,4 and 5 year-old 
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children were then asked, "In the picture (the children were shown only 
the back of the photograph), where is the object? " Comparing this task to 
a similar false belief task, Zaitchik found that photographs were no easier 
to reason about than beliefs. 
In one of a series of experiments, Zaitchik ruled out the variable that 
children had problems with the representational nature of photographs. 
Zaitchik proposes that the representational complexity in the photograph 
task i. e., the child must represent both his knowledge of the world and the 
deceived actor's false belief, is the same in the photograph task as the 
belief task. In the former, the photo is at odds with the child's current 
perceptual representation of the world. The photo assigns truth to the 
claim which the child's own perceptual representation denies. Zaitchik 
maintains that the child understands the representational nature of photos, 
but does not or cannot use this knowledge in the case where the photo 
conflicts with the child's own perceptual representation of the true state of 
affairs. In this case, Zaitchik says, the child's reasoning collapses. 
Leekam and Perner (1991) used the Zaitchik's photo task with autistic 
and 3-and 4-year-old non-disabled children. A Polaroid picture was 
taken of a doll dressed in blue. While the photograph developed, the 
doll's clothes were changed to green. Before the developed photograph 
was shown to the children they were asked "What colour is the doll in the 
picture? " Children's responses to this question were compared to a 
similar question about a person's false belief, who, as in the photo 
version, saw the doll dressed in blue, but missed the change to green. 
The 3-and 4-year-old children found the two questions equally difficult; 
however, surprisingly, the autistic children found the photograph question 
easier9. These results were replicated by Leslie and Thaiss (1992) and 
Charman and Baron-Cohen (1992). The latter study used drawings 
instead of photographs. 
Moses and Flavell's study (1990) gives further weight to the argument 
that children's poor performance in false belief tasks is due to their failure 
to understand the representational nature of the mind, in particular, that 
they fail to realise that a single state of affairs in the world can be 
9 Perner (1993) provides some possible reasons why autistic children 
should find this question easier. 
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represented in different, apparently contradictory ways. This study is 
significant in a number of ways. It deals with the issues of informational 
access and inference and indicates that these factors do not pose major 
difficulties for children in false belief tasks. Moses and Flavell 
hypothesised that children might perform better on false belief tasks if 
they could reason backwards to the belief from its effect, e. g., a 
character's actions and reactions. The standard false belief tasks require 
children to make forward-looking predictions from the causes of a belief, 
e. g., what a character has or has not seen, to either the character's belief 
or the character's action. Moses and Flavell also thought that children 
would perform better if the character's lack of perceptual access to the 
critical event, e. g., someone moving an object from location x to location 
y was highlighted. In their study, forty-eight 3 year-olds were shown two 
video recordings in which a character acquired a false belief by not 
having had perceptual access to a critical event. In a perception 
condition, the only belief cue available to the child was the character's 
lack of perceptual access, e. g., the main character, Cathy, finds crayons in 
a bag and goes out to get some paper. Meanwhile, a clown enters, hides 
the crayons in a drawer and substitutes rocks in the bag. In an action 
condition, belief cues were available from the character's actions as well 
as from perceptual access, e. g., when Cathy returns, she walks over to the 
bag and is just about to open it when the video stops and the experimenter 
asks his questions. In a surprise condition, belief cues were available 
from the character's reaction of surprise following violation of 
expectation, as well as from access and the character's actions, e. g., Cathy 
walks over to the bag, opens it and says, "Hey, there are rocks in here! " 
with strong facial expressions of surprise and a surprised tone of voice. 
In this condition, the experimenter even rewinds the tape back to the 
point at which Cathy was about to walk towards the bag, and then plays it 
forward to the point at which she was about to open the bag. Memory 
questions were asked in all conditions to check the child's knowledge of 
critical aspects of the stories. The results of these experiments showed 
that the majority of 3 year-olds were unaffected by the considerable clues 
and failed to attribute false belief to the protagonists. The children's 
performance in the surprise condition was slightly better than in the 
standard task but it was still no better than chance. The authors' 
explanations for the young children's difficulties in these tasks remain the 
same as in as in Flavell's earlier studies (Flavell 1985, etc., ). They 
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believe their failure rests in their inability to conceive beliefs as 
representations which may diverge from reality. 
Moses and Flavell state that children need a tight correspondence 
between beliefs and the true state of affairs in the world. Evidence from 
the children's justifications of their answers in this study showed that the 
most common error was to refer in some way to reality. Children would 
say Cathy thinks there are rocks in the bag because there are rocks in the 
bag, or because the clown put the rocks in the bag. Moses and Flavell 
write, " It was as though, for these children, the real state of affairs 
constituted a reason for the protagonist's belief. These children appeared 
to hold the view that beliefs must necessarily accord with reality. " (page 
939). 
Forguson and Gopnik (1988) support this argument and provide the 
following commentary on the Moses and Flavell study: 
"The difference between the 3 year-olds and the 4 year-olds might 
be summarised as follows: The 4 year-olds have developed a 
representational model of the mind. This model construes the 
relation between the mind and external reality as mediated by 
mental representations: mental states with contents that have 
satisfaction conditions in the external world. Some of these states 
are satisfied (roughly: the world is as it is represented as being); 
some of them are not. The world is independent of our thought 
and experience; but it is represented in thought and experience. To 
think about or experience is always to represent mentally, whether 
or not it is always the case that the content of one's experience or 
thought constitutes accurate (or adequate) information about how 
things stand in the world. " (page 236). 
Russell et al. 's (1991) 'window task' also demonstrated 3-year-old 
children's difficulty in inhibiting their responses to the immediate 
perceived reality. Russell presented children with a competitive game in 
which they have to win as many sweets as they can by deceptively 
directing a competitor (the experimenter) to an empty box. The children, 
but not the experimenter could see which box was empty and which was 
full by looking through small windows in the boxes. Russell et at. found 
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that 3-year-old children persistently pointed to the box containing the 
sweet despite repeatedly losing it. 
Wellman and Bartsch's (1988) study paints a more optimistic picture of 
3-year-old's representational model of the mind. They created three 
scenarios similar to the false belief task. Wellman and Bartsch's tasks 
required the child to consider two contradictory beliefs, i. e., the child 
believes the object is in location x or in both locations and the protagonist 
believes it is in location y, and the protagonist's action has to be predicted 
on the basis of his or her belief, not the child's. For the "Not Own 
Belief", the "Discrepant Belief" and the "Inferred Belief" tasks, 3 year- 
olds were correct 63%, 82% and 88% respectively (study 3). In study 4, 
Wellman and Bartsch provided a simplified false belief task. They 
reduced the inference requirement in this task. (In Wimmer and Perrier's 
original task, the child is never told the protagonist's belief, - Maxi thinks 
the chocolate is still in the original cupboard. Instead, the child must 
infer the protagonist's belief from perceptual access). Wimmer et al., 
(1988) believed that this inference requirement was central to the child's 
difficulty with false belief . To test this hypothesis, 
Wellman and Bartsch 
created an "Explicit False Belief" task where the child was told the 
protagonist's belief, e. g., "Jane is looking for her kitten. Her kitten is 
really in the playroom, but Jane thinks the kitten is in the kitchen. Where 
will Jane look for her kitten? " However, in spite of this reduction in 
inferential demands, only 16% of Wellman's 3 year-olds, 31% of his 4 
year-olds and 86% of his 4 1/2 year-olds passed the test. The children's 
performance was well down on their performance on the "Not Own 
Belief", "Discrepant Belief" and "Inferred Belief" tasks. This led 
Wellman and Bartsch to propose that children fail false belief tasks, 
because, from the perspective of the 3 year-old, these tasks present a 
conflict between desire reasoning (Jane wants her kitten and it is in the 
playroom, therefore Jane will look in the playroom) and belief reasoning 
(Jane believes the kitten is in the kitchen, therefore Jane will look in the 
kitchen). Wellman says that in such situations, 3 year-olds predict on the 
basis of desire. He says they do so not because they have no conception 
of belief, but because for them belief and desire are in conflict and they 
weight desire over belief in arriving at a prediction. Wellman and 
Bartsch state that when there is no conflict, young children can include 
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belief in their reasoning, e. g., in his "Inferred Belief' and "Discrepant 
Belief' tasks. They explain their argument as follows: 
"In those tasks (Inference and Discrepant Belief), while reality 
(desired objects are located at Location 1 and 2) is discrepant from 
belief (the character believes the objects are only at Location 1), 
there is no direct contradiction between reality and belief. Hence, 
there is no conflict between belief and desire reasoning, beliefs 
augment or focus desires. In those circumstances, therefore, 3- 
year-olds consider and appropriately incorporate belief 
information. Similarly, in our Not Own Belief task, even if the 
child him or herself thinks the object is at Location 1, he or she can 
predict the character's action on the basis of the character's belief 
(the character thinks it is at Location 2), because the child does not 
know where the object really is. Given that ignorance, there is no 
contradiction between desires and beliefs to contend with, and 
belief information simply and appropriately augments the desire 
information (he wants the object, he thinks it's at 1: he'll look at 
1). " (page 271). 
In a later study, Bartsch and Wellman (1989) reinforce their argument 
that young children fail false belief tasks because of a conflict between 
desire and belief. Their study also indicated that children have an 
awareness of false belief much earlier than reported in previous research. 
In this study, as in the one conducted by Moses and Flavell, Bartsch and 
Wellman investigated children's ability to reason backwards-i. e., 
explaining actions in terms of beliefs and desires. Traditional false belief 
tasks, as we have seen, involve children reasoning forwards-i. e., 
predicting from beliefs and desires to actions. Bartsch and Wellman also 
wanted to rule out the possibility that young children's understanding of 
belief is not that at all, but perhaps merely being an understanding of 
desire. In their first experiment, sixty 3 year-old children were asked to 
explain why story characters performed simple actions. The stories were 
classified as being of three types: Neutral, Anomalous Desire, and 
Anomalous Belief. Examples of each story type are taken from the 
original extract: 
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Neutral: Here's Mary. Mary is going to buy an ice-cream at the Grocery 
Store. Why do you think Mary is doing that? Anomalous Desire: Here's 
Jane. Jane hates frogs. But Jane is looking for a frog under the piano. 
Why do you think Jane is doing that? Anomalous Belief: Here's Jane. 
Jane is looking for her kitten. The kitten is hiding under the chair. But 
Jane is looking under the piano. Why do you think Jane is doing that? 
Nine stories were presented in total and each story was accompanied by a 
drawing. After the explanation question ("Why do you think Jane is 
doing that? "), when a response did not refer specifically to a desire or 
belief of a protagonist, the experimenter prompted the subject by asking 
either a desire prompt, "What does (Jane) want? " or a belief prompt, 
"What does (Jane) think? ", depending on the story type. If a false belief 
was mentioned, the experimenter asked a reality question, e. g., "Where is 
the kitten, really? " to ensure story comprehension. 
Children's explanations were coded as being one of three general types: 
(1) referring to psychological causes, including the protagonist's desires, 
beliefs or other psychological constructs, (2) referring to non 
psychological causes, or (3) no explanation attempted. Of course, 
Wellman was interested in explanations referring to psychological 
causes. Wellman found that a substantial majority of the unprompted 
explanations of 3 and 4 year-olds referred to psychological states. For 3 
year-olds, 60% of their psychological explanations specifically 
mentioned beliefs and desires; for 4 year-olds the figure was 69%. 
Further analysis of children's unprompted explanations showed that belief 
comprised 10% and 15% for 3 and 4 year-olds respectively and desire 
explanations comprised 28% and 34%. This supports other researchers' 
findings that children acquire a rudimentary understanding of desire 
earlier than they acquire a rudimentary understanding of belief (Flavell, 
1988; Forguson and Gopnik, 1988; Perser, 1988, Wellman 1990,1993). 
It is interesting that 65% of 3 year-olds and 82% of 4 year-olds gave at 
least one false belief explanation. 15 (of 23) 3 year-olds generated 25 
false belief explanations, and all but one of the 25 involved an explicit 
mention of "think" or "thought". Bartsch and Wellman (op. cit. ) found 
that 12 of the 25 false belief attributions occurred prior to a prompt. 
Bartsch and Wellman's results suggested to them that earlier studies may 
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be revealing not a difficulty with false belief per se but a more limited 
difficulty with predictions via false belief. This prompted their second 
experiment which would lend support to their hypothesis if young 
children could explain actions via false belief although fail to correctly 
predict actions based on false beliefs. 
In their second experiment, 3 year-old children were given both false 
belief explanation and prediction tasks. Both prediction and explanation 
tasks involved stories in which a puppet searched for an object in one of 
two containers. For example, each child was first shown a bandaid 
plaster box and a similar, but unmarked, white box, and was then shown 
that in fact the bandaid plasters were only in the white box and not in 
their usual container. The boxes were then closed and a puppet who had 
cut himself was introduced. In prediction tasks, the child was simply 
asked to predict in which box the puppet would look. In explanation 
tasks, the puppet started to look in the marked but empty box and the 
child was asked why the puppet was looking in that box. If the child 
failed to respond or mentioned only something other than the puppet's 
beliefs, the experimenter prompted with: "What does (Bill) think? " If a 
false belief was mentioned, the child was asked a reality question. 
Bartsch and Wellman's results indicated that children performed well on 
explanation tasks, even when they failed the prediction tasks. 16 of 24 
three-year-olds passed the explanation task while only 6 passed the 
prediction task. Bartsch and Wellman say that this study supports their 
earlier findings (Wellman and Bartsch 1988) that children fail false belief 
tasks because they present a conflict between desire reasoning and belief 
reasoning. Given this conflict, 3 year-olds predict on the basis_of desire. 
They do not fail because they have no concept of belief. Wellman and 
Bartsch propose that the reason desire wins out is to do with the young 
child's strong allegiance to the maxim that, in general, people act in order 
to satisfy their desires. Wellman and Bartsch say that young children are 
disinclined to suppose that an actor will act in a manner to thwart his or 
her own desires-which the actor may be seen to do through the eyes of a 
3 year-old in the prediction task. Bartsch and Wellman write: 
"When children are invited to explain actions by referring to false 
beliefs, the child does not have to propose that the actor will act in 
contradiction to his desire. Instead, the child simply has to accept 
75 
that such an action has in fact been produced and then sensibly 
explain it. The child resorts to belief to provide an explanation of 
this state of affairs. " (Bartsch and Wellman 1989, page 959). 
Moreover, Wellman and Bartsch propose that conceptually, predicting 
from information about a false belief is more difficult than explaining an 
action due to a false belief. They write: 
"Generally speaking, predicting an action requires an examination 
of the relevant desire and relevant beliefs. In a false belief 
prediction task, consideration of the character's desire leads to a 
prediction that the character will do what is necessary to satisfy 
that desire, but consideration of the relevant (false) belief leads to 
an opposite prediction. For example, if I know only that Joe wants 
candy and that candy is in the cupboard, I will probably predict 
that he will look in the cupboard. If I know further that Joe 
(wrongly) believes the candy is in the refrigerator, I must reverse 
my prediction. Therefore, in the case of predicting from false 
belief, it becomes necessary for the reasoner to weigh these 
conflicting predictions appropriately, allowing the belief 
information to overturn the prediction from the desire information. 
Deciding between conflicting possible actions may be the source of 
the young children's difficulties with predicting via false belief. " 
(Wellman and Bartsch 1988, page 260). 
Wellman and Bartsch's findings indicate that young children's 
understanding of false belief occurs at an earlier age than suggested in 
previous studies. 
Following Wellman and Bartsch's study, Perner (1989, and later 1993) 
examined the representational status of desire and belief. He proposed 
that before the age of 4 years, the child interprets mental states as relating 
to situations directly; only later does the child re-conceptualise them as 
relating to representations of situations. Perner believes that it becomes 
necessary to bring in representations as stand-ins for situations in order to 
understand cases of misrepresentation, because there it becomes 
necessary to differentiate between content and reference. According to 
Perner, ' this explains the child's late understanding of false belief and 
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appearance-reality. Central to Perner's argument is his distinction 
between "thinking of" and "thinking that". The following extract taken 
from Perner illustrates his distinction: 
"..... 1) You think of me lying on a Mediterranean beach. 2) You 
think that I am lying on a Mediterranean beach. The difference 
between these sentences is important...... The difference arises 
because "think of" and "think that" relate you to two different 
situations. "Think of" in sentence 1) relates you only to the 
situation where I am lying on a Mediterranean beach (content). 
"Thinking that" in sentence 2) relates you to two situations: to the 
situation of me lying on a Mediterranean beach as the content of 
your belief and to the real situation of me sitting in rainy England 
as the referent of your belief. " (Perner 1991, page 146). 
In Perner's example above, he draws the distinction between content and 
referent. Perner believes that the referential use of mental terms is 
marked by "that" and that if the child cannot conceive of mental states as 
representations, he or she cannot understand "thinking that". He says in 
this case the child has a theory of "thinking" but can at best assimilate 
"thinking that" to "thinking of". Perner says the child's inability to 
understand "thinking that" ".... provides the basis for understanding why 
children find wants so much easier to understand than belief. 
Understanding most relevant behavioural and emotional implications of 
desire does not need the understanding of "that". For belief this 
understanding is essential. " (Perner 1991, page 149). 
Perser writes that in some of the published research involving "thinking", 
(and he cites Wellman and Bartsch's (1988) Discrepant Belief Story; see 
page ), the child only has to interpret "thinking" as "thinking of", not 
"thinking that". Perser states that such tasks can be easy or difficult 
depending on whether "think" has to be interpreted as "a mental 
representation, "thinking that" (belief) or simply as a relationship to a 
situation, i. e., "thinking of" (expressing a thought with the implication of 
interest or preference i. e., desire). Perner writes that if all instances of 
"think" are replaced by "think of' in Wellman and Bartsch's Discrepant 
Belief Story, it would read as follows (Perner's emphasis): 
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Look there are bananas in the cupboard and bananas in the refrigerator. 
Jane wants a banana. Jane only thinks of the bananas in the cupboard; 
she doesn't think (much) of the bananas in the refrigerator. Perner is not 
surprised that the majority of 3 year-olds said that Jane would look for 
bananas in the cupboard (the correct response), - but challenges that this 
is an attribution of a belief-based response. Perner states that the only 
one of Wellman and Bartsch's tasks that cannot be correctly responded to 
in terms of interest or preference (desire) is the Explicit False Belief 
story-in which only 16% of the 3 year-olds passed. In this task, the 
children have to interpret information about the protagonist's "thinking" 
as "thinking that" which pertains to belief. Thus Perner proposes that 
children's performance on conceptual role-taking tasks depends on 
whether the attributions of mental states have to be construed as mental 
representation i. e., belief, (and possibly intention) or whether it is 
sufficient to understand them as a relationship to a situation i. e., thought 
and desire. Perner argues that children begin to understand false belief at 
around four years because at this age that they begin to understand more 
about representation (Perner, 1991,1993). 
3.7 Children's understanding of second-order beliefs 
In the false belief studies reviewed so far, investigations have centred on 
children's ability to distinguish their beliefs from someone else's beliefs, 
e. g., "Sally thinks the marble is in the box, but I know that it is, in fact, in 
the basket. " This reasoning is called first-order belief attribution 
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983) or second-order representation (Dennett, 
1978; Pylyshyn, 1978; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Leslie, 1987). 
Children's second-order belief attribution has received less attention in 
the literature. To the author's knowledge there have been no studies 
which specifically investigate the second-order representational 
difficulties of children with severe learning difficulties (apart from 
studies in which children with Down's Syndrome are matched with 
mainstream and autistic children). Second-order belief attribution would 
include the construction: "John thinks that Mary thinks that the ice-cream 
van is in the park", (Perser and Wimmer, 1985). Second-order beliefs are 
often referred to as 'nested' beliefs (Dennett, 1983), 'recursive' or 'self- 
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embedded' thinking (Miller et al., 1970) and 'metarepresentation' (Leslie, 
1987,1993). 
Flavell (1968) called this reasoning "Level 2 perspective taking". 
Flavell's two levels were as follows: 
Level 1: the ability to think about another person's thoughts about an 
objective event, 
Level 2: the ability to think about another person's thoughts about a third 
person's thoughts about an objective event. 
Flavell et al (1968) investigated children's ability to achieve second-order 
belief attribution by observing their strategies in deceptive games. In one 
game, Flavell paired children against each other to win money. Subject 
X was the hider and subject Y the guesser. Subject X had the choice of 
either hiding a nickel under a cup marked "A" or a dime under a cup 
marked "B". (A dime is worth more than a nickel). The object of the 
game was for subject X to deceive subject Y about where a coin was 
hidden. If subject Y guessed the correct cup, he or she could keep the 
coin. Subject X could keep the coin if his opponent failed to find it. The 
strategy on the part of subject X (while his opponent closed his eyes) was 
to empty the cup that he thought subject Y was going to choose. So, if 
subject X thought that his opponent would go for the largest payoff, i. e., 
choose the dime under cup "B", then he would put the nickel under cup 
"A". However, if subject X thought that his opponent would suspect his 
strategy, i. e., that he would hide the nickel under cup "A", then he would 
hide the dime under cup "B". The child's two levels of reasoning are 
shown below: 
Step One-Subject X: "I think he will go for the dime under cup B; so, I 
will put the nickel under cup A. " 
Step Two-Subject X: "I think he will think that I will think that he will go 
for the dime under cup B; so, I will put the dime under cup B. " 
Flavell failed to elicit evidence of level two, or second-order belief 
attribution in children below the age of 11 years. However, as Flavell 
(1977) points out, reliance on introspective reports for evidence about 
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children's reasoning abilities may lead to underestimation of children's 
competence. 
Perner (1979) criticises the methodology of Flavell's game studies, 
because of what he describes as their "circular" nature. Perner proposes 
that children's higher-order reasoning cannot be distinguished from 
lower-order reasoning. In the example above, a further step in the child's 
reasoning, which would represent step 3), would bring subject X back to 
hiding the nickel under cup "A", as in step 1), and the cycle of reasoning 
would start all over again. 
Miller et al (1970) investigated children's second-order belief attribution, 
which they called "recursive" or "self-embedded" thinking. In their 
study, children aged between 6-12 years described embedded "think- 
bubble" cartoons involving non recursive and recursive thinking. Miller 
et al found that children's understanding of non recursive and recursive 
thinking progressed sequentially across mastery of 4 types of reasoning: 
1) thinking about contiguous people (social objects) e. g., "The boy is 
thinking of the girl and father" (non recursive), 
2) thinking about action between people (e. g., talking) e. g., "The boy is 
thinking that the girl is talking to father", (non recursive), 
3) thinking about thinking (one-loop recursion) e. g., "The boy is thinking 
that the girl is thinking of father" (recursive), 
4) thinking about thinking about thinking (two-loop recursion) e. g., "The 
boy is thinking that the girl is thinking of father thinking of mother" 
(recursive). 
Miller et al found that, in response to the cartoons, the 10-12 year-olds 
used one-loop and two-loop recursive descriptions with a 60% and 35% 
success rate respectfully. Landry and Ruth's study (1980), which used 
Miller's cartoons, replicated these findings. Miller et al., like Flavell, 
concede that, as they presented children with a verbal production task, 
they may have underestimated the children's ability to reason recursively. 
The authors also were aware of the linguistic complexity of the task, 
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especially the 2-loop recursion, which they say occurs infrequently in 
real-life. 
Eliot et al (1979) found improved performance on a non-verbal version of 
Miller's test. Children were given a description and were asked to point 
to the corresponding think-bubble cartoon. Penner and Wimmer (1985) 
propose that the children's responses in Miller's and Eliot's studies do not 
demonstrate an understanding of beliefs beyond a syntactic exercise of 
matching embedded sentences with embedded think-bubble cartoons. 
Perner and Wimmer's study offers a more ecologically valid 
demonstration of children's second-order belief attribution by predicting a 
story character's behaviour. In their study, successful belief attribution 
does not demand elaborate verbal skills and first-and second-order belief 
attribution can be differentiated. Perner and Wimmer's studies (op. cit. ) 
demonstrated that many of their 6 year-olds and the majority of 7 year- 
olds were able to mentally represent second-order beliefs. A basic story 
framework ran through all of their 6 studies. An overview is provided 
below: 
John and Mary go to the park. Mary wants to buy an ice-cream from an 
ice-cream van. Mary has no money. The ice-cream man says he will be 
in the park all afternoon. Mary goes home to get some money. John stays 
in the park and sees the ice-cream man drive off. The ice-cream man 
says that he is going to the church to sell ice-creams. On the way to the 
church, the van passes Mary's house. The ice-cream man tells Mary that 
he is going to the church. Mary goes to the church to buy an ice-cream. 
Meanwhile, John goes to Mary's house. Mary's mum tells John that Mary 
has gone to buy an ice-cream. Belief Question: Where does John think 
Mary has gone to buy an ice-cream? 
Perner and Wimmer stated that correct answers could only be given to 
this question if children had formed a mental representation of John's 
second-order belief, because reasoning based on first-order beliefs or 
reality would have led to the wrong answer. 
Baron-Cohen (1989) used an adaptation of this scenario with non- 
handicapped, autistic and Down's Syndrome children matched for mental 
age and linguistic ability. Baron-Cohen found that 90% of the non- 
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handicapped 7 year-olds passed the second-order belief question on two 
trials. This is consistent with Perner and Wimmer's results. None of 
Baron-Cohen's autistic children passed on both trials. These subjects had 
previously passed the Sally -Anne false belief test, i. e., the first-order 
belief attribution test. These results give further weight to Baron-Cohen's 
hypothesis that the autistic child has a specific developmental delay in his 
or her theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et at, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1993; 
Leslie, 1987; Leslie and Frith, 1988; Perner et at, 1989; Perner 1993). 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed some of the experimental studies investigating 
young children's representational thinking. Much of children's 
development in this area is implicit in their behaviour; 2-year-old 
children's pretend play is one of the earliest manifestations of 
representation. In the next chapter, children's representation of 
psychological states will be examined further, in particular, their 
spontaneous language relating to psychological states. 
In contrast to observing children's behaviour in naturalistic contexts, this 
chapter has reviewed evidence about children's understanding of the mind 
from their behaviour in experimental settings. Findings from many of 
these studies have indicated that at about 4 years of age, children begin to 
understand something about the representational nature of the mind; that 
is, similar to pictures, people's thoughts and beliefs are only 
representations of reality, not reality itself. 3-year-olds, on the other 
hand, have a basic awareness of the existence of minds and thoughts, but 
are seen to be more as 'desire psychologists' rather than 'belief-desire 
psychologists' (Wellman, 1990,1993). 3-year-old children make 
reference to people's desires to explain behaviour; 4-year-olds make 
reference to people's beliefs and desires to explain and predict behaviour. 
In the vast majority of studies reviewed, 4-year-olds seem to understand 
appearance/ reality, representational change and (first-order) false belief; 
3-year-olds have an incomplete and fragile understanding of these things. 
The majority of 6 and 7 year-old children understand second-order false 
belief. 
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It has been proposed that a preliminary step to investigating the 
representational abilities of children with severe learning difficulties is to 
examine in depth the same abilities of the non-learning disabled child. In 
chapter 4, the author's first study investigates the abilities of mainstream 
children to represent first-order false belief. The methodology and 
experimental contexts utilised in the author's empirical work have been 
informed by the review of experimental work in this chapter. In the first 
investigation, he replicates the Baron-Cohen 'Sally-Anne' task (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1985), and then makes a number of modifications to it with 
the intention of reducing the information-processing demands 
(investigations 2& 3). Children's responses to these modifications are 
analysed to look for improved performance in attributing first-order 
belief. In the second study, the author introduces his own false-belief 
story scenario, which utilises the experiential component of the 'Smarties' 
task (Hogrefe et al., 1986). The author uses drama and a method of'split- 
briefing'to enable children to directly experience false-belief. Children's 
abilities to represent both first-and second-order false belief are examined 
within the medium of drama. This experimentation with mainstream 
children guides the author's subsequent work with children with severe 
learning difficulties. The author's research with mainstream children 
reveals avenues of research which offer potential for work with children 
with severe learning difficulties. The author's final study follows a 
questionnaire-based study looking at the internal state language of non- 
learning disabled children and children with Down's Syndrome with 
severe learning difficulties. Implications from this research provide the 
impetus for the final study. Here, children with severe learning 
difficulties are provided with an interactive context in which they are 
encouraged to talk about people's internal states. 
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Chapter 4 
Working with mainstream children on False Belief 
tasks 
4.1 General Introduction 
The preceding chapter reviewed a wealth of experimental literature 
indicating that children aged below 4 years experience great difficulty in 
representing another person's false belief. In the majority of the false 
belief tasks, children have to simultaneously represent two people's 
different conceptual views of a single state of affairs. In order to 
successfully represent another person's false belief, children have to 
simultaneously represent both their own knowledge of the world (e. g., the 
object is in location X, not in location Y) and the deceived actor's false 
belief (the object is in location Y). Children's ability to represent the 
actor's wrong belief is seen by several authors as providing evidence for 
their capacity to conceive mental states and therefore their possession of 
a'theory of mind'. 
This chapter describes two major studies. The first study consists of 3 
investigations examining 3,4 and 5 year-old children's understanding of 
first-order false belief. The second study consists of a single 
investigation into 6 and 7 year-old children's understanding of both first- 
and second-order false belief. The researcher uses two different false 
belief story scenarios in each study. The two studies differ in a number 
of ways, although both studies fall within a quantitative paradigm of 
educational research. The major difference between the two studies is the 
researcher's intentions and the type and degree of participation of the 
children. In study 1, the intention of the researcher is to examine 3,4 and 
5-year-old children's understanding of first-order false belief in a 
replication of Baron-Cohen's false belief task. He then offers different 
groups of children two further modifications of the false belief task in an 
attempt to simplify the task and facilitate children's understanding of a 
story protagonist's first-order false belief. In the three investigations in 
study 1, the children play a relatively passive role in the proceedings. 
Different groups of children observe a version of the false belief story 
scenario and answer a series of control and experimental questions. The 
researcher draws a number of conclusions from the children's responses 
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to these questions. The researcher keeps a tight rein on the procedure; 
consistency of presentation and questioning between subjects is 
maintained and there are few opportunities for deviation, in terms of 
probing and asking children to justify their responses to questions or 
probing further into their line of reasoning. The experimenter is very 
directive and the children very passive. The limitations of this type of 
research are discussed in the conclusion. 
In the second study, the researcher's intention is also to investigate 
children's understanding of false belief: first-and second-order false 
belief. In this study, children also answer control and experimental 
questions about story protagonists' false beliefs; however, in this study 
some of the children actually play the characters in the story scenario. 
Children are involved in a role-play context and it will be seen that, using 
a dramatic technique called 'split-briefing', some of the children are put in 
a situation where they actually experience false beliefs. The 
experimental procedure is much more interactive: 6- and 7-year-old 
children are asked a series of belief questions which tap their 
understanding of false belief, but the aim was to encourage them to talk 
about their beliefs, desires and intentions in a debriefing session after the 
role-play. It will be seen that this aspect of the research, which 
represented perhaps the greatest potential in terms of children's vicarious 
learning, was not fully utilised because all the group members correctly 
appreciated each other's different conceptual viewpoints. This was 
confirmed in children's responses to first-and second-order belief 
questions during debriefing and in a subsequent video presentation of the 
false belief story scenario. 
The research with mainstream children described in this chapter served as 
a platform for the researcher to learn about how young children 
demonstrate social-cognitive abilities in an experimental context. The 
researcher used this to formulate learning contexts and teaching strategies 
to facilitate social-cognitive understanding in children with severe 
learning difficulties. This is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Study 1, Investigation 1-3 
The series of studies in the first investigation fall within a strict 
quantitative approach. Children are involved in test situations where the 
researcher manipulates the experimental context according to his 
hypothesis and looks at the relationship between two or more variables 
(in this case, independent variables), e. g., does the provision of 
perceptual prompts improve children's ability to predict a story 
character's behaviour according to her false belief (study 2)? Children 
either pass or fail the researcher's control and experimental questions. 
Using statistical analysis the researcher attempts to show that there is a 
significant relationship between the two variables, which in turn supports 
or rejects his hypothesis. 
As stated earlier, in these three investigations, the children play a 
relatively passive role in the task. The researcher is concerned with 
consistency in the way he presents information and the way he asks 
questions. There is a need to keep strictly to a specified procedure. The 
researcher is not at liberty to wander from his brief, the only flexibility he 
has to respond intuitively to the child is in a short acclimatisation period 
before the task, where the researcher and child familiarise themselves 
with each other and with the materials. After this, the researcher keeps to 
his procedure and controls the situation to fulfil his intentions. He 
presents children with a short story involving puppets or real actors. He 
provides a commentary of the action (this is also significant; the story 
scenario in the second investigation contains narrative and therefore is 
more dynamic) and at given points in the action, he asks the children a 
series of control and experimental questions. The researcher accepts the 
children's responses, - they are either right or wrong, and he does not 
provide feedback on their answers; this is beyond his remit. Indeed, the 
researcher's intentions probably remain a mystery to the children (and 
perhaps to many of the staff). When setting up research within a 
quantitative framework, the researcher may have some good reasons for 
not fully communicating his intentions to the subjects (or indeed the staff 
working with them), e. g., to prevent the children informing their peers 
what the experimenter is looking for, or to inhibit staff working with the 
children on similar activities. The researcher's most immediate concern 
is to use the experimental context to support or refute his hypothesis, to 
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interpret his findings, and in the longer term communicate these findings 
to a wider audience through writing a report and publication. 
Study 2 
In contrast to study 1, the researcher's intention in the second 
investigation is also to ask children a series of control and experimental 
belief questions. However, in addition to this, his intention is to provide 
children with a story scenario in which they can participate and learn 
about their own and other people's beliefs and intentions. This is 
afforded by taking video-recordings of individual children's responses to 
questions between scenes, as the story develops (as some of them actually 
experience false belief first-hand). The intention was to use these video- 
recordings as a catalyst for discussion during debriefing after the role- 
play. In this investigation, then, the research may be seen to include 
features of both quantitative and qualitative research. There are a number 
of general and specific questions relating to a hypothesis, i. e., -will 
children's involvement in drama facilitate their understanding of first-and 
second-order belief? and more specifically, as tested by control and 
experimental questions, will the method of 'split-briefing', where children 
are placed in contexts where they have first-hand experience of false 
belief, facilitate their understanding of first- and second-order belief? 
In addition to these interests, the experimenter's intention was to provide 
the pupils with a learning context, i. e., to help any children who were 
seen to find difficulty appreciating the different conceptual viewpoints of 
their peers, particularly their mental states which involve second-order 
belief attribution. This was to be achieved in discussion during 
debriefing, when video-recordings of children's responses to questions 
which represent their different conceptual and perceptual viewpoints at 
significant points in the drama could be played back to the children to 
help them'decentre'. 
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4.2 Study 1: Children's ability to predict behaviour according to 
first-order beliefs 
4.3 Introduction 
The first study consists of three separate investigations which focus on 3- 
and 4-year-old children's ability to answer questions of first-order belief 
attribution. In order to successfully answer these questions, children have 
to differentiate their own beliefs from the false beliefs of story characters, 
e. g., "Sally thinks that the marble is still in the box, but I know that it is 
really in the basket". The first study is a slight adaptation of Baron 
Cohen's (1985) false belief task. The study uses a larger sample of 
children than the Baron-Cohen investigation. The aim of this study is to 
compare the performance of children from the present larger sample size 
with the results from Baron-Cohen's original study. 
In studies 2 and 3, modifications are made to the original task in an 
attempt to improve children's performance. Study 2 substitutes real 
people for dolls and provides children with two 'perceptual' prompts. 
Study 3 attempts to simplify the false belief task by significantly reducing 
the inferential demands. 
4.4 Investigation 1: An adaptation of the 'Sally-Anne' False Belief 
task. 
Baron-Cohen's 'Sally-Ann' false belief test (Baron-Cohen, 1985) was 
designed for use with autistic children to investigate their understanding 
of other people's mental states. Compared to the original Wimmer and 
Perner (1983) task, the story scenario appears simple, the memory 
demands relatively light and the linguistic complexity limited (children 
can hypothetically respond to the memory, reality and belief questions 
non-verbally by pointing, although this is not mentioned in the 
methodology). Baron-Cohen used 27 pre-school children and found that 
85% of his 4 year-old children could successfully predict a doll's 
behaviour on the basis of her false belief (Sally will look in the basket) 
and not on the basis of their own belief (the marble is now in the box). 
Baron-Cohen found that his Down's Syndrome children (linguistic and 
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cognitive ability matched to the non-learning disabled 4 year-olds) 
performed remarkably close to the pre-school children (86%), but only 
20% of his autistic sample (again matched) passed the task. 
The aim of this study is to use the same story scenario with a slightly 
modified procedure. This version makes 3 small changes to the original 
study: 
1) The present study uses glove puppets instead of small dolls. This 
allows the experimenter to effect the transfer of the marble more easily 
and naturally; in the Baron Cohen task, the experimenter's manipulation 
of materials is more explicit, i. e., the use of dolls (which do not have the 
limbs to hold the marble) forces the experimenter to use his own hand to 
transfer the marble from one receptacle to the other. This may give the 
impression that it is the experimenter who effects the transfer (and 
therefore is controlling the action), and not the doll. Arguably, from the 
child's perspective, the experimenter's use of glove puppets may engender 
the same impression of experimenter control. (This is discussed later). 
2) In this study, different sex puppets were used instead of the same sex 
dolls in the original study. It is proposed that different sex puppets are 
easier for children to identify and differentiate during the task. 
3) In the description of the Baron-Cohen task, during the second trial, the 
experimenter transfers the marble to a different location, namely the 
experimenter's shirt pocket. Similar to item 1), if the child has to enter 
into the pretend story scenario to attribute beliefs to puppets (in order to 
pass the test, the child has to do this to appreciate Sally's false belief), it 
seems that placing the marble in the experimenter's pocket causes a 
temporary transition between the pretend world and the real world. It 
also suggests that the experimenter may be in collusion with Mike. For 
these reasons, in the second trial, Mike takes the marble out of the box 
and puts it out of view under the table. 
In summary, the aim of this study is to try to replicate Baron-Cohen's 
findings with the adaptations described above and using a larger sample. 
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4.5 Subjects 
, 
Seventy-three children from a Primary School in the London Borough of 
Bromley participated in this study. Thirty-three children were from two 
first-year infant classes (mean age = 5; 3, range = 4; 9 to 5; 8) and forty 
children from the school play group (mean age = 4; 4, range = 3; 2 to 
4; 11). Overall, 42 boys and 31 girls took part. 
4.6 Materials 
Two glove puppet protagonists, Sally and Mike. Two small receptacles: 
a plastic box with lid and a ceramic egg which divides horizontally in 
half, and a marble. 
4.7 Background 
The experimenter made 3 afternoon visits to each class prior to the 
research to familiarise himself with the children and vice-versa. The 
experimenter joined in regular classroom activities and took the classes 
for music sessions to build up a rapport with the group. When he began 
his experimental work, he left time to join in regular classroom activities 
for the last 30 minutes. 
The experimental work took place in a quiet alcove in the classroom, 
divided from the main area by a curtain. Children were collected 
individually from the main classroom area by the experimenter. The 
experimenter made audio recordings of each session. 
4.8 Procedure 
The procedure is a slight adaptation of the original Baron Cohen 'Sally- 
Ann' experiment. The children are shown the plastic box and the egg. 
The experimenter talks to the child about where he got them from, what 
they are usually used for, asking the children what they could put in 
them, etc., to familiarise and settle the child. He lifts the lid of the box 
and divides the egg to show that there is nothing inside them. The 
experimenter shows the subjects the two glove puppets and tells them 
their names. He invites the children to say "hello" to each puppet and 
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shake each puppet's hand. The experimenter checks that each child 
knows which doll is which. He says to the children: 
Identification Command: "Show me Sally" and then "Show me Mike. " 
The experimenter then manipulates the dolls and materials and provides a 
commentary as follows: 
"Sally and Mike are playing together in the classroom. Sally has a 
marble and she puts it into a plastic box and closes the lid. Then Sally 
goes out into the playground. " (The experimenter removes Sally from 
the scene and places her behind his back). "When Sally is gone, Mike 
takes the marble out of the box and puts it into the egg. " (The egg 
divides in half. When the upper half is in position, it is not possible to see 
inside). 
The experimenter then asks two control questions, the first to check for 
memory: 
Memory Question: "Where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? " 
The experimenter then asks the second control question, to check that the 
child knows where the marble really is: 
Reality Question: "And, where's the marble now, really? " 
The experimenter then brings back Sally and as he does so, he asks the 
critical Belief Question: 
Belief Question: "When Sally comes back, where will she look for the 
marble? " 
The experimenter then repeats the procedure a second time to establish 
consistency of the children's responses. In the second trial, the procedure 
is the same except that instead of Michael transferring the marble to the 
egg, he puts it under the table, on the floor. 
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4.9 Results 
If the children respond by stating that Sally will look "in the box" or point 
to the previous location of the marble, then they pass the Belief Question 
because they have appreciated the doll's false belief. If the children 
respond by saying that she will look "in the egg" or point to the marble's 
present location, then they fail the Belief Question by not taking into 
account the doll's belief. 
In order for the child to pass or fail the Belief Question, they must have 
passed the preceding control questions, the Name, Memory and Reality 
Questions. If children fail to respond correctly to the control questions, 
they are removed from the analysis. 
Six children from the school play group were distracted by the materials 
during the task. The experimenter was unable to redirect their attention 
back to the task and therefore had to abandon the procedure. Distractions 
included taking the marbles out of the receptacles, interfering with the 
puppets and the intrusion of other children. A further seven children 
from the play group failed one or more of the control questions (name, 
memory or reality questions). This left 27 children from the play group 
who passed the control questions of both trials. 
One child from a reception class failed a control question on both trials. 
She was therefore removed from the analysis leaving 32 children from 
the reception classes who passed the control questions on both trials. 
This left a total of 59 children (36 boys and 23 girls) from the original 
sample of 73 children who had passed the control questions and 
responded to the Belief Questions. These children were divided into 3 
broad age groups: 3 year-olds (age range 3; 2 to 3; 10, mean age = 3; 7, n= 
10); 4 year-olds (age range 4; 0 to 4; 11, mean age = 4; 7, n= 28) and 5 
year-olds (age range 5; 0 to 5; 8, mean age = 5; 3, no = 21). As would be 
expected, the 3-year-olds had the largest proportion of children who 
were eliminated from the sample because they were distracted from the 
task or they failed one or more of the control questions. This meant that 
the 3-year-old sample was rather small, - 10 children. The researcher had 
involved all the available 3-year-olds in the play group, so he could not 
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increase the size of this sample. (It would not have been acceptable to 
involve 3-year-olds from another play group). 
Table 1 shows the numbers and percentages of 3-, 4-and 5-year-olds 
passing the belief questions on both trials. 
Chi-square analysis revealed no sex differences in children's responses x 
= 1.32, n= 59, df = 1, p=0.25 
Table I Numbers and percentages of 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds passing the Belief 
Question on both trials in study 1 
age range mean age number pass BQ % pass BQ 
3 years 3; 2-3; 10 3; 7 10 5 50 
4 years 4; 0-4; 11 4; 7 28 18 64 
5 years 5; 0-5; 8 5; 3 21 18 86 
4.10 Discussion 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) devised the first false belief story scenario. 
This task was criticised for its complexity both in narrative structure and 
plot (Chandler et al, 1988; De Gelder, 1990). Wimmer and Perner found 
that none of their 3 year-old children (age range 3; 1 to 3; 9) could pass a 
belief question indicating that they could predict a character's behaviour 
according to her false belief. In the Baron-Cohen 'Sally-Ann version the 
author collapsed his sample of children into a single group (age-range 3; 5 
to 5; 9, mean 4; 5) so it is not possible to make a direct comparison of the 
performance of his 3 year-olds and the 3 year-olds in this study. 
However, even though there were only ten 3-year-olds in the present 
study, 50% of them were able to successfully attribute first-order beliefs 
to story characters compared to no 3 year-olds in the Wimmer and Perner 
study (in response, of course, to a different false belief task). 
Baron-Cohen reports that 85% of his group of twenty seven 4 year-olds 
(which represent, in fact, a mixture of 3,4 and 5 year-olds; children 
ranging from 3; 5 to 5; 9, mean age 4; 5) passed his Belief Question on two 
trials. When the complete sample of fifty- nine children in the present 
study are collapsed into roughly the same age range (3; 2 to 5; 8 mean age 
4; 8), 70% of the children passed the Belief Question on two trials. This 
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represents a slightly poorer performance of the children in the present 
study compared to Baron-Cohen's children. However, a direct 
comparison cannot be made because 1) the present study represents a 
slight adaptation of the Baron-Cohen procedure, and 2) a much larger 
sample of children is used (when the age ranges are collapsed, there are 
over twice the number of children in the present study). 
In investigation 1, it is proposed that there may be a number of 
methodological and conceptual difficulties which may militate against 
children demonstrating their true ability to attribute first-order belief, i. e., 
in this context, successfully predicting Sally's behaviour according to her 
false belief. The first difficulty may be to do with experimenter control. 
Although it has been proposed that the substitution of dolls by glove 
puppets may, from the child's perspective, reduce the overall impression 
that the experimenter is directing the sequence of events, this element of 
experimenter control may still represent to the child a serious distraction 
from a pretend scenario. We shall see that children must enter 
(wholeheartedly) into the pretend scenario in order to answer the belief 
question from Sally's perspective. An analogy to this difficulty is when 
mother and young child are involved in pretend dialogue and mother slips 
out of pretend mode (or when the child thinks that mother has slipped 
out). Young children may find temporary suspension of pretence (by the 
interference of reality) problematic. For example, when mother and child 
enter into pretend dialogue, if mother invites the young child to wipe up 
an imaginary mess of pretend tea, the child may interpret this as a 
reference to reality and struggle to maintain the pretence 10. It is possible 
that the experimenter's manipulation of materials and his overall control 
may, from the child's perspective, represent a distracting interference of 
reality and may lead to similar suspensions of pretence. 
It is possible that the way the experimenter controls the sequence of 
events may also make it difficult for children to differentiate between 
Sally's knowledge base (Sally thinks that the marble is in the box) and the 
experimenter's knowledge base (the experimenter knows that the marble 
is in the egg). The child is aware that the experimenter is controlling 
10 Harris (1992) would see this as the child slipping out of the pretend 
mode, - where he or she falls back on the default setting of current reality (see page 50 of this thesis). 
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Sally. When she sees him bringing Sally back, she may have difficulty 
differentiating his state of mind from Sally's state of mind. She may 
assume that because the experimenter knows that the marble has been 
moved, then Sally will also know. This may prompt the child to answer 
the Belief Question from the experimenter's perspective rather than 
Sally's. 
Another related difficulty is the powerful influence that the experimenter 
has on children's responses. Donaldson (1978) wrote about how young 
children provide the answers that they think the experimenter wants to 
hear. It could be that if someone else other than the experimenter who 
was seen to manipulate the sequence of events, rather like the 'Naughty 
Teddy' episode to which Donaldson refers (McGarrigle and Donaldson, 
1974), then 'experimenter bias' may be reduced. 
Yet another factor which may make it difficult for children to engage in 
the make-believe world of the story (and in fact, from the child's 
perspective may make it less plausible) is the absence of narrative. The 
fact that the experimenter provides a commentary on the sequence of 
events (in addition to his manipulation of the action) may reinforce to the 
child that the story characters are under his control; they are not masters 
of their own destiny11. This may have an influence on the way children 
engage with the story scenario when they are asked the Belief Question. 
Perhaps the greatest potential difficulty in using puppets or dolls in an 
experimental context such as this is if children do not consider them to be 
'thinking' or 'perceiving' entities. It is feasible that children regard 
puppets as inanimate objects which are not capable of thought or 
perception. If this is so, then a belief question about a puppet's 
conceptual or perceptual viewpoint may be confusing for a child, or 
dismissed by the child as unrealistic 12. 
One way of eliminating all the potential difficulties described above is to 
substitute real people for puppets, who may not be considered to be under 
such explicit experimenter control; who may be seen to be more 
11 This aspect of narrative, the illocutionary force of characters speaking for themselves, is discussed in investigation 3. 
12 The way that young children engage spontaneously in pretend play 
with dolls suggests that this is unlikely. 
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autonomous13 and who, necessarily, will be regarded as having thoughts 
and perceptions. 
Finally, another potential difficulty in the pretend scenario is that when 
the experimenter removes Sally from the scene and puts her behind his 
back, the child may think that she can still hear and perhaps see the 
ensuing action. After all, the puppet is still within a few feet of Mike. If 
this is the case, then the child may consider that Sally is aware of the 
marble's transfer and what the experimenter considers as an incorrect 
response to the Belief Question (Sally will look in the egg), from the 
child's perspective, will be the correct response. In study two, the 
experimenter will provide two perceptual prompt questions ("Nina has 
gone right away. Can Nina see us? Can Nina hear us? "). These 
questions are considered to be prompt questions because they may 
emphasise to the child that the assistant taking Sally's part in study 2 has 
gone right away and therefore is not witness to the marble's transfer. 
These perception prompt questions represent two further control 
questions. Children must answer these questions correctly before their 
responses to the Belief Question can be considered for analysis. 
4.11 Investigation 2: Substitution of real actors in place of puppets in 
the false belief task 
This study uses the same false belief framework as the previous study. 
The principal differences arel) that people take the place of dolls (the 
experimenter and an assistant), and 2) two perceptual prompt questions 
are included before the name, memory, control and belief questions. 
4.12 Subjects 
Forty-eight 3-and 4-year-old children participated in this study. None of 
these children had participated in the previous study. The children were 
taken from a parallel play group in the same school. The children's ages 
ranged from 3; 0 to 4; 9. 
13 It will be argued later that in most experimental contexts, children 
probably believe that the experimenter is in collusion with his or her 
assistants. 
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4.13 Materials 
The same plastic box, ceramic egg and marble as used in the previous 
study. 
4.14 Background 
As in the previous study, the experimenter made 3 afternoon visits to the 
play group prior to the research and engaged in similar activities with the 
children to familiarise them with his presence. In this study, the 
experimenter used an assistant in the procedure. This person was a 
familiar person to the children in the play group. She was a paid worker 
in the play group and was a parent of one of the children. The 
experimenter and assistant worked in an adjacent classroom (two classes 
had been knocked into one) which had its own door. This area was 
divided from the adjacent area by a curtain. The experimenter and 
assistant had sole use of this area. 
The experimenter made audio recordings of each session. 
4.15 Procedure 
Children were collected individually from the main classroom area by the 
experimenter and assistant. The child sits opposite the experimenter and 
beside the assistant. The experimenter first checks that the child is 
familiar with the assistant's name. He says, "This is Nina. You know 
Nina, don't you? " He then shows the child the box and the egg as in the 
previous study. Before the action begins, the experimenter asks the first 
control question, the Name Question. He says: 
Name Question: "I want you to watch and listen carefully.... (pause, the 
experimenter falters as if he has forgotten the assistant's name) What is 
this lady's name? ...... Yes, Nina is going to show you something.... " 
The assistant takes a marble out of her pocket, saying, "In my pocket, I've 
got a marble. I've got to go back to the other children for a while, so I'm 
going to put it in the box for safe keeping. " The assistant puts the marble 
in the box, closes the lid and leaves by the classroom door. She closes 
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the door behind her. The experimenter then poses the two Perception 
Questions. He asks in a low voice, 
Perception Question 1: "Now, Nina has gone. Can she see us? " 
Perception Question 2: "Can Nina hear us? " 
The experimenter then says, "Now that Nina has gone, I'm going to take 
her marble out of the box and put it in the egg. " He does this and then 
asks the following memory, reality and belief questions: 
Memory Question: "Where did Nina put the marble in the beginning? " 
Reality Question: "Where is the marble now, really? " 
The experimenter then points to the door and asks: 
Belief Question: "When Nina comes back, where will she look for the 
marble? " 
The assistant comes back and the scenario is repeated, as in the previous 
study, with the experimenter putting the ball under the table. 
4.16 Results 
Four children did not complete the task because they were distracted by 
the materials or were in some way uncooperative. None of the children 
failed the Name Question or the Perception Questions. Sixteen children 
failed one or more of the Memory or Reality Questions. This left 28 
children who passed all the control questions on both trials and who 
responded to the Belief Question. 
The remaining sample consisted of 17 boys and 11 girls (age range 3; 0 to 
4; 9, mean age 3; 11). 
Table 2 shows the percentages of 3 and 4 year-olds passing the Belief 
Questions on both trials. 
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Chi-square analysis revealed no sex differences in children's responses, x 
=3.37, n=28, p=0.067. 
Table 2 Numbers and percentages of 3-, and 4-year-olds passing the Belief Question 
on both trials in study 2 
age range mean age number pass BQ % pass BQ 
3 years 3; 0-3; 11 3; 6 14 9 64 
4 years 4; 0-4; 9 4; 5 14 11 79 
Although the sample size and the age-ranges of the 3-and 4-year-old 
children were not matched in both studies, more 3-and 4-year-olds passed 
the belief questions in study 2 than in the previous study. 64% and 79% 
of 3-and 4-year-olds respectively passed the 2 belief questions compared 
to 50% and 64% of 3-and 4-year-olds in study 1. Table 3 provides a 
comparison of the results from the two studies. Study 2 utilised real 
people instead of puppets and included two perception control questions. 
The 4-year-olds ability to respond to belief questions in study 2 appears 
to be better than similar aged children in study 1. 
Table 3: Combined results of 3-and 4-year-old children passing the Belief Questions 
in studies 1 and 2. 
age range mean age number ass BQ % pass BQQ 
3 year-old 3; 2-3; 10 3; 7 10 5 50 
-puppet 3 year-old 3; 0-3; 11 3; 6 14 9 64 
people 
4 year-old 4; 0-4; 11 4; 7 28 18 64 
u et 
4 year-old 4; 0-4; 9 4; 5 14 11 79 
_people 
Applying a Chi-Square Test and a Fisher's Exact Test to the combined 
and separated performance of 3-and 4-year-old children in studies 1 and 2 
indicates that the substitution of real people for dolls and the inclusion of 
perceptual prompts did not significantly improve children's ability to 
-answer belief attribution questions. A Chi-square test of the 3 and 4 year- 
olds' performance across studies 1 and 2 shows X=0.844, df = 1, p= 
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0.358. A Fisher's Exact Test14 (One-Tail) on the 3 year-olds' and the 4- 
year-olds' performance across studies 1 and 2 shows p=0.389 and p= 
0.282 respectively. 
4.17 Discussion 
Statistical analysis of the performance of 3-and 4-year-old children in 
studies 1 and 2 indicates that there appears to be no significant difference 
in children's ability to predict the behaviour of characters according to 
their false belief. In other words, when children are provided with 
perception prompt questions and are then asked to predict the behaviour 
of real people (investigation 1) children did not perform significantly 
differently from similar aged children responding to questions about 
puppets without perception prompt questions. 
In the first study, the size of the 3-year-old sample was seriously 
diminished by children being distracted by the materials and failure of the 
control questions. Statistical analysis is limited and with a sample size of 
less than 12 any findings should be regarded as tentative. Even though a 
comparison of the results of the 3-and 4-year-old children in studies 1 and 
2 indicate a trend towards improved performance in the second study, the 
Chi-Square and Fisher's Exact Test measures the discrepancy between the 
actual results and those expected by chance. In this case, it seems that the 
difference between the two sets of results was caused by chance factors 
rather than the independent variable, i. e., the provision of perception 
prompts and the use of real people. 
4.18 Investigation 3: Reducing the inferential demands of the false 
belief task 
In the previous studies, success on the false belief task requires that the 
child correctly infers that because Sally or the assistant did not see Mike 
or the experimenter transfer the marble from the box to the egg, she 
14 The Fisher Exact test was used in comparing samples age for age because 
the xx tables consisted of 2 rows and 2 columns with small expected frequences. 
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(Sally or assistant) does not know that the marble has changed locations. 
Wimmer et al (1988) speculated that this inferred-belief demand may be 
the basis of children's difficulties with the false belief task. In this study, 
the procedure is adapted in an attempt to reduce the inferential demands 
of the task. This is done in two ways. Firstly, after Sally has left the 
scene, the experimenter substitutes the perceptual prompt questions in 
study 2 with a perceptual prompt statement: "Sally has gone right away. 
She can't see or hear what's going to happen, next. " It is proposed that in 
addition to providing the child with a perceptual prompt, this statement 
serves to heighten children's expectations that something is about to 
happen which warrants close attention. Secondly, the experimenter 
hopes to reduce the inferred-belief requirement by explicitly telling the 
child about Sally's unchanged state of mind. When Mike takes the 
marble out of the box and puts it in the egg, the experimenter points in 
the direction of Sally and says, "Sally did not see that. She thinks that the 
ball is still in the box. " 
In this study, the researcher will only include 3-year-old children in his 
sample. This is because of the shortage of 4-year-olds in the parallel play 
group. It is proposed that any differences of performance attributable to 
changes in the experimental design will be shown by this age-group. 
In summary, the hypothesis to be tested in this study is that heightening 
the child's expectations of ensuing foul play and making explicit to the 
child Sally's perceptual and conceptual viewpoint ("Sally did not see that" 
and "Sally thinks the marble is in the box", respectively) will improve 
children's performance in the false belief task. 
4.19 Subjects 
Twenty-six 3-year-old children from a play group in the same school (14 
boys and 12 girls). These children had not participated in the previous 2 
studies. The children were aged between 3; 1 to 3,11 years. 
4.20 Materials 
The same marble, plastic box, egg and puppets as study 1. 
101 
4.21 Background 
The same number of preliminary visits as in the previous two studies. As 
in study 1, the experimenter worked alone in a quiet, curtained off alcove 
connected to the main classroom. 
The experimenter made audio recordings of each session. 
4.22 Procedure 
The procedure follows along identical lines as experiment 1 up to the 
point when the experimenter removes Sally. This time, he gets up and 
takes Sally away from the scene and puts her 5 metres away, around the 
corner of another alcove. The experimenter then says as he sits down, 
"Sally has gone right away. (In a rather sinister voice) "She can't see or 
hear what's going to happen next. " Mike transfers the marble from the 
box into the egg. The experimenter then points in the direction of where 
he put Sally and says, "Sally did not see that. She thinks the ball is in the 
box. " The control and belief questions follow and the scenario is 
repeated as in study 1. 
4.23 Results 
Of the 26 in the original sample, 2 children did not complete the task 
because they were distracted by the materials or were in some way 
uncooperative. 12 children failed one or more of the Memory or Reality 
Questions. This left 14 children who passed all the control questions on 
both trials and who responded to the Belief Question. 
The remaining sample consisted of 6 boys and 8 girls (age range 3; 0 to 
3; 11, mean age 3; 7). 
Table 4 shows the number and percentage of 3 year-olds passing the 
Belief Questions on both trials in study 3. 
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Table 4 Number und percentage of 3-year-old passing the Belief Question on both 
trials in study 3 
age range mean age number ass BQ % pass BQ 
3 years 3; 0-3; 11 3; 7 14 5 36 
Compared to the previous two investigations (the mean ages are 
comparable), the successful responses of the 3-year-olds to the belief 
questions in this study is surprisingly low; 36% pass rate compared to 
50% and 64% in studies I and 2 respectively. Table 5 provides a 
comparison of the performance of the 3-year-old children in all three 
studies. However, we are reminded of the low sample size in study 1; 
replication of these experiments with larger samples would need to be 
undertaken to attach greater weight to these findings. Chi-square analysis 
of the performance of the 3-year-olds in studies 1,2 and 3 confirms the 
need to be cautious about the significance of these results (X = 2.29, df = 
2, p=0.32). 
Table 5 Combined results of the 3- year-old children passing the Belief Questions in 
studies 1,2 and 3. 
age range mean age number pass BQ % Pass BQ 
3 year-old 3; 2-3; 10 3; 7 10 5 50 
stud 1 
3 year-old 3; 0-3; 11 3; 6 14 9 64 
stud 2 
3 year-old 3; 0-3; 11 3; 7 14 5 36 
stud 3 
4.24 Discussion 
Results of the 3-year-old children's performance in this study suggest that 
providing children with a perceptual prompt statement ("Sally has gone 
right away. She can't see or hear what's going to happen, next") and 
making explicit to the child Sally's perceptual and conceptual viewpoint 
("Sally did not see that" and "Sally thinks the marble is in the box", 
respectively) did not improve children's performance in the false belief 
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task. In fact, results indicate a trend that children may perform worse in 
false belief tasks when offered these perceptual and conceptual clues. 
It is possible that such prompts may in fact overload the child with 
additional information which may be distracting to the child. 
Alternatively, the child might wonder why the experimenter is supplying 
such explicit information; the child may think that there is some kind of a 
catch, and the answer that the experimenter wants to hear is not the most 
obvious one. 
These questions, and others, would need to be considered if and when the 
same trends were observed following a replication of the same 
experiment using a larger sample of children. For the statistical analysis 
of the results of this study when compared to the previous two indicate 
that the perceptual and conceptual prompts given to children in this 
experiment did not significantly improve or impede the performance of 
children's ability to answer the false belief question. 
4.25 Conclusion 
The three studies described above suggest how resilient the generic false 
belief prediction task is to facilitation. The manipulations to the 
experimental procedure in the three studies, i. e., using real people instead 
of puppets and the provision of perceptual and conceptual prompts do not 
appear to make the tasks easier for young children. If children are going 
to fail the belief question in study 1, they would be likely to fail the belief 
questions if they were involved in studies 2 or 3. This imperviousness to 
simplification seems to support the general findings from similar 
adaptations of the false belief task reviewed in chapter 3. 
The intentions of the researcher in this first major study was to try to 
facilitate children's first-order belief attribution by adapting and 
simplifying the task. His hypotheses in studies 1-3 were rejected by 
statistical analysis. This was disappointing, for, as stated elsewhere in 
this thesis, the researcher felt that the traditional false belief task was 
underestimating or indeed masking children's true ability to attribute first- 
order (false) beliefs to others. The researcher had hoped that reducing 
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some of the inferential demands would ease the representational demands 
and enable the younger children in the sample to demonstrate their ability 
to successfully predict a character's behaviour according to her false 
belief. 
In his work with the children in studies 1-3, the researcher was struck by 
the potential that a false belief story scenario affords to talk about 
characters' mental states, - their beliefs, desires and intentions. What was 
common to all three studies was the researcher's frustration with the 
constraints of a test situation. When children responded incorrectly to the 
belief question, the researcher often wanted to intervene, to sensitively 
invite the child to justify his or her response and then perhaps to talk 
about the different belief perspectives of the different characters. The 
researcher's teaching background heightened this feeling of frustration; 
working within a test situation necessarily led to missed learning 
opportunities. 
The author's recognition of the potential of the false belief task when 
used outside a test situation in a teaching context motivated the 
researcher to devise a more interactive way of working with children 
using a new story scenario. The aim of the second study would be to 
investigate children's understanding of first-and second-order false belief, 
but within a context which would allow the participants to learn about the 
different perceptual and conceptual viewpoints of their peers. Study 2 
was devised to offer the researcher opportunities to 'scaffold' (Bruner, 
1975) children's understanding of the different belief perspectives of 
characters in a false belief story scenario. 
4.26 Study 2: Children's ability to predict behaviour according to 
first-and second-order beliefs 
4.27 Introduction 
This purpose of this investigation is to use drama as a medium in which 
to encourage children to mentalise, i. e., to understand and predict 
people's behaviour by appreciation of their mental states. In particular, 
the storyline and questions used in this study encourage children to attend 
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to and predict their peers' behaviour according to first-and second-order 
beliefs. 
Drama is an area which has been neglected in the plethora of past and 
present research into children's developing 'theories of mind'. In the same 
way that theatre appeals to our 'folk psychology', drama may be regarded 
as a powerful medium within which to encourage children to appreciate 
the mental states of others. It is proposed that drama can provide young 
children with an ecologically valid medium in which they can experience 
false belief, and then talk about their own and other story characters' 
beliefs, desires and intentions during a group debriefing. A dramatic 
technique called'split-briefing'is used to place children in contexts where 
they experience false belief first hand. It is proposed that simulation of 
false belief in this manner offers a potentially more powerful method of 
investigating children's understanding of false belief than in the more 
contrived experimental scenarios such as the one described in the 
previous study. 
In this study, the researcher seeks to investigate and, where appropriate, 
intervene to facilitate 6-and 7-year-old children's understanding of their 
own beliefs and those of their peers. This can be achieved using video- 
recordings of individual children's interviews, when children are asked a 
series of belief questions between scenes and during intervals. These 
video-recordings can be used in a debriefing session when the children 
are encouraged to discuss their states of mind at critical stages of the plot. 
Previous research (such as that reviewed in chapter 3) has indicated that 
children of 6 and 7 years are able to attribute first-and second-order 
beliefs. However, to the author's knowledge, there have been no studies 
which have used role-play to involve children directly in a story scenario. 
It is hypothesised that the technique of 'split-briefing', where children 
actually experience false belief (first-hand) may be a powerful medium in 
which to focus children's attention upon their own belief perspectives and 
those of other people. The advantages of using video-recordings of both 
the action on stage and of individual interviews is that, during debriefing, 
it allows the researcher to question, reinforce, and focus the children's 
attention on the different states of mind of the characters at critical stages 
in the plot, e. g., when Mike is 'off stage' during scenes 2, he still thinks 
106 
that the marble is in the vase, when in fact Sally, unbeknown to him, has 
moved it from the vase to a dish on a sideboard. For children who might 
find belief attribution (especially, second-order false belief) difficult, 
freeze-framing of video at critical points can offer the researcher valuable 
opportunities to help children appreciate the conceptual perspectives of 
others. 
A pre-recorded video presentation of the same story (created by the 
researcher specifically for this investigation) will be shown to the 
children the following week. This video shows the entire action and can 
be stopped by the researcher at critical points (and replayed if necessary 
to provide memory prompts) to allow the researcher to ask each child the 
whole range of control and belief questions. It will become clear that 
when the children are involved in drama, either as actors or observers, at 
specific points in the action, they are asked selected questions. The pre- 
recorded video presentation allows the researcher to ask the subjects the 
complete range of questions. It also allows him to check individual 
children's responses for consistency. 
4.28 Subjects 
A group of eight 6-and 7-year-old children (4 boys and 4 girls) 
participated in this study. These children attended the same primary 
school as the children from the previous study. 
4.29 Background 
The researcher, assistant and a video-cameraman were introduced to the 
group by the classroom teacher a week before the experimentation. On 
this occasion, the researcher and his assistant did some introductory 
drama work with the group to familiarise themselves with each other. 
'Warm-up' activities were filmed and included some role-play and 
improvisation to orientate the children towards future work. The school 
hall and stage were made available for use. The school was very well 
equipped for drama. The stage was prepared with all the necessary 
fixtures and props, for example a door was placed to one side of the 
stage, boxes were covered with painted cloths to represent a television, 
etc. On the second week, the session commenced with some brief 'warm- 
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up' activities. The main experimental work then commenced as described 
below. The main action and the interviews were video-recorded. 
4.30 Procedure 
The children were given a brief introduction to the casting arrangements 
and the setting in which the drama was based. 
Five of this group were asked to assume the roles of the story characters 
and three of them were observers. Figure 1 gives a summary of the story 
scenario and the memory, reality and belief questions (asked 
individually). 
Figurel: Summary of Doll's House Story 
Scene 1 
Sally and Mike are playing marbles in the living room. 
One of the marbles rolls under the sofa. Mike finds a large, 
'special' marble under the sofa. They both claim that it is 
their marble and argue about who should keep it. Sally 
snatches the marble from Mike and puts it in her toy box. 
They continue to argue. 
(Enter Mum). Mother comes in to see what the noise is all 
about. She tells them off and sends Sally out to play in the 
garden and asks Mike to clear up the mess in the living 
room. (Exit Sally and Mum). While Mike is alone, he takes 
the marble out of Sally's toy box and hides it in a vase on 
the window-sill. (Exit Mike). 
Experimenter 1's questions to Mike (off stage, during 
interval) 
Memory Question: Where did Sally put the marble in the 
beginning? (box) 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? (vase) 
1st order Belief Question: When Sally comes back later to 
get the marble, where will she look for it? (box) 
Experimenter 2's questions to observers: 
Memory Question: Where did Sally put the marble in the 
beginning? 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
1st order Belief Question: When Sally comes back later to 
get the marble, where will she look for it? 
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Scene 2 
(Enter Sally). Sally comes into the living room with some 
flowers. She is very surprised to see the marble in the 
vase. She realises that Mike has taken the marble out of 
her toy box and hidden it in the vase. She takes it out of the 
vase and puts it in a dish on the sideboard. But she is so 
engrossed in arranging the flowers, she forgets about the 
marble and leaves it in the dish on the sideboard. (Exit 
Sally). 
Experimenter 1's questions to Sally (off stage, during 
interval): 
Memory Question: While you were out in the garden, what 
do you think Mike did with the marble? (put marble in 
vase) 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? (dish) 
1st order Belief Question: When Mike comes back later to 
get the marble, where will he look for it? (vase) 
Experimenter 2's questions to observers: 
Memory Question: When Sally was outside in the garden, 
what did Mike do with the marble? 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
1st order Belief Question: When Mike comes back later to 
get the marble, where will he look for it? 
Scene 3 
Mum, Dad, Sally and Mike are watching television. (Enter 
Tom the cat). Everybody is so busy watching the television 
that they don't see what Tom the cat does. He jumps up onto 
the sideboard and knocks the marble out of the dish. The 
marble drops to the floor and rolls underneath a table. 
Mum, Dad, Sally and Mike all go up to bed. Sally and Mike have forgotten all about the marble. 
Scene 4 
Sally wakes up in the middle of the night. She remembers 
that she has left the marble downstairs. She goes 
downstairs to get the marble. 
Experimenter 1's questions to Sally (during briefing, 
before scene 4): 
Memory Question: Where will you look for the marble? 
(dish) 
Experimenter 2's questions to observers: 
1st order Belief Question: Where will Sally look for the 
marble? (dish) 
Reality Question: Where is the marble, really? (under 
table) 
As she gets halfway across the living room floor, she hears a noise behind her. She turns around to see Mike 
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watching her from the doorway. Mike has also got up in 
the middle of the night to get the marble. 
Experimenter 1's question to Mike (during interval, off 
stage): 
1st order Belief Question: When you were watching Sally 
from the doorway, where did you think that she would look 
for the marble? (box) 
Experimenter 2's questions to observers: 
2nd order belief question: Where does Mike think that 
Sally will look for the marble? 
But before Sally and Mike can say or do anything they see 
Dad coming down the stairs. He has heard a noise 
downstairs. He sees Mike and Sally in the living room. He 
tells them both off for being downstairs in the middle of 
the night and sends them straight to bed. 
Scene 5 (described to children, but not acted) 
Mike is laying awake in bed. He intends to get up early the 
next morning to get the marble. He wonders if Sally will 
get up earlier than him the next morning to look for the 
marble. 
Experimenter 1's questions to Mike (off stage, after 
performance): 
1st order Belief Question: If Sally does manage to get up 
before you tomorrow morning, where will she look for the 
marble? (box) 
Experimenter 2's question to observers: 
1st order Belief Question: If Sally does manage to get up 
before Mike the next morning, where will she look for the 
marble? (dish) 
2nd order Belief Question: If Sally does manage to get up 
before Mike the next morning, where does Mike think that 
Sally will look for the marble? (box) 
Sally is laying awake in bed. She also intends to get up 
early the next morning to get the marble. She wonders if 
Mike will get up earlier than her the next morning to look 
for the marble. 
Experimenter 1's questions to Sally (off stage, after 
performance): 
ist order Belief Question: If Mike does manage to get up 
before you tomorrow morning, where will he look for the 
marble? (vase) 
Experimenter 2's question to observers: 
ist order Belßef Question: If Mike does manage to get up 
before Sally the next morning, where will he look for the 
marble? (vase) 
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2nd order Belief Question: If Mike does manage to get up 
earlier than Sally the next morning, where does Sally 
think that Mike will look for the marble? (vase) 
First-and second-order belief questions require answers requiring first- 
and second-order belief attribution e. g., "Sally thinks the marble is in the 
box" (1st-order) and "Mike thinks that Sally thinks that the marble is in 
the box" (2nd-order). 
The researcher and assistant 'split-briefed' the characters individually 
about their parts, scene by scene. Figure 2 provides an example of Sally's 
'split-briefing' ( appendix 1 contains all the characters' briefings). 'Split- 
briefing' means that characters were briefed on their part and only their 
part. Children were not given a script because of the unnecessary 
demands upon literacy and memory. However, the researcher and 
assistant gave them examples of the kind of things that they may say. 
The plot is considered to be simple enough to allow children to improvise 
and children had demonstrated their ability to do this in the 'warm-up' 
activities. 
Figure 2 Briefing for Sally 
You are playing marbles in the living room with your 
brother Mike. One of the marbles rolls under the sofa. 
When Mike looks for it he finds a big 'special' marble that 
you lost a few weeks ago. It's your marble, you bought it in 
the sweet shop down the road. Mike says it's his marble 
and that Daddy gave it to him. He must be mistaken. You 
start to fight over this marble. You don't want Mike to 
have it. You snatch the marble away from Mike and put it 
in your toy box which is in the corner of the living room. 
Mike continues to argue with you saying it is his marble. 
Mum comes in to see what all the noise is about. She gets 
cross with you and Mike. She tells you to go out and play in 
the garden and tells Mike to clear up the toys on the living 
room floor. You go out into the garden to play. 
Scene 2 
You come back into the living room with some flowers that 
you have picked in the garden. You go over to the 
window ledge to put them in a vase. As you are about to 
put them in, you are surprised to see your marble in the 
bottom of the vase. Mike has obviously taken it out of your 
toy box and hidden it there. You take the marble out of the 
vase and put it in a dish on the sideboard while you put the 
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flowers in the vase. However, you are so busy arranging 
the flowers that you forget about the marble. You leave 
the marble in the dish on the sideboard and go out in the 
kitchen to find Mum. 
Scene 3 
Later that day after tea, you are sitting with Mike, Mum 
and Dad watching 'Top of the Pops'. At the end of 'Top of 
the Pops' you and Mike have to go up to bed. You say 
goodnight to everyone and go up to your bedroom. You are 
very tired and you fall asleep quickly. 
Scene 4 
In the middle of the night you wake up. You suddenly 
remember about the marble. You get out of bed and creep 
downstairs to find it. As you get half-away across the 
living room, you hear a noise behind you. You turn 
around and see Mike watching you from the doorway. But 
before you are able to do or say anything, you both see Dad 
coming down the stairs. He has heard some noises 
downstairs and has come down to see what's going on. He 
sees you and Mike and tells you both off. He sends you both 
straight back up to bed. 
Scene 5 
You lie awake in bed thinking about your marble. 
This method of 'split-briefing' offered a certain amount of realism to the 
plot. For, although each character had learned a little about the plot from 
the general introduction, that they were each to play a family member, or 
a cat, and that the scene began in the living room of a house, etc., they 
were still kept in the dark about what everybody was going to do. In this 
way, the children did not know about the other characters' intentions. 
However, another dramatic device was used, which increased the mystery 
and added further realism to the plot. When each actor had played their 
part, they were asked to go 'off stage', and sit behind a screen positioned 
at the other end of the hall, right away from the action. (The cameraman 
supervised them to ensure that they could neither see nor hear the other 
characters play their parts). This meant that not only did the characters 
not know about each others' briefings (so they were kept in the dark about 
the plot), but when they were 'off-stage', they did not know what each 
other would be doing. Unlike conventional actors, who have read the 
complete script and know about everybody's parts and roles, these 
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dramatists only knew about their own individual roles, and this 
knowledge was only built up scene by scene after their briefing. 
This meant that individual characters had their own unique belief 
perspective according to what they did, saw and knew. (This did not, of 
course, stop them predicting what might be happening on stage in their 
absence; this added to the dramatic realism). These two dramatic devices 
('split-briefing' and 'off staging') meant that the characters (especially 
Sally and Mike) would experience false belief first-hand. For example, 
Mike would genuinely think that Sally would think that the marble was 
still in the box. The observers, who watched all the action on stage, 
would have a very different assessment of each character's mental state; 
and they were asked individually a series of control and belief questions 
(see figure 1). 
After the actors had played their parts (as they went off stage, and in 
some cases before they went back on), they were interviewed 
individually about their beliefs (see figure 1). The actors were 
interviewed again after the final act (their beliefs were expected to 
change as the events unfolded on stage). These interviews were video- 
recorded (as was all the live action 'on stage'). Then, all the characters 
came together to watch the video of the complete plot. Children were 
then encouraged to reflect upon their own false beliefs according to their 
ignorance of certain events at critical points in the plot. 
The following week, the 8 children watched a video of the same story 
scenario performed by puppets. The experimenter stopped the video at 
critical points and asked the children to write down their answers to the 
complete range of control and belief questions. During the drama 
session, the actors were only asked specific control and belief questions. 
Only the observers were asked the complete range of questions. 
4.31 Results 
Figure 3 shows the actors' and observers' responses to the memory, 
reality and belief questions. The appropriate responses are shown in 
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brackets. The children's correct and incorrect responses are signified 
with a&x. 
Figure 3: Children's responses to the memory, reality and belie, f questions in the 
drama session. 
Scene 1 
Experimenter 1's questions to Mike (off stage, during 
interval) 
1. Memory Question: Where did Sally put the marble in the 
beginning? (box ) 
2. Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
(vase) 
3. Ist order Belief Question: When Sally comes back later to 
get the marble, where will she look for it? (box ) 
Experimenter 2's questions to 3 observers: 
4. Memory Question: Where did Sally put the marble in the 
beginning? (box ) 
5. Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
(vase ) 
6.1st order Belief Question: When Sally comes back later to 
get the marble, where will she look for it? (box ) 
Scene 2 
Experimenter 1's questions to Sally (off stage, during 
interval): 
7 Memory Question: While you were out in the garden, 
what do you think Mike did with the marble? (put marble 
in vase ) 
8. Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
(dish) 
9. Ist order Belief Question: When Mike comes back later to 
get the marble, where will he look for it? (vase ) 
Experimenter 2's questions to 3 observers: 
10. Memory Question: When Sally was outside in the 
garden, what did Mike do with the marble? (put marble in 
vase ) 
11.1st order Belief Question: When Mike comes back later 
to get the marble, where will he look for it? (vase ) 
12. Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
(dish) 
Scene 4 
Experimenter 1's questions to Sally (during briefing, 
before scene 4): 
13. Memory Question: Where will you look for the marble? 
(dish ) 
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Experimenter 2's questions to observers: 
14.1st order Belief Question: Where will Sally look for the 
marble? (dish X) 
15. Reality Question: Where is the marble, really? (under 
table ) 
Experimenter 1's question to Mike (during interval, off 
stage): 
16.1st order Belief Question: When you were watching 
Sally from the doorway, where did you think that she 
would look for the marble? (box ) 
Experimenter 2's questions to observers: 
17.2nd order belief question: Where does Mike think that 
Sally will look for the marble? (box) 
Scene 5 (described to children, but not acted) 
Experimenter 1's questions to Mike (off stage, after 
performance): 
18.1st order Belief Question: If Sally does manage to get up 
before you tomorrow morning, where will she look for the 
marble? (box ) 
Experimenter 2's question to observers: 
19.1st order Belief Question: If Sally does manage to get up 
before Mike the next morning, where will she look for the 
marble? (dish X) 
20.2nd order Belief Question: If Sally does manage to get up 
before Mike the next morning, where does Mike think that 
Sally will look for the marble? (box ) 
Experimenter 1's questions to Sally (off stage, after 
performance): 
21.1st order Belief Question: If Mike does manage to get up 
before you tomorrow morning, where will he look for the 
marble? (vase ) 
Experimenter 2's question to observers: 
22.1st order Belief Question: If Mike does manage to get up 
before Sally the next morning, where will he look for the 
marble? (vase ) 
23.2nd order Belief Question: If Mike does manage to get up 
earlier than Sally the next morning, where does Sally 
think that Mike will look for the marble? (vase ) 
24. Reality Question: Where is the marble, really? (under 
table ) 
As was expected, the actors' responses were correct to all control and 
belief questions. One of the 3 observers answered questions 14 and 19 
incorrectly. His response to both these first-order belief questions was 
that Sally would look for the marble in the box. It is proposed that this 
child, who consistently gave the same answer, although at different times 
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(scenes 4 and 5), to essentially the same question probably experienced 
difficulty keeping pace with the plot. This is because he had answered 
the reality question (question 12 the marble is now really in the dish) 
correctly after scene 2. This suggests that by scene 4, he may have 
forgotten that Sally had transferred the marble from the vase into the 
dish. This indicates that one of the children in the sample had difficulty 
keeping up with the complexity of the plot. It is interesting that when the 
same child saw the puppet video presentation of the story, he answered 
questions 14 and 19 correctly. It seems the video had reminded him that 
Sally had temporarily put the marble in the dish. 
After the drama activity, children participated in a debriefing session 
when they shared with each other what they had done and what they had 
thought at various stages in the plot. The experimenter, assistant and 
cameraman made limited input in this discussion as it was apparent from 
the children's answers to the questions during the experimentation and 
their discussion whilst they watched the same sequences of the video- 
recording that they had little difficulty appreciating each other's different 
belief perspectives. 
The following week, children watched the puppet video presentation of 
the same story. The experimenter paused the video at certain points in 
the story and asked all the children to write down all their answers to the 
complete range of memory, reality and belief questions. All of the 
children answered all of the questions correctly. 
4.32 Discussion 
Findings from the majority of false belief experiments reviewed in 
chapter 3 indicate that children between the ages of 3.5 -4.5 years are 
able to predict the behaviour of a story character according to their false 
belief, i. e., children of this age are able to differentiate their own beliefs 
from the false beliefs of story characters, e. g., 'Sally thinks that the 
marble is still in the box, but I know that it is really in the vase. ' This 
ability is described as successful first-order belief attribution (Wimmer 
and Perner, 1983). 
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Perner and Wimmer's (1985) study demonstrated that many of their 6 
year-olds and the majority of 7 year-olds were able to mentally represent 
second-order beliefs, e. g., 'John thinks that Mary thinks that the ice- 
cream man is in the park' (when he is, in fact, in the churchyard; Perner 
and Wimmer, op. cit. ). Baron-Cohen (1989) found that using a slightly 
adapted story 90% of 7 year-olds passed the second-order belief question 
on two trials. All the 7-year-olds who participated in this study were also 
able to successfully attribute first-and second-order beliefs. 
This study used an original context in which to investigate children's 
ability to represent other people's mental states pertaining to false belief. 
Through drama, using a technique known as 'split-briefing' and 'off 
staging' children were placed in situations when they actually 
experienced false beliefs first-hand. During interviews, these children 
were able to correctly predict other characters' behaviour according to 
their false-beliefs. Observers were also able to attribute first-and second- 
order false beliefs to their peers. In a short debriefing session children 
were able to report on their false beliefs and justify their actions based on 
these beliefs. The children's 'ceiling' performance in the questions during 
interviews and their apparent ease in appreciating the belief perspectives 
of their peers, including second-order false belief attribution, meant that 
the debriefing session in this study had a relatively low emphasis. 
However, the smooth methodological and mechanical process of what 
had seemed a complex procedure had brought home to the researcher the 
potential of this type of work for children who may find such belief 
attribution difficult. 
A puppet video depicting the same story scenario was also shown to the 
children. To the researcher's surprise, this puppet video was very popular 
with the children. The researcher thought that the puppets might be taken 
in rather a light-hearted manner by this age group; however, the children 
treated it seriously and appeared highly motivated by it. The 'picture 
search' facility of a video version would seem to have great application to 
children who had difficulty keeping up with the storyline, although this 
was not needed for anyone in this group of children. The children 
consistently responded correctly to first-and second-order questions when 
watching this video. 
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This study has shown the feasibility of using drama as a medium to 
explore children's social-cognitive awareness. It has the advantage of 
enabling children to experience first-hand false-beliefs and through 
video-recording, questioning and discussion to encourage children to see 
how these beliefs may not accord with reality. The children in this study 
were able to represent both their own and other people's first-and second- 
order beliefs and were able to answer the experimenter's belief questions 
with relative ease. However, there would seem to be rich potential in 
working in this way with people with learning difficulties, who may 
experience difficulty in representing other people's conceptual 
viewpoints. The relative ease in which the children in this study 
answered the memory, reality and belief questions meant that the plenary 
debriefing took on a low profile. However, for some children, 
encouraging them to talk about both their own and other people's belief 
perspectives would seem to have much potential. The experimental 
work with children with severe learning difficulties in chapter 6 seeks to 
investigate whether this is the case. However, before this, the focus of 
the next chapter is to discover whether the two false belief story scenarios 
and the belief questions contained therein, can be usefully employed with 
children with severe learning difficulties. 
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Chapter 5 
Working with children with severe learning difficulties 
on false belief tasks. 
5.1 General introduction 
The previous chapter described two studies which investigated 
mainstream children's understanding of first-and second-order beliefs. 
The findings of these two investigations generally support the wealth of 
experimental literature indicating that four-year-old children are able to 
predict the behaviour of other people according to their first-order false 
beliefs, e. g., "Sally thinks the marble is in the box, but I know that it is 
really in the vase", and 6-and 7-year-old children are able to predict the 
behaviour of other people according to second-order false beliefs, e. g., 
"Mike thinks that Sally thinks that the marble is in the box, but I know 
that Sally thinks that it is in the dish". It is feasible that the technique of 
'split-briefing' used in study 2, where children are involved in drama in 
order to make them actually experience false beliefs themselves, may 
facilitate children's understanding of second-order false belief at an even 
younger age than 6 years. 
This chapter describes some work undertaken with children with severe 
learning difficulties. The experimental -work is guided by the preceding 
work undertaken with mainstream children. The same two false belief 
story scenarios are used to investigate a group of children's understanding 
of first-and second-order false belief. There have been few published 
studies which examine the performance of children with severe learning 
difficulties on such conceptual role-taking tasks. Study 3 also looks at 
the efficacy of using two well-known psychometric tests to assess 
children's development in language and cognition, and investigates 
whether children's scores on these tests represent good indicators to 
children's performance on false belief tasks. It is the author's opinion that 
tests of mental age and receptive language will not predict children's 
performance on first-and second-order false belief tests, because tests like 
the Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (Ravens et al, 1988) and The 
Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG, Bishop, 1984) do not 
specifically measure children's social-cognitive abilities. However, it is 
feasible that these two developmental tests may represent good indicators 
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of children's performance on false belief tasks. In summary, the research 
questions to be investigated in the following study are 1) can children 
with severe learning difficulties predict the behaviour of story characters 
according to their first-and second-order false beliefs? and 2) do 
children's scores on Raven's Coloured Progressive Matrices (op. cit. ) and 
The Test for Reception of Grammar (op. cit. ) provide a good indicator of 
whether they will pass or fail first-and second-order false belief questions 
?. More specifically, the second research question will consider whether 
children with severe learning difficulties who score beyond four years in 
cognitive and linguistic development (the age when 'normal' children start 
to 'mentalise') are seen to pass tests of first-order belief attribution, and 
children who score beyond 6 or 7 years are seen to pass tests of second- 
order belief. 
5.2 Study 3: Using first-and second-order false belief tasks with 
children with severe learning difficulties. 
5.3 Introduction 
The review of experimental literature in chapter 3 and the experimental 
work undertaken by the author in the preceding chapter indicate that 
children between the ages of 3.5 -4.5 years are able to attribute first-order 
false beliefs to story characters, and children aged between 6-7 years are 
able to attribute second-order false beliefs. This study investigates the 
ability of children with severe learning difficulty to predict the behaviour 
of story characters according to first-and second-order false beliefs. 
Some of the 'theory of mind' literature reviewed in chapter 3 has 
involved children with severe learning difficulties in experimental 
conceptual role-taking tasks, but in the majority of cases, participants 
have been children with Down's Syndrome, and their inclusion has been 
primarily for the purposes of comparison with autistic children. In 
relation to special needs, the 'theory of mind' literature has been 
preoccupied with the 'mentalising' abilities of children with autism. It 
should be noted that the autistic children involved in these studies were 
not attending schools for children with severe learning difficulties and 
were not regarded as children with severe learning difficulties. The 
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present investigation involves children with severe learning difficulties, 
including children with Down's Syndrome, in two false belief tasks used 
in the previous chapter. 
Baron-Cohen's original Sally-Anne test (Baron Cohen et al, 1985) used a 
group of Down's Syndrome children matched by mental and linguistic 
age to a group of 'normal' 4-year-old children and a group of autistic 
children . Baron Cohen found that 86% of the Down's group successfully 
predicted where Sally would look on the basis of where Sally should 
(wrongly) believe her marble to be (first-order belief attribution). 85% of 
the 'normal' four-year-old children were successful, but by contrast, only 
20% of the autistic children were able to do this. This pattern of results 
has been replicated by other researchers using matched groups of Down's 
children, autistic children and 'normal' children. In these false belief 
studies, the Down's syndrome children in the control groups passed 
questions of first-order false beliefs if psychometric tests indicate that 
their language and mental age is equivalent to the four-year-old level 
(e. g., Baron-Cohen, 1989a, 1989c; Leekam and Penner, 1991; Leslie and 
Thaiss, 1992; Reed and Peterson, 1990; Leslie and Frith, 1988). 
Similarly, other studies which have investigated autistic children's 
second-order belief attribution demonstrated that groups of children with 
Down's Syndrome whose mental and linguistic abilities were matched to 
groups of non-learning-disabled 7-year-olds, were able to appreciate the 
second-order false beliefs of story characters (Baron-Cohen 1989a; 
Ozonoff et at 1991; Wimmer et 1988). 
The performance of the groups of matched Down's Syndrome children in 
these studies suggests that children with Down's Syndrome will pass tests 
of first-and second-order false belief if their linguistic ability and 
cognitive development is equivalent to around age 4 years for first-order 
belief attribution, and age 6/7 years for second-order belief. The present 
study seeks to investigate whether other topographies of severe learning 
difficulties conform to similar patterns of developmental performance in 
conceptual role-taking tasks as children with Down's Syndrome in 
previous studies. The hypothesis to be tested in this investigation is that 
children with severe learning difficulties should successfully predict story 
characters' behaviour according to first-order beliefs if their performance 
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in psychometric tests indicates that their mental age and linguistic ability 
are beyond 4 years. Similarly, children whose performance on 
psychometric tests indicate cognitive and linguistic levels to be less than 
6 years, should be unable to correctly predict characters' behaviour 
according to second-order beliefs. 
5.4 Subjects 
27 children attending a school for children with severe learning 
difficulties in Greater London participated in this study. The sample 
consisted of 15 boys and 12 girls, aged between 8,2 and 18,9. There were 
7 children with Down's Syndrome in the sample and one child with 
Prader Willi Syndrome. The other children were of unknown aetiology. 
None of the subjects was diagnosed as having autism. 
5.5 Procedure 
Children's non-verbal powers of intellectual reasoning were tested using 
the book form of Sets A, Ab, and B of Raven's Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (Raven and Raven, 1988). This is a standardised test of non- 
verbal mental age developed for use with "people with physical 
disabilities, aphasia, and people with intellectual disabilities (Raven and 
Raven 1988). The procedure described in the manual was followed by 
the experimenter, i. e., children must pass the first five items of Set A to 
continue with the test. Unless the child is able to solve the first five 
items, he cannot be said to have understood the nature of the task. 
Children were helped by the experimenter on item Al to orientate them 
towards the task. 
Children's verbal understanding was tested using The Test for Reception 
of Grammar (T. R. O. G., Bishop, 1982). TROG is a multiple choice test 
which has been used to assess the receptive language of children with 
learning difficulties, hearing impairment, specific language disorders and 
cerebral palsy. Again, guidelines in the handbook were followed by the 
experimenter, scoring the child's responses in terms of the number of 
blocks passed, rather than the number of items correct. A block is passed 
when all four items are responded to correctly. The testing is stopped 
when five consecutive blocks have been failed. 
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Children's understanding of first-order belief attribution was tested using 
two story scenarios; the 'Sally and Mike' puppet false belief task adapted 
from Baron-Cohen (1985) used with mainstream children in Investigation 
1, study 1 and the first two scenes of the doll's house video used with 
mainstream children in Study 2. The procedure used for the Sally and 
Mike puppet task was exactly the same as the one used in study 1, 
investigation 1. The same criteria for success was used in this study; 
children could only pass the two first-order belief questions if they 
responded correctly to the preceding Name, Memory and Reality Control 
Questions. 
Children's understanding of first-order belief attribution was further 
tested by using the first two scenes of the doll's house video. These two 
scenes contain two first-order belief questions preceded by memory and 
reality questions. The 4 first-order belief questions in the first stage of 
this study are reproduced in figure 4. The lower case Roman numerals 
shown in brackets after the question number indicate whether the belief 
question is first-or second-order, i. e., question 1 (i) is a first-order belief 
question. 
It should be noted that the level of difficulty of the belief questions in the 
two different stories is not meant to be similar. The author considers that 
the belief questions in the doll's house video are more difficult because 
the story plot is more complex and the language contained in the question 
is more advanced. However, a comparison of children's responses to 
belief questions across the two story scenarios provides information 
about the consistency of their ability to attribute first-order beliefs. 
Stage 2 of the study involves only the children who successfully respond 
to the first-order belief questions shown in figure 4. Only these children 
proceed on to stage 2 of the study, where they are shown the rest of the 
doll's house video (scenes 3,4 and 5) and are asked additional first-order 
belief questions and second-order belief questions. Figure 5 shows the 
whole format of the doll's house video with the cut off point for children 
who did not successfully respond to all four belief questions. 
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Figure 4: First-order belief questions in both story scenarios in stage 1. 
(puppet story first trial) 
1st order Belief Question 1(i): When Sally comes back, where will she look 
for the marble? 
(puppet story second trial) 
1st order Belief Question 2(i): When Sally comes back, where will she look 
for the marble? 
Scene 1 (doll's house story) 
1st order Belief Question 3(i): When Sally comes back later to get the 
marble, where will she look for it? (box) 
Scene 2 (doll's house story) 
Ist order Belief Question 4(1): When Mike comes back later to get the 
marble, where will he look for it? (vase) 
Figure 5: Summary of Doll's House video story 
Stage 1 
Scene 1 
Sally and Mike are playing marbles in the living room. 
One of the marbles rolls under the sofa. Mike finds a large, 
'special' marble under the sofa. They both claim that it is 
their marble and argue about who should keep it. Sally 
snatches the marble from Mike and puts it in her toy box. 
They continue to argue. 
(Enter Mum). Mother comes in to see what the noise is all 
about. She tells them off and sends Sally out to play in the 
garden and asks Mike to clear up the mess in the living 
room. (Exit Sally and Mum). While Mike is alone, he takes 
the marble out of Sally's toy box and hides it in a vase on 
the window-sill. (Exit Mike). 
Memory Question: Where did Sally put the marble in the 
beginning? (box) 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? (vase) 
1st order Belief Question 3(i): When Sally comes back later 
to get the marble, where will she look for it? (box) 
Scene 2 
(Enter Sally). Sally comes into the living room with some 
flowers. She is very surprised to see the marble in the 
vase. She realises that Mike has taken the marble out of 
her toy box and hidden it in the vase. She takes it out of the 
vase and puts it in a dish on the sideboard. But she is so 
engrossed in arranging the flowers, she forgets about the 
marble and leaves it in the dish on the sideboard. (Exit 
Sally). 
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Memory Question: When Sally was outside in the garden, 
what did Mike do with the marble? 
Reality Question: Where is the marble now, really? 
1st order Belief Question 4(i): When Mike comes back later 
to get the marble, where will he look for it? 
................. (stage 1 cut off point for children who respond incorrectly to 1st order belief questions in previous puppet 
story and up to this point in this story) ......................... 
Stage 2 
Scene 3 
Mum, Dad, Sally and Mike are watching television. (Enter 
Tom the cat). Everybody is so busy watching the television 
that they don't see what Tom the cat does. He jumps up onto 
the sideboard and knocks the marble out of the dish. The 
marble drops to the floor and rolls underneath a table. 
Mum, Dad, Sally and Mike all go up to bed. Sally and Mike 
have forgotten all about the marble. 
Scene 4 
Sally wakes up in the middle of the night. She remembers 
that she has left the marble downstairs. She goes 
downstairs to get the marble. 
1st order Belief Question 5(i): Where will Sally look for the 
marble? (dish) 
Reality Question: Where is the marble, really? (under 
table) 
As she gets half-way across the living room floor, she 
hears a noise behind her. She turns around to see Mike 
watching her from the doorway. Mike has also got up in 
the middle of the night to get the marble. 
2nd order belief question 6(ii): Where does Mike think that 
Sally will look for the marble? 
But before Sally and Mike can say or do anything they see 
Dad coming down the stairs. He has heard a noise 
downstairs. He sees Mike and Sally in the living room. He 
tells them both off for being downstairs in the middle of 
the night and sends them straight to bed. 
Scene 5 (described to children, but not acted) 
Mike is laying awake in bed. He intends to get up early the 
next morning to get the marble. He wonders if Sally will 
get up earlier than him the next morning to look for the 
marble. 
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1st order Belief Question 7(i): If Sally does manage to get 
up before Mike the next morning, where will she look for 
the marble? (dish) 
2nd order Belief Question 8(ii): If Sally does manage to get 
up before Mike the next morning, where does Mike think 
that Sally will look for the marble? (box) 
Sally is laying awake in bed. She also intends to get up 
early the next morning to get the marble. She wonders if 
Mike will get up earlier than her the next morning to look 
for the marble. 
1st order Belief Question 9(i): If Mike does manage to get 
up before Sally the next morning, where will he look for 
the marble? (vase) 
2nd order Belief Question 10(ii): If Mike does manage to get 
up earlier than Sally the next morning, where does Sally 
think that Mike will look for the marble? (vase) 
5.6 Results 
Three of the children did not proceed to the false belief tasks after testing 
because they made errors in the first five items of Set A of the Raven's 
test. These same children also made erratic responses to the first blocks 
of the TROG assessment. The children were generally restless and 
distractible and did not respond well to the assessment situation. They 
were removed from the sample leaving 24 children-15 boys and 9 girls, 
aged between 8,2 and 18,9 years who proceeded on to stage I of the false 
belief tasks. 
One child (subject 12) scored on the Raven's test but only achieved 2 
blocks on the TROG. Success on only 2 blocks of this test means that 
the child does not achieve an age equivalent score. However, this child 
remained in the sample because of his relatively high mental age (5 
years). 
Table 6 shows children's responses to the memory, reality and first-order 
belief questions in stage 1 of the study. This table includes information 
on children's aetiology and sex and their mental and linguistic ages as 
measured by the Raven's and TROG assessments. 
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For statistical analysis, children scored one point for each correct 
response to the first-order belief questions in the puppet story (belief 
questions 1(i) and 2(i)) and the first two scenes of the doll's house story 
(belief questions 3(i) and 4(i)). Children could score a maximum of 4 
points in total. Children's responses to the belief questions can only be 
interpreted as correct if they have responded correctly to the preceding 
memory and reality questions. 
Table 6 Children's responses to memory, reality and 1st-order questions in stage I. 
Subj. Sex Aetio- 
lo 
Chron 
Ae 
Mental 
Age 
Ling. 
Age 
Belief 
. li) 
Belief 
2i 
Belief 
. 
31) 
Belief 
. 4i 
Total 
Score 
9 f Down's 9,1 36 4,0 WX  0 
4 m unkn. 12 3 4,6 4,9    3 
I5 f Down's 15,1 4,6- 
5,0 
4,0 3C X )C xx 0 
2 m unkn. 13,8 4,6- 
5,0 
5,0   X X 2 
14 m unkn, 15,3 4,6- 
5,0 
5,0 X X XX XXX 0 
13 f Down's 8,2 
.5 ,0 
5.3     4 
21 m unkn. 10,0 5 ZO 49   
0 
8 m Down's 15,2 5,0 4,0     4 
1 f Down's 1511 5,6 4,3     3 
10 
I f Pr. Wil. 12,7 5,6 5,0   WX  0 24 f unkn. 12,7 5,6 5,3     4 
12 m Down's 189 6,0 0 WX   0 
6 m unkn. 12,0 6,0 4,9    0 
5 m Down's 13 7 60 4,0     4 
3 f unkn. 16,3 6,0 5,9     4 
16 m Down's 13 2 6,0 5,0   * XXX_ 0 
7 m unkn. 10,0 7,0 5,3     4 
18 f Down's 15,9 7,0 . 4 .9  
  0 
20 f unkn. 15,8 7,0- 
76 
4,9   n/a** n/a n/a 
17 m Down's 18,9 7,0- 
7,6 
5,0     4 
23 m unkn. 18,9 7,0- 
7.6 
5,0     4 
11 m unkn. 9,4 7,6 5,0     0 
19 m unkn. 17,7 76 4,9     4 
22 m unkn. 10,1 7,6- 
80 
6.0     4 
Subject 20, (marked**) found great difficulty with the doll's house video 
due to her visual impairment. Although she responded correctly to the 
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questions in the puppet task, it was clear to the experimenter that she had 
difficulty seeing the events in the doll's house video. Her responses were 
therefore removed from the analysis. 
10 out of the 23 children passed all four first-order belief questions in 
stage 1 and proceeded on to stage 2 of the study. All of these children 
gave correct and satisfactory responses to the memory and reality 
questions, including the memory question relating to belief question 4(i), 
which unlike the other control questions, made more demands on the 
children's expressive language (the other memory questions required only 
a one word response as to location. Memory question preceding 4(i) 
required a statement of the order that Mike had taken the marble and put 
it in the vase). For these children, responses to first-order belief 
questions remained consistent across both story scenarios. 
Two children (subjects 4 and 1) correctly responded to 3 out of the 4 
belief questions. Both these children made the same error on belief 
question 4(i); they responded that Mike will look for the marble in the 
dish. At this point in the story, this is where the marble really is (they 
gave the same response as they gave for the preceding reality). It is just 
possible that what these two children may have meant was that Mike 
would have first looked in the vase, then, realising that it was not in there, 
may have looked in the dish. This may have been the response that the 
children thought the experimenter would be looking for, in order that 
Mike would have found the marble. However, without probing during 
the procedure, this remains unclear. 
One child (subject 2) passed both belief questions 1(i) and 2(i) in the 
Sally and Mike puppet task, but failed the two belief questions in the 
doll's house task. This child passed the memory and reality questions in 
the doll's house task, but responded to question 3(i) that Sally would look 
in the vase (the reality location), and stated that Mike would look in the 
box in response to belief question 4(i). This child has already 
demonstrated some ability to predict characters' behaviour according to 
first-order beliefs, so it suggests that, in terms of information processing, 
the doll's house video places more demands on the child to keep abreast 
of the plot. 
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One child's response to the belief question 3(i) in the doll's house video 
(child 16), revealed how it was possible to answer the belief question 3(i) 
correctly (marked with an *), when he has responded incorrectly to the 
preceding reality question (and answered correctly to the relevant 
memory question). This is because the child's response to all three 
questions could be the same, i. e., Sally put the marble in the box in the 
beginning; the marble was really now in the box (when in fact it had been 
transferred to the vase) and therefore when Sally comes back she will 
look for her marble in the box. This shows how what would appear to be 
a correct response to the belief question, can be a response which does 
not entail appreciation of Sally's false belief. This supports the 
methodological condition that in order to pass the belief questions, 
children must respond correctly to the previous memory and reality 
questions. 
All of the 10 children who failed all four of the belief questions passed all 
the memory and reality questions on the ' Sally and Mike puppet task. 
However, only two of the 10 (subjects 10 and 11) passed all of the 
memory and reality questions relating to the belief questions in the doll's 
house video. This lends further support to the proposal that the doll's 
house video is more complex than the Sally and Mike puppet task. 6 of 
the 8 children who failed at least one of the control questions failed the 
memory question relating to belief question 4(i). This was the question 
which required more than a one word answer. 
Children's performance on the belief questions was then examined in 
relation to their developmental ages in cognition and language as 
measured by the Raven's Matrices and the TROG assessments. The 
results shown in table 6 show a marginal trend toward better performance 
on behalf of the subjects who have higher mental and linguistic ages. 
The small number of children in this sample does not allow comparison 
of this group with any of the mainstream samples in the previous chapter. 
One would expect there to be a trend of better performance among the 
children with higher Raven's and TROG scores and this is generally 
reflected in table 6. However, only 7 out of the 13 children (54%) with 
mental ages of 6 years and above passed the first-order belief questions. 
5 out of these 13 (38%) children failed all 4 belief questions in both tasks. 
All except one of these children (subject 12) had receptive language 
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scores of 4 years or above. (Subject 12 did not score on the TROG scale 
as he only passed two blocks on the test. Although he failed the belief 
questions, he passed the memory and reality questions relating to belief 
questions 1(i), 2(i) and 3(i)). All of the 5 children who failed the belief 
questions passed the memory and reality questions of the Sally and Mike 
puppet test. This suggests that their failure on this task was due to their 
difficulty in appreciating Sally's mental state. Only one of these five 
children (subject 11) passed all the memory and reality questions of the 
doll's house video. 
Table 7 shows the performance of the 10 children who proceeded on to 
stage 2 of the study. 
Table 7: Children's responses to first-and second-order belief questions in stage 2 
(scenes 3,4&5 of doll's house video). 
Subj Sex Aeti Ch 
Age 
MA Ling 
Age 
BQ 
51 
BQ 
611 
BQ 
71 
BQ 
811 
BQ 
91 
BQ 
1011 
/3 
1 
/3 
11 
13 f D. S 8,2 5,0 5,3 0 0 
8 m D. S 15,2 50 40 * 0 0 
24 f unk 12,7 5,6 5,3       3 3 
5 m D. S 1 13,7 6,0 4,0 0 0 
3 f unk 16,3 60 5,9    3 0 
7 m unk 10,0 7,0 5,3 * * 0 0 
17 m D. S 18,9 7,0- 
7,6 
5,0       3 3 
23 m unk 18,9 7,0- 
7,6 
5,0       3 3 
19 m unk 1 17,7 7,6 49     1 3 
22 m unk 10,1 7,6- 
80 
6,0       3 3 
4 out of the 10 children responded correctly to all memory, reality, first 
and second-order belief questions. The manner in which they all 
responded to the questions was much more confident than the other 
subjects. In addition to their successful responses to the first-and second 
order belief questions, for 2 of the children (subjects 17 &23), their non- 
verbal behaviour also indicated that they understood the false beliefs of 
the story characters. For example, these 2 children (boys) seemed to 
identify with Mike, and found it amusing that, in scene 5, when Mike lay 
in bed thinking about whether Sally would get up earlier than him in the 
morning and find the marble, they empathised with his mistaken feeling 
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of reassurance that Sally would not find the marble (question 8 (ii)), but 
were also amused that no-one would find the marble in the end (because 
the cat knocked it under the table). 
One of these two children (subject 23) also drew it to the experimenter's 
attention that Mike probably would find the marble eventually after a 
thorough search of the room. 
Child 19's responses to questions 5(i) and 7(i) suggest that, similar to 
subjects 13 and 5, he had difficulty remembering that Sally had left the 
marble in the dish. He responded "in the vase" to both questions, but 
responded correctly to the other first-and second-order belief questions 
which were not dependent on remembering this one change of location. 
So, although this child made 2 first-order belief errors, this was more 
likely due to demands on memory loading. His other responses to first- 
order belief questions indicate that he is able to appreciate first-and 
second-order belief. 
It is possible that the complexity of the plot, particularly keeping track of 
the location of the marble, may have marred children's true ability to 
appreciate first-and second-order beliefs. Two of the children who failed 
all the first-and second-order belief questions (subjects 13 and 5) made 
the same errors. Their responses suggest that they may have found the 
events in scene 3 rather confusing, or that the delay between seeing Sally 
transfer the marble to the dish (scene 2) was too long in terms of memory 
loading before they were asked belief question 5 (i). Both children 
responded to this question that Sally would look in the vase for her 
marble. There is no memory question between these scenes, and the 
reality question relating to question 5 (i) offers no prompts to events in 
scene 2. Both these children responded correctly to this reality question. 
These two children gave responses of 'Don't know' to questions 7 -10. 
Child 8's response to belief question 6(ii) "in the box", although correct, 
could not be regarded as a true second-order belief attribution because he 
gave the same (incorrect this time) response to belief question 5(i). 
Similarly, child 7's responses to belief questions 9(i) and 10 (ii) were 
consistent to his incorrect responses to 5(i) and 6(ii). Child 3's responses 
indicate that she is able to predict story protagonists' behaviour according 
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to first-order beliefs, but is unable to do the same according to their 
second-order beliefs. In fact she responded to the second-order belief 
questions as if they were first-order questions, e. g., she interpreted 
questions 5(i) and 6(ii) as the same, responding "in the dish" to both 
questions. 
In summary, 5 out of the 10 children who proceeded to stage 2 of the 
study demonstrated that they were able to predict the behaviour of story 
characters according to their first-and second-order beliefs. In stage 2 of 
the study, there is a more noticeable trend towards better performance in 
the children who had higher mental and linguistic ages. Four out of the 
five subjects who passed second-order belief questions (subjects 17,23, 
19, & 22) had the highest mental and linguistic ages (mental ages of at 
least 7,0-7,6; linguistic ages of above 5,0). However, one girl (subject 
24) passed all first-and second-order questions with a mental age of 5,6 
and a linguistic age of 5,3. 
5.7 Discussion 
This study investigated the abilities of a group of children with severe 
learning difficulties to predict the behaviour of story protagonists 
according to first-and second-order false beliefs. 24 children and young 
people with severe learning difficulties aged between 9 and 18 years were 
assessed using the Raven's Coloured Matrices (Ravens, 1988) and the 
Test for Reception of Grammar (TROG, Bishop, 1982). Children then 
participated in stages 1 and 2 of the study; stage 1 investigated children's 
ability to predict story characters' behaviour according to first-order 
beliefs, and stage 2, story characters' behaviour according to second-order 
beliefs. 
In stage 1,10 out of the 24 children (42%) passed all of the first-order 
belief questions from the two story scenarios. 13 of the 24 children 
(54%) passed at least 2 of the 4 first-order belief questions in stage 1.3 
of the children made errors on the first 2 belief questions of the doll's 
house video, which makes far more demands on children's understanding 
of language and memory. Taking into account the demands of the second 
task, 54% of the sample would seem to be a more reasonable figure of 
those children able to successfully attribute first-order beliefs. All of the 
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children who could successfully attribute first-order false beliefs had 
developmental ages in both language and cognition as assessed by the 
Raven's and TROG of at least 4 years. This does seem to support the 
findings from the literature and the results from the experimental work 
with mainstream children in the previous chapter. However, there was 
only one child who participated in this study who was assessed as having 
a mental age below 4 years (subject 9), so further investigation involving 
children with scores of below 4 years in cognition and language would 
need to be done to add weight to this finding. 
In stage 1 (first-order belief attribution), children's performance in 
relation to their developmental ages in cognition and language (as 
measured by the Raven's and TROG) indicated a marginal trend towards 
better performance by the children assessed as having higher 
developmental levels as shown by these tests. In stage 2 of the study, 
there is a more noticeable trend towards better performance in the 
children who had higher mental and linguistic ages. Four out of the five 
subjects who passed second-order belief questions had the highest mental 
and linguistic ages (mental ages of at least 7,0-7,6; linguistic ages of 
above 5,0). However, one girl passed all first-and second-order questions 
with a mental age of 5,6 and a linguistic age of 5,3. Subject 19, with a 
mental age of 7,6 and a linguistic age of 4,9, although not passing all 
first-and second order questions, nevertheless passed over half of the 
questions (including all of the second-order questions). 5 out of the 10 
children who proceeded to stage 2 of the study demonstrated that they 
were able to predict the behaviour of story characters according to their 
first-and second-order beliefs. 
One of the most interesting findings of this study was that only 7 out of the 13 children (54%) with 
mental ages of 
,6 
years and above passed the first-order belief questions. 5 out of these 13 (38%) 
children failed all 4 belief questions in both tasks. Some children with mental ages of 7 years and 
receptive language ages of 5 years failed these tasks. In comparison to the performance of the 
mainstream children participating in similar first-order belief tasks, it is tempting to assume that when 
taking into account their developmental ages, the performance of children with severe learning 
difficulties in this study is significantly poorer. In investigation 1, study 1,64% of 4-year-olds and 86°/a of 
5-year-olds successfully answered questions relating to first-order belief. 
However, this assumption would depend upon the efficacy of the psychometric 
tests utilised in this study. The author of this thesis has serious misgivings 
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about the validity of using the Raven's Coloured Matrices to assess 
mental age in this type of task and about the way similar psychometric 
tests have been used in similar conceptual role-taking tasks in the 'theory 
of mind' literature. The use of TROG seems more appropriate because 
measures of children's receptive language are necessary to assess how 
well they can be expected to cope with the linguistic demands of the 
narrative and the questions asked. 
The Raven's Coloured Matrices is a reputable test of non-verbal 
intellectual reasoning. However, it is proposed that this test (and perhaps 
other tests traditionally used to assess developmental levels in non-verbal 
intellectual reasoning) do not assess children's social-cognitive abilities. 
It is children's social-cognitive abilities which are drawn upon in the 
belief attribution tasks described in this and the previous chapter. This 
may explain why children with severe learning difficulties scoring at 6 
years and above on the Raven's test can fail first-order belief attribution 
questions. The difficulty lies in finding any psychometric test which can 
really assess the type of social-cognitive learning which the young child 
acquires incidentally from interacting in the social world. It is likely that 
by the time the 'normal' child reaches the age of 4 years, family life has 
provided him or her with the natural context for learning to'mentalise'. 
Toddlers in the 'terrible twos' demonstrate quite sophisticated social- 
cognitive awareness; they have learned much about how best they can get 
their own way, how they can manipulate people's behaviour and 
emotions. The child with severe learning difficulties may have missed 
much of this early incidental social-cognitive learning. This is discussed 
in the next chapter, when the author discusses the benefits of involving 
children with severe learning difficulties in conceptual role-taking 
activities and other contexts which focus their intention upon 
psychological states. 
Children's success on belief attribution tasks depend more on their social- 
cognitive abilities than on intellectual reasoning. It was argued in 
chapter 1 that social-cognitive learning is more to do with learning from 
social interaction, i. e., learning from and about people. This type of 
learning is more difficult to assess by psychometric tests, although 
assessments tapping social cognition have been developed, many for the 
screening of autism, e. g., The DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric 
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Association, 1987) and the Checklist for Autism in Toddlers (Baron- 
Cohen et al., 1992). 
In conclusion, the Raven's test may have given the children with severe 
learning difficulties in this study rather optimistic mental age scores for 
the type of task presented. It is proposed that there are few psychometric 
tests available which can offer a reliable indication of children's social- 
cognitive development. 
This study has demonstrated that the false belief tasks used with 
mainstream children have enabled children with severe learning 
difficulties in this sample to demonstrate their abilities to attribute first- 
and second-order beliefs to story characters. The results of this study 
have highlighted the difficulties of using existing psychometric tests to 
give meaningful base-line measures of mental age for children with 
severe learning difficulties in conceptual role-taking tasks. A clear 
relationship between children's performance in first-and second-order 
belief attribution tasks and their scores of mental age using the Raven's 
test was not reliably shown in this study. However, as expected, there 
was a general trend towards better performance among children with 
higher scores on the Raven's and the TROG assessments. This study has 
questioned the validity of using the Raven's test to predict children's 
performance in false belief tasks. This is due to the number of children 
with mental age scores of 6 years and above in this sample who failed 
first-order belief questions. 
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Chapter 6 
Children's understanding of internal states 
6.1 Introduction 
Internal state language is language which refers to intentions, cognitions 
and feeling states (Bretherton and Beeghly, 1981). Analysis of children's 
understanding and use of internal state terms is of interest to the author of 
this thesis because it provides some indication of their developing social - 
cognitive awareness. Longitudinal studies of children's spontaneous use 
of internal state terms, often provided by parental reports of children's 
language in the home setting, have provided valuable analysis of the uses 
of such words and when they first begin to appear in children's language. 
These longitudinal studies are reviewed in the first section of this chapter. 
In addition, other studies are reviewed which investigate children's 
understanding of internal state terms in experimental paradigms. 
So far in this thesis, the author has argued that analysis and review of 
existing research into the social-cognitive development of non-learning 
disabled children are both necessary and desirable for researchers 
planning to undertake investigative work with children with severe 
learning difficulties. The previous two chapters reviewed a number of 
studies investigating children's developing understanding of the mind and 
representational abilities. This prepared the reader for the author's own 
experimental work with mainstream children and then children with 
severe learning difficulties. This direction of research, - from mainstream 
to special, - has informed, guided and focused the author's work with 
children with severe learning difficulties. In this chapter, this procedure 
is maintained. It begins with a review of the literature into non-learning 
disabled children's understanding and use of internal states. This is 
followed by the author's questionnaire-based study investigating the 
spontaneous use of internal state terms by non-learning disabled children 
and Down's Syndrome children with severe learning difficulties. This 
study prepares the reader for the author's final study at the end of this 
chapter, where learning-disabled children's understanding of internal 
states is investigated further using drama. 
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6.2 Internal state language 
In chapter 2, Premack and Woodruff were quoted as using the term 
'mental states' when they proposed that a person can be said to possess a 
'theory of mind' if ".... he imputes mental states to himself and others. " 
Here, Premack and Woodruff were concerned with 'cognitive' states, 
which, in this thesis, will be referred to as 'metacognitive' terms. Indeed, 
in Premack's example below, all the words that they designate in italics 
can be regarded as 'metacognitive' words, i. e., words relating to 
knowledge, -with the exception of 'pretending', which is a behaviour 
implying a mental state rather than a purely mental state in itself. 
"John believes in ghosts; He thinks he has a fair chance of winning; 
Paul knows that I don't like roses; She is guessing when she says 
that; I doubt that Mary will come; Bill is only pretending. " 
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978, page, 515). 
Other authors view states of mind rather more broadly as 'internal states', 
which include 'cognition'-the subset that Premack calls 'mental states'. 
'Internal states' as used by Bretherton et al., (1986) include words relating 
to 'perception', 'physiology', 'affect', 'moral judgement/ obligation', 
'cognition' and 'volition/ ability'. Scholnick and Hall (1991) classify 
internal state words into four semantic categories: 'cognition', 'affect', 
'perception' and 'intentions and desires'. 
Similarly to Premack, Bretherton et al (1981) used the term 'internal 
states' in reference to children's developing 'theory of mind'. However, 
their view of children's developing understanding of the mind puts more 
emphasis on language: 
".... young children progress to an explicit, verbally expressible 
theory of mind that begins to emerge at the end of the second year. 
At this stage in their development, children become capable of 
exchanging verbal information about internal states as experienced 
by themselves and by others. " (page 356). 
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Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) write that during the preverbal stage an 
infant's theory of mind remains "implicit in behavior"; however, they 
state that the mastery of language renders it "increasingly observable and 
explicit. " (page 907). 
Bretherton et al (1981) cite certain authors who propose that infants 
demonstrate an awareness of other people's intentions when they develop 
intentional communication for instrumental purposes at the end of the 
first year (Bates et al. 1975, Bruner 1975). For example, Bates (1979) 
defines intentional communication as "signalling behaviour in which the 
sender is aware, a priori, of the effect that the signal will have on his 
listener, and he persists in that behaviour until the effect is obtained or 
failure is clearly indicated. " (page 36). 
Bretherton et al. write that implicit in Bates's definition is the fact that the 
infant recognises a partner's capacity to understand a message, i. e., the 
infant attributes an internal state of knowing and comprehending to the 
mother. However, they add that Bates's quotation is ambiguous as to 
how much the infant when "communicating intentionally" understands 
about the listener's mind. As Perner (1988) states, the ambiguity arises 
from the expression "effect on the listener" by which the infant judges the 
success of his communication efforts. Perner proposes that if the child 
judges success on a purely behavioural basis, then clearly an infant's 
intentional communication does not involve a 'theory of mind'. If, on the 
other hand, the effect is a particular state of mind in the listener, then 
intentional communication involves attribution of a mental state. 
Bretherton et al. (op. cit. ) are careful to state that they do not assume that 
young infants can reflect on their own or others' internal states, i. e., 
achieve second-order representation. It seems reasonable to expect that 
infants have beliefs, desires, and intentions, since they show surprise, 
frustration, etc., but that is very different from their understanding of 
belief and intention. In fact, Bretherton et at. state that they do not 
believe that infants can impute mental states to others; they write that 
"the young infant's theory of interfacible minds remains at first implicit 
and fairly rudimentary. " (Bretherton et al 1981, page 340). 
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Children's contemplation of internal states is explored in greater depth 
towards the end of this chapter, particular in relation to the difficulties 
that children with severe learning difficulties may experience in 
reflecting upon people's psychological and affective states. Many of 
these children, who have developmental delay and/or impairment in 
language and communication, can be assumed to experience internal 
states, e. g., sadness, loneliness, frustration, etc., but they may not have 
the specific vocabulary to label and reflect upon these internal states. A 
person's lack of specific internal state vocabulary may prevent his or her 
access to internal states, in terms of the ability to reflect upon them, to 
develop and refine them. It is proposed that focusing children's attention 
upon their own and other people's internal states is a preliminary step to 
identification and labelling of them. The research which is described at 
the end of this chapter is an attempt to do just this. It uses drama as a 
strong visual medium in which to focus children's attention upon internal 
states. 
There have been a few studies which have explored children's developing 
use of internal state language. Bretherton and Beeghly's (1981) 
longitudinal study showed that 30% of a sample of thirty 20 month old 
children were found to use verbal labels for fatigue, pain, disgust, 
distress, affection and moral conformity in appropriate contexts. Another 
study by the same authors provides additional information about the 
internal state language used by 3 year old children (Bretherton and 
Beeghly, 1982). 
Shatz et al (1983) used the term 'mental states' in the same way as 
Premack, i. e., referring only to cognitive states. They used a method of 
convergent analyses of naturally occurring speech of one child aged from 
2 years, 4 months to 4 years. To minimise the overestimation of the 
child's knowledge, they separated utterances related to mental state from 
mental verbs related to conversational use. Shatz et at recognised that the 
word "know" can be used as conversational pause fillers, e. g., "you 
know". They say the word "think", as in "I think I want a cookie", can be 
used to mitigate a demand, in other words, the word does not necessarily 
refer to a mental state. Shatz et at write that an utterance is classified as a 
mental state only if "the mental term is judged, with regard to its context, 
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to refer to the thoughts, memories or knowledge of the speaker, listener, 
or a third person". 
Urmson (1963) discusses a wide variety of "parenthetical" uses of mental 
verbs. Such uses are said to modify the meaning of statements rather 
than to describe a person's psychological state. Urmson (1963) argues, 
for example, that terms such as "know", "believe" and "guess" can be 
used to signal the degree of reliability of statements, rather than anything 
necessarily mental. She says a statement such as "I believe it will rain", 
may function in a manner similar to "It will probably rain", signalling the 
likelihood of rain rather than describing any actual mental state. Limber 
(1973) said much the same about the word "think", stating that at about 2 
years 6 months, the child uses the word "think" in a parenthetical manner, 
e. g., "I think I want grape juice" may be substituted by "perhaps" or 
"maybe". 
Although Scholnick and Hall (1991) refer generally to 'internal', rather 
than 'mental' states, their distinction between semantic and pragmatic 
uses of internal states is useful. Like the authors above, Scholnick and 
Hall state that internal state words sometimes lose their'internal content' 
in everyday speech and are used merely as 'pragmatic' devices. They talk 
about 'know' being used as an 'attention getter', e. g., "You know, Jack 
could play shortstop" (their example). They also describe 'conversational 
devices' and 'mannerisms' in much the same way as Limber, and'hedges', 
which they refer to as conveying uncertainty, e. g., "It's going to rain, I 
think. " Scholnick and Hall also identify certain 'attentional devices', as in 
the imperative function of words like 'look', e. g., "Look what I did", and 
in some uses of the word 'see' in questions, e. g., "You see that? " 
Both Bretherton's and Shatz's studies showed that all children producing 
mental state utterances had previously produced mental verbs for 
conversational functions prior to the expression of mental state. Shatz et 
al's (1983) samples of one child's spontaneous speech from the age 2 
years; 4 months to 4 years showed that no mental state verbs occurred 
before the age of 2 years 8 months. The authors examined language 
samples of 30 additional children using the same sorts of criteria applied 
to the earlier single subject study. The results produced utterances 
containing a mental verb rate roughly comparable to the single subject 
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study. No children were observed using mental state verbs before the age 
of 2 years, 6 months. 
Johnson (1982) proposed that "children first acquire a simple 
interpretation of mental verbs with respect to overt acts and uses of 
language and only subsequently develop a more reflective understanding 
of the verbs as definitively mental descriptions. " (page 449). Several 
other authors have found that children initially interpret mental states as 
referring to external states. Misciones et al (1978) found that children 
under the age of 4 years were unsystematic in their use of the terms 
"know" and "guess". They found that between the ages of 4 and 6 
children increasingly used "know" to refer to correct choices of a hidden 
object's location and "guess" to refer to incorrect choices regardless of 
prior knowledge. Children stated that they "knew" the location of an 
object when their performance was correct, even when lacking any 
knowledge basis, i. e., when they simply guessed right. Misciones et al 
propose that only when the children reach 6 years of age can they 
differentiate "know" and "guess" on the basis of epistemic states rather 
than observable outcomes. 
Similarly, Wellman and Johnson (1979) found that 4 year-olds often 
stated that a story character "remembered" when the character correctly 
judged the location of a hidden object, and "forgot" when incorrect, 
regardless of the knowledge basis of these performances. They found 
that both 5 and 7 year-olds used "remember" more appropriately to refer 
to the presence of prior knowledge accompanied by correct choice of the 
location. However, these same children tended to judge whether the 
character had forgotten solely on the basis of whether the correct location 
was chosen. Wellman and Johnson concluded that "remember" is 
understood earlier than "forget" and that the child progresses from 
understanding these verbs in terms of overt behaviours to understanding 
them in terms of inferred cognitive states. 
Johnson and Maratsos (1977) found that 4 year-olds, but not 3 year-olds, 
understood the different implications of the verbs 'think' and 'know'. 
Moore et al (1990) found that children start to differentiate 'know' and 
'think' with respect to the expression of certainty at around 4 years. The 
general finding is that young children may not understand the precise 
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meaning of these verbs, although they can use the verbs in natural 
situations. Olson and Astington (1987) state that even adults in ordinary 
conversation may not use mental terms precisely, saying, (Olson's 
example) "I knew that it would be a typical Hollywood movie", even 
though the speaker had no prior evidence for knowing 15. (Olson and 
Astington 1987, page 400). 
In Shatz's study (op. cit. ), the strongest evidence that the young children 
cited did distinguish internal mental states and processes from external 
physical events and behavioural acts came from their production of 
contrastive utterances. In contrastive utterances, children explicitly 
contrasted the mental world with the real world by saying things like, "I 
thought there wasn't any socks, but when I looked I saw them, " and 
"Before I thought this was a crocodile; now I know it's an alligator". 
Such contrastives occurred in children's speech at about 2 years 8 
months. Contrastives in children's language are seen to be particularly 
significant. They are not just children's expressions of mental attitudes 
towards the things of the world but also their reflections on their former 
mental attitudes. Feldman (1988) writes: 
"Children...... move mental attitudes from an initial occurrence as 
comments about real-world events into a stipulative given where 
they themselves could be talked about. To do this, children could 
make use of a general recursion rule -that is, a procedure for 
standing back from a process (in this case a construal) in order to 
turn it into a product (a constructed mental object). " (page 128). 
This brings to mind Flavell's (1981) view, referring to developing 
metalinguistic abilities, that children must be able to "take 
communications as cognitive objects and critically analyze them. " (page 
37). 
Feldman's discussion about children standing back from a process shows 
how important language is in this process of reflection. This relates to 
what Scholnick and Hall (1991) believe is the function of internal state 
15 It is possible, however, in Olson's example, that the speaker was trying to 
claim prior knowledge, in the sense of superior perceptiveness. (I am 
grateful to Mark Roberts for this point. ) 
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language for an individual: an internal state vocabulary enables the 
person to gain access to his or her internal states, in order to "monitor and 
transform them". They state that language is thus the 'tool for 
monitoring'. 
A study by Wellman and Estes (1986) shows that under certain 
circumstances young children can distinguish mental states from 
observable events. They found that 3 year-olds acknowledged that if 
someone is merely thinking about a biscuit, they do not really have a 
biscuit. If 3 year-olds are told one boy has a biscuit and another boy is 
thinking about a biscuit, they can tell you which biscuit can be eaten, 
shared, touched, etc. Other studies show how young children can 
understand the subjectivity of thoughts. In simple tasks they can state 
that they can 'see' their own mental images, but that others cannot (Estes, 
et al., 1989) or that while they may think that a particular biscuit tastes 
nice, another person may think that it is horrible (Flavell et al., 1990). 
Harris et al., (1991) also showed that young children can appropriately 
distinguish between real and mental entities in 'fantasy-reality' tests, 
investigating children's understanding of monsters, ghosts and witches. 
Several authors have identified some possible factors which may 
facilitate young children's acquisition of mental state language. These 
studies have great significance for the present author's development of 
experimental work in chapter 6. Wellman (1985) proposes that both 
formal education and references to internal states in everyday speech may 
contribute to internal state acquisition. Bearison and Cassel (1975) found 
that children of parents who referred to needs, intentions thoughts, and 
feelings, when attempting to regulate their children's behaviour, 
performed better on a communication task than did children whose 
parents were more likely to refer to rules in such situations. Dunn, 
Bretherton and Munn (1987) analysed verbal communication about 
feeling states in naturally occurring conversations at home. The authors 
found an increase in explicit references to feeling states between 18 and 
24 months both in children's speech and in maternal speech to children. 
They found that references to feeling states made by the mother and older 
sibling when the target child was 18 months were positively correlated 
with the target child's speech about feeling states at 24 months. 
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Flavell (1988) proposes that one of the ways young children develop a 
common sense psychology is the way their parents explain mental states 
to them, - drawing their attention to the wishes, hopes, and purposes of 
others. 
Furrow et al (1992) also looked at the relationship between mental state 
use in mothers' and their young children's language. They found that 
children's mental term use mirrored that of their mothers and that 
mothers' use of mental terms for particular functions when their children 
were 2 years of age predicted their children's use at 3 years. The authors 
state that their findings suggest that the development of mental state 
language is fostered by the linguistic environment of the home. Moore et 
al. (1994) provide further evidence that maternal use of belief terms and 
the ways in which mothers direct children's attention to mental states has 
been shown to be a significant predictor to their children's future 
understanding and use of belief terms. Moore et al., found that mothers 
who use more belief vocabulary (e. g., know, think, guess, remember, 
etc. ) when their children are two years of age have children who use more 
desire terms at that age (e. g., want, need, wish, prefer, etc. ), more belief 
terms one and two years later, and have 4-year-old children who 
understand better the distinctions among belief terms. 
Beeghly et al. (1986) investigated the frequency and type of internal state 
language used by mothers of Down's Syndrome children to their children. 
They analysed the internal state language used by mothers to their young 
non-learning disabled children, and compared this with the internal state 
language used by mothers to Down's Syndrome children. The analysis 
showed that mothers of children with Down's syndrome used 
proportionately far fewer internal state utterances than did mothers of the 
non-handicapped children -even when the children were matched for 
linguistic level or mental age. One category of the Down's mothers' 
internal state utterances which seemed particularly sparse were those 
relating to cognition, i. e., metacognitive language. Beeghly et al. 
speculate that mothers of Down Syndrome children may have used less 
internal state language "because they had overly pessimistic expectations 
for their children's linguistic and cognitive development". The authors 
add that "Insofar as children's linguistic environment affects children's 
acquisition of an internal state vocabulary, children with Down's 
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syndrome may be at some disadvantage in acquiring the verbal means 
needed to discuss intentions, motivations, cognition and feelings with 
others. " (Beeghly et al 1986, page 259). 
To the author's knowledge, there have been no follow up studies to see if 
Beeghly's findings are replicated with other groups of mothers of children 
with Down's Syndrome, or for that matter, mothers of other children with 
severe learning difficulties. Commenting on Beeghly et al's research, 
Hinchcliffe and Roberts (1987) considered it reasonable to infer that 
other groups of children with severe learning difficulties were likely to 
experience a similar disadvantage; if so, they suggested, children with 
severe learning difficulties "may be retarded not only by their own 
inherent cognitive impairments but also by a degree of deprivation in 
their language environment. " (page 77). 
There have been few studies investigating the understanding and use of 
internal state language among children with severe learning disabilities. 
Tager-Flusberg (1992) analysed spontaneous speech from a longitudinal 
study of language-acquisition in autistic and Down's Syndrome children. 
Children's references to internal states were categorised into four major 
categories: desire, perception, emotion and cognition. Down's Syndrome 
children's internal state language was found to make reference to all 
categories, but the autistic children made significantly less reference to 
cognitive states. This finding fits in well to the 'theory of mind' research 
undertaken with autistic children referred to in chapter 3, which has 
shown that autistic children are significantly less able to understand the 
representational nature of the mind than matched mainstream and Down's 
children. If autistic children generally find representation of epistemic 
states difficult, it follows that they are unlikely to use language relating to 
cognitive states (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). 
Although it is interesting to note from Tager-Flusberg's longitudinal 
study that children with Down's Syndrome are able to use internal state 
language relating to the above four categories, little information is 
provided by the author about the Down's children in the sample. This 
was an American study and it is not clear how far the children with 
Down's Syndrome who participated can be regarded as having severe 
learning difficulties. Children with Down's Syndrome, like most children 
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with learning 'disabilities, have individual differences across a range of 
developmental areas. Some older pupils in Britain have been successful 
in passing GCSE's, passing their driving tests in later life and holding 
down jobs in the community. Other young people with Down's 
Syndrome experience severe developmental delay in most areas; some 
have profound learning difficulties. 
This prompted the author to investigate the use of internal state terms by 
a group of children with Down's Syndrome with severe learning 
difficulties and a group of non-learning disabled children, aged 1-5 years. 
This study is described below. 
6.3 Study 4: The spontaneous use of internal state language by 
young non-learning disabled children and children with Down's 
Syndrome. 
6.4 Introduction 
To the author's knowledge, there have been few studies reported in the 
literature which have analysed the understanding and use of internal state 
terms among children with severe learning difficulties. Additionally, 
most of the longitudinal studies analysing the internal state language of 
non-learning disabled children have come from the USA. There may be 
some differences in use of internal state language among American and 
British native speakers. The word 'guess', used in the majority of 
instances by British speakers as a metacognitive term, is often used in a 
non-cognitive sense by American people-meaning 'suppose', e. g., "I guess 
we should go and get the shopping"16. For this reason, the first stage of 
the author's study is to invite parents of non-learning disabled children 
aged between 2-5 years to record their children's spontaneous use of 
targeted internal state terms, some relating to cognition. The author then 
repeats the procedure with parents of children with severe learning 
difficulties. 
This study used parental questionnaires to investigate children's 
spontaneous use of 18 internal state words; 3 words relating to perception 
16 British people do use 'guess' in this way, probably because of the 
influence of American culture. 
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('see', 'hear' and 'feel'), 3 words relating to intentions and desires ('mean', 
'wish' and 'hope') and 12 words relating to cognition ('know', 'remember', 
'think', 'wonder', 'believe', 'forget', 'guess', 'understand', 'dream', 'pretend', 
'trick' and 'mistake'). The last 3 words-'pretend', 'trick' and 'mistake' have 
been put into this category because, although they may not strictly be 
classed as metacognitive words, depending on how they are used, they 
may imply a reference to a mental state (cognition). These words are 
shown in table 8. The main aim of the study is to investigate the use of 
internal state terms by a group of Down's Syndrome children with severe 
learning difficulties. However, as there have (to the author's knowledge) 
been few studies investigating the internal state language of British non- 
learning disabled children, it was decided to obtain data on young 
children aged between 2-5 years. This would allow certain comparisons 
to be made between the ways non-learning disabled and learning disabled 
children use internal state language. 
6.5 The questionnaire 
Parents of both groups of children were asked to report on their children's 
spontaneous use of 18 'target' internal state words. Longitudinal studies 
of children's language indicate that perception words are among the first 
category of internal state words used by the young child; metacognitive 
words are generally found much later in children's spontaneous speech 
(Shatz, 1983; Bretherton and Beeghly, 1982). Parents were sent a 
questionnaire containing a list of the 18 targeted words. Parents were 
asked to keep the questionnaire for a period of one month and write down 
examples of phrases and sentences in which their children spontaneously 
used any of the targeted internal state words. Parents were asked to place 
or pin the list of words in a convenient location, so that they had easy 
access to it (e. g., on a fridge, cupboard, shopping-board, etc. ). The actual 
instructions relating to the list of words were as follows: "Does your child 
use, with understanding, any of the following words? Please give, 
alongside each word, example(s) of sentences and phrases in which your 
child uses any of these words". These examples of phrases and sentences 
in which these targeted internal state words were used provided the 
researcher with information about context and allowed him to assess 
whether the words were used with 'internal content', i. e., whether they 
were used in ä semantic rather than pragmatic way (Scholnick and Hall, 
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1991). A semantic use occurs when the literal internal-state meaning of a 
word contributes directly to the intended meaning of the utterance 
containing it. In respect of the metacognitive words listed, consideration 
of the phrase or sentence in which the internal state word is used provides 
information about whether the word was used in a truly metacognitive 
way, i. e., whether it was used to convey something about knowledge 
itself. In this way, the pragmatic uses of the terms, of which examples 
were given on page ? above, could be identified and eliminated. 
When analysing the questionnaires, a strict criterion of acceptance of 
internal state usage was implemented. If parents had indicated on the 
questionnaire that their child had used an individual targeted internal state 
word, but they did not provide the sentence in which it occurred, their 
response to this item was scored as a 'no'. If the parent had left a blank 
alongside an individual word, this nil response was also interpreted as a 
'no'. These strict criteria were applied stringently in the data analysis so 
as not to give an optimistic picture of internal state use by children. If 
anything, these rigorous criteria for a 'yes' response (whether individual 
words could be counted as being used with 'internal content' by children) 
may have led to a slight underestimation of children's abilities to use 
internal state words. 
The questionnaire also contained questions about the child's age and sex. 
It also asked whether the child in question had, as far as the parent knew, 
normal language development and general development. The parents of 
the non-learning disabled children were, in the main, friends of the 
author's undergraduate college students. These students distributed the 
questionnaires and collected them after a period of one month. Students 
were made aware of the importance of consistency between respondents 
in terms of how long they kept the form. In total, 112 questionnaires 
were given to parents of non-learning disabled children, and 86 were 
returned. 3 of the questionnaires were rejected due to illegibility or 
because the children referred to attended a special school. In total 83 
questionnaire responses from parents of non-learning disabled children 
were analysed. 
The questionnaires sent to parents of Down's Syndrome children 
contained some additional questions. Parents were asked if their child 
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had Down's Syndrome with severe learning difficulties. Parents were 
also asked if their child attended a school for children with severe 
learning difficulties. These questions helped to ensure that the group of 
children with Down's Syndrome were children who could be regarded as 
being within the range of severe learning difficulties; however, as was 
discussed earlier, defining this range is problematic. Within the special 
school population, there is a range of individual differences among 
children. In the author's experience, nearly all schools for children with 
severe learning difficulties have some 'borderline' children, who may be 
considered to be within the MLD (moderate learning difficulties) range. 
The Down's Syndrome children in this sample all attended schools for 
children with severe learning difficulties. 
The covering letter of the questionnaire sent to parents of children with 
Down's Syndrome invited parents to respond to questions about their 
child's expressive language. These are reproduced below and are aimed 
to elicit a'benchmark' measure of the child's expressive language (pre- 
verbal, one word/sign, two-word/sign, three-word/sign, four-word/sign 
and longer). 
a) Is your child showing a response to your words/ signs but (at the 
present time he or she is) not yet using any recognisable signs or words? 
b) Is your child, most of the time, using single words/ signs? 
c) Is your child, most of the time, using two word/ sign combinations, 
e. g., "daddy car"? 
d) Is your child, most of the time, using three word/ sign combinations, 
e. g., "Mum drinking tea"? 
e) Is your child, most of the time, using four-element or longer 
structures? 
The parents of the Down's Syndrome children in this study were the 
parents of children taught by teachers on the author's in-service course in 
the education of children with severe learning difficulties. Parental 
responses about their Down's Syndrome children referred to children 
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attending schools for children with severe learning difficulties in the 
West London area. Co-operation of teachers in this study gave an added 
check on parental responses to the child's expressive language referred to 
above. In all but 4 cases, the teachers agreed with the parents' response 
regarding their child's expressive language abilities (one-word, two word/ 
sign, etc. ). These 4 questionnaires were removed from the analysis. 
62 questionnaires were distributed to teachers on the author's in-service 
course. 51 were returned. 6 questionnaires were removed from the 
analysis because the children referred to on the form were shown to be 
pre-verbal. (This was the result of a misunderstanding; teachers were 
told that pre-verbal children were not intended to be included in the 
study). As mentioned above, 4 questionnaires were also removed from 
the analysis because the teacher did not agree with the parents' response 
to the expressive language question. This left 41 questionnaires in the 
Down's Syndrome children sample. 
6.6 Results 
Non-learning disabled children 
Table 8 shows the percentages of non-learning disabled 2-, 3-, 4-and 5- 
year-old children who were reported to be using the targeted internal state 
words. As indicated above, the sentence or phrase in which the child 
used the word was analysed to ensure that the word was used with 
reference to 'internal content', i. e., for the metacognitive words, that the 
children's use of the word related to knowledge. Parents' examples of 
their children's use of the word 'feel' showed that children aged between 2 
and 5 years used the word as a perception word and an emotion word 
("You feel soft", and "Mummy feels poorly"). The only 1-year-old child 
who used the word 'feel' used it as a perception word ("feel wet", child 
aged 22 months). The word 'mean' can be used relating to 'intention', 
e. g., "I didn't mean to spill my drink" or in a metalinguistic sense, e. g., "I 
don't know what it (a word) means. ` In this study, both interpretations of 
the word 'mean' were accepted, i. e., relating to intention and 
metalanguage. 
150 
Table 8 Non-learning disabled children's use of internal state terms 
1 year 2 year 3 year 4 year 5 year 
n= 12 29 18 12 12 
ae ran e 18-23 mth 24-35 mth 36-47 mth 48-59 mth 60-71 mth 
mean age 20 mth 29 mth 41 mth 52 mth 67 mth 
see 25 86 100 100 100 
hear 0 69 83 100 100 
know 0 38 89 100 100 
feel 8 41 83 100 100 
for et 0 7 72 100 100 
remember 0 17 78 92 100 
think 0 34 72 92 100 
mean 0 10 61 83 100 
pretend 0 17 72 75 100 
dream 0 7 28 75 100 
wish 0 0 28 75 100 
underst. 0 0 39 67 100 
hope 0 3 22 67 100 
guess 0 0 28 58 100 
trick 0 10 43 58 92 
mistake 0 3 33 58 92 
wonder 0 0 33 50 92 
believe 0 0 11 58 92 
1 year-old children 
A small proportion of the 1 year-old children in the sample, all above 18 
months, used two of the perception words, 'see' (25%) and 'feel' (8%). 
One of the children, aged 22 months used the word 'see' ("me see 
+point... "; and "feel wet"). Two other children were reported to use 
"see", one aged 20 months (also saying "me see +gesture") and another 
aged 22 months ("mummy see"). These constructions are similar to the 2 
year-old children's use of the perception words, e. g., "me see moon" 
(2,4); "me hear da, da" (fire engine, 2,4); "I hear Lucienne" (2,4); "you 
feel soft" (2,5); "feel my hand, mum" (2,10); "It feels hot" (2,11). 
2 year-old children 
From this sample of 29 parents of 2-year-old children, the word 'hear' was 
heard by more of them (69%) than the word 'feel' (41%). In fact the 
metacognitive word 'know' appeared to be heard more by parents of 2- 
year-olds than the word 'feel'. As indicated earlier, the author was able to 
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differentiate explicit semantic uses of the word 'know' from pragmatic 
uses because he had the sentences and phrases in which young children 
used the word. However, the process of trying to differentiate mental 
from non-mental use, made the author realise how difficult a task this is. 
In order to ascertain, with any degree of certainty, that internal states are 
used with 'internal content', it seems the assessor would really need to be 
present when the child used the term. This is because then (and perhaps 
only then) can the listener fully appreciate the non-linguistic context 
which accompanies the child's internal state reference 17. Nevertheless, 
examples of the 2-year-old children's use of the word 'know', in which 
they do seem to make reference to knowledge include, "Daddy knows 
how it works" (2,5); "I know this book" (2,11); "Yes, I know it's naughty" 
(2,7); "I know what it means" (2,7); "I don't know how to do this one" 
(2,7) and "I don't know where mine (sic) shoes are" (2,7). The youngest 
2-year-old child reported to use the word 'know' was 2 years 5 months 
(example above). 
The word 'feel' was reported to be used by 41% of the 2-year-olds. In the 
majority of cases it was used as a perception word, e. g., "Feel the dolly's 
hair, mummy" (2,7); "I feel sick" (2,5). 
The word 'think' was reported to be used by 34% of the 2-year-olds. The 
youngest child reported to be using the word was aged 2 years, 4 months 
("I think Daddy come home"). Other examples of the word 'think' 
include: "I think Tom's naughty" (2,7); "I think it's like Thunderbirds" 
(2,7); "I think it's cold" (2,9); and "I think teddy ate my sweet" (2,10). 
The word 'pretend' was reported to be used by 17% of 2-year-olds. The 
youngest child in the sample using it was a child aged 2 years, 7 months 
("I'm just pretending to cook it"(2, ). Other examples include, "Only 
pretend to drink it" (child drinking bath water, 2,7); and "I'm pretending 
it's a rocket" (referring to a pen, 2,8). 
10% of the sample of 2-year-olds used the word 'mean' relating to 
intention. The youngest-child was 2 years 7 months, who was reported as 
17 This brings to mind Donaldson's views about 'embedded language', where 
young children's language is embedded in the flow of events which 
accompany it, i. e., the context (Donaldson, 1978). Donaldson states that the 
non- linguistic context of spoken language exerts a powerful influence on interpretation. 
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saying "I didn't mean it" (when the child bumped into her sister, child 
aged 2,7). Other examples include, "Didn't mean to spill my drink" (2,7) 
and "I didn't mean to" (2,10). 'Remember' was used by 17% of the 
sample and the youngest child who used the word was 2 years 5 months, 
reported as saying, "I can't remember her" (2,6). Other examples include, 
"I remember it" (2,5) and "remember this, daddy" (2,11). 'Forget' was 
used by 7% of the 2-year-olds, examples include "I forgot my car" (2,4) 
"I forget my lunch box" (2,7). 
The word 'trick' is another example of a word which is difficult to assess 
in terms of its metacognitive content. Some parental references to the 
word referred to its use as a noun, where there may be a hint of 
metacognitive implication, for example, "I show you a trick". From this 
statement, it is not certain whether the word 'trick' is being used in a 
metacognitive sense, and so it was rejected. The following examples of 
children's use of the word as a verb were accepted as they imply a 
reference to someone's mental state, "I'm tricking you, daddy" (hiding his 
keys, child aged 2,7); "I hide your money, mum-I trick you" (2,7). 
Only 1 child from the sample of 29 2-year-olds (3%) used the word'hope' 
and 'mistake' (the same child). He was reported to have said, "He made a 
mistake" (the child's brother 2,6) and "I hope so" (in response to a 
question whether his brother is coming home). Two children were 
reported to have used the word 'dream'. Both children used the word as a 
noun, and again, it is difficult to assess whether it is being used in a truly 
metacognitive sense, "Had horrible dream, mummy" (2,7) and "I had a 
dream about a snake" (2,6). These examples were accepted because the 
children are referring to a (previous) state of mind. 
None of the 2-year-olds in this sample were reported to use the words 
'wish', 'understand', 'guess', 'wonder', or 'believe'. 
3-year-old children 
The words 'wish', 'understand', 'guess', 'wonder', and 'believe', which were 
not reported in the language of 2-year-olds, were reported to be used 
fairly infrequently by 3-year-old children. The word 'wish' was used by 
only 28% of the sample; references included "I wish it was mine" (3,0) 
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and "I wish I had a computer" (3,4). 'Understand' was used by 39% of 
the sample, e. g., "Do you understand me? " (3,0) and "My teacher got 
cross because she didn't understand that I wasn't being naughty" (3,4). 
Examples of the word 'guess' (28% of the sample) were used primarily as 
questions, e. g., "Guess what's in my hand? " (3,0) and "Guess what's in 
the box" (3,9). 'Wonder' was reported by 33% of the sample and 
included, "I wonder what's in there, now" (3,4) and "I wonder where he's 
going? " (3,4). Some uses of the word 'wonder' were rejected, e. g., "I 
wonder if you could help me" (3,0). This is an example of a pragmatic 
use of the word, rather than metacognitive use ('wonder' in this context 
suggests "Please can you help me"). 
'Believe' was reported to be used, by only 11 % of 3-year-olds, e. g., "You 
don't believe him, do you mum? " (3,4) and "All right, I believe you" 
(3,9). 
References to the word 'dream' were still fairly scarce among the 3-year- 
olds (28%). However, a child of just 3 years is reported to have used the 
word, "I dreamed I saw some lions" (3,0). Another child is reported to 
say, "I only like nice dreams (3,9). 'Hope' is used by 22% of the sample, 
e. g., "I hope we can go swimming" (3,0) and "I hope we got (sic) dinner 
soon" (3,4). References to 'mistake' were reported by 33% of the sample, 
including, "I made a mistake, it was Tom not Bonnie" (3,11) - referring to 
two cats. 
From the table, there is a noticeable increase in children's use of the 
following words between the 2-year-old and 3-year old children, - 
'remember' (17% to 78%), 'forget' (7% to 72%) and 'pretend' (17% to 
72%). Examples of the word 'remember' indicate metacognitive usage-, 
"I remember, you did that for my birthday" (3,1) and, "Do you remember 
when we had our photo taken? " (3,11). Examples of the word 'forget' 
include, "I forgot my doll" (3,3) and "Don't forget, now" (3,4). 
'Pretend' was not only used as a verb, "Let's pretend we're in the 
Labyrinth" (3,0); "I only pretend cut hair" (3,1), but also as an adjective, 
"This is a pretend doggy" (3,0). It is possible that the onset of pretend 
play generally seen in young children's play at about 2 years, 6 months 
may explain children's increasing references to pretence when they are 3 
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years; engagement in pretend play may be thought to precede 
metacognitive reference to such activity-the 'doing' precedes the 'talking 
about the doing'. 
The child's interest in pretence and deception around 2-3 years may 
explain why references to 'trick' become more common (43% of the 3 
-year-olds). References are mainly verbs, and unlike in the 2-year-olds' 
utterances, the metacognitive implication is more clearly evident, e. g., 
"Let's do a trick on mummy" (hide something from her, child aged 3,1) 
and "He's not really a tree, he's trying to trick the children" (referring to a 
story, child aged 3,11). 
4-and 5-year-old 
The words 'guess', 'trick', 'mistake', 'wonder' and 'believe' were reported to 
be used by just over half of the 4-year-olds, but most of the 5-year-olds 
were reported to be using these words and all the others. 
6.7 Summary findings (non-learning-disabled children) 
Figure 6 shows a graphical representation of internal state word use 
across the age range. 
The words on the left-hand side of the graph are words which are 
reportedly being used by the children at an earlier age than the words on 
the right-hand side. Of course, the findings of this study relate to a 
relatively small number of children in each age range, therefore any 
findings must be viewed with caution. If parents fail to report children 
using certain internal state terms at certain ages it does not mean that 
individual children are not using those words: it means that they have not 
been heard to use those words over the observational period specified 
(one month). Again, this means that these findings should be regarded as 
tentative. 
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Down's Syndrome Children 
41 responses from parents of children18 with Down's Syndrome aged 
between 3 years, 3 months and 19 years, 3 months were analysed. All 
children in this sample were attending schools for children with severe 
learning difficulties. There was only one 3-year -old in the sample (aged 
3,3) and she attended a nursery class in a special school. There were two 
19-year-olds in the sample (aged 19,1 and 19,3). Pupils in schools for 
children with severe learning difficulties can stay at school until they are 
19 years of age, and generally leave at the end of the term nearest their 
19th birthday. 
Only those children who were reported to be using a minimum of single 
words were included in the analysis. The groups of children described as 
being at the 3-and 4-plus word level were collapsed into one group. This 
was because of the low numbers of children in these 2 groups (six at the 3 
word-level; nine at the 4-plus word level). This seemed acceptable as 
children with expressive language at the 3 to 4-plus word level are 
regarded as having relatively good language skills in schools for children 
with severe learning difficulties. 
Down's children at the single word level 
None of the 12 children at the single word/ sign level (aged between 3,3- 
12,1) were reported to be using any of the 18 internal state words. 
Down's children at the two-word level 
8 out of the 14 (57%) children at the two-word level were reported to be 
using the word 'see'. Interestingly, these were not the oldest children in 
the sample; three 4-year-old children and one 5-year-old child were using 
the word (see table 9). The types of 2-word phrases used by the children 
included, "see daddy" (4,4); "me see" (meaning "let me see", 4,9); "see 
dog" (5,4); "see you" (when playing hide and seek, 8,9; "see fish" (9,3) 
and "see grandma" (11,11). All of the examples above relate to the 
18 For brevity, I use the word "children" to include young people up to age 19. 
157 
children referring to what they themselves could 'see'-people and animals. 
There were no reported references of Down's children referring to what 
other people could 'see', as was the case in one of the youngest non- 
learning disabled children (1,10) when she was reported to say "Mummy 
see". However, references to self perception by Down's children 
mirrored the majority of the examples of the word 'see' by non-learning 
disabled 1-and 2-year-olds. 
Table 9 Internal state words used by Down's children at the 2-word level. 
A 4,1 4,4 4,9 4,11 4,11 5,4 6,4 6,9 8,7 8,9 9,2 9,3 9,3 11,11 
Lang 
level 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
hear    
knw 
feel  
f. ct 
rem. 
think  
mean 
pr. d 
dr. m 
wish 
unds. 
hope 
SS 
tnck 
mista 
won 
helve 
Three of the children who were reported to use the word 'see' were also 
using the word 'hear' (21 % of the sample). Examples of the use of 'hear' 
include, "hear Kimberly" (6,9); "hear bird" (8,9) and "hear daddy" (9,3). 
Only one child in the sample was reported to use the word 'feel' 
(perception) saying " feel cold" (8,9) and one other child used the word 
'think' (metacognition), "think cat" (when seeing a squirrel, aged 5,4). 
This child's use of 'think' almost certainly shows metacognitive content. 
The only other target internal state word that this child was reported to 
have used was 'see'. 
The results at the 2-word level do not show a clear relationship between 
age and internal state use. Table 9 shows that it is not the older children 
in the group who were reported to be using the most internal state 
I 
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language. Three of the youngest children in the group were using the 
word 'see'. However, the children who were reported to be using more 
than one internal state word tended to be the older children; however, we 
can see one child aged 11 years who was reported to not be using any of 
the targeted internal state words. A much larger follow-up study would 
be needed with greater numbers of children in each group to investigate a 
correlation between internal state use and expressive language level and 
age. 
Down's children at the three/ four plus-word level 
All of the children in the sample at the 3/ 4+ word-level were reported to 
be using the word 'see'. 12 of the 15 children (80%) were using the 
words 'hear' and 'know'. In the majority of examples of the children's use 
of 'hear', children were referring to themselves, e. g., "Charlotte (meaning 
herself) hear baby crying" (4,2); "Can't hear you" (referring to herself, 
age 6,6); "I can hear the television" (7,6) and "I can hear the alarm" (7,9). 
However, there was one example of a child referring to other people's 
perceptions, e. g., "Can you hear it? Listen, Daddy", (15,5). 
The same criteria of accepting only what appeared to be semantic uses of 
internal state terms were applied to the Down's examples as with those 
from the non-learning disabled reports. In the case of the word 'know', all 
the examples provided were accepted, e. g., "I know what to do", (16,4); 
"I know what you mean", (19,1); "I don't know how to do it", (7,9); and 
"I know that song", (7,6). 
The examples of the children's use of the word 'feel', (used by 67% of the 
sample) were equally balanced between perception references and 
references to (own) feeling states. Examples of the former include, 
"Grass feels prickly", (4,2); "You feel it mum, it's wet", (15,5); "that feels 
too hot", (7,9); "it feels funny", (referring to touch, age 19,1); and "this 
dog feels soft" (16,4). Examples of feeling state references include, "I 
feel cold", (7,6); "it feels sore", (14,10); "I feel sick", (11,5); and "I don't 
feel well", (16,10). 
'Remember' and 'trick' were used by 67% of the sample. As with the 
non-learning disabled children's use of the work 'trick', it is difficult to 
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ascertain the level of metacognitive implication in the Down's children's 
examples. In some examples, the meaning is unclear, as in "I'm going to 
play a trick on you", (19,1). Without further clues about the context, i. e., 
the type of trick referred to and what actually happened, it is difficult to 
determine the level of metacognitive implication. Other examples are 
more clearly identifiable as referring to deception, e. g., "I was tricking 
you", (after some dreadful joke, age 11,5) and "I'm going to play a trick 
on mummy and put glue on her seat", (7,6). 
Some pragmatic uses of the word 'think' were not accepted, e. g., "I'll get 
my bike out, I think" and "I think so". Examples that were accepted 
include, "I think that boy likes me", (19,3); "think hard! ", (15,5); "1 think 
it will be roast dinner tomorrow", (7,6); and "I think you're horrible" 
(11,5). 
'Pretend' and 'mistake' were used by 47% of the sample. Examples 
include, "Let's pretend we're witches and fairies", (11,5); "You pretend to 
be the baddie", (7,6); and "Don't worry mum, I'm only pretending", (to be 
cross, age 7,9); "I made a mistake" (looking at school work, age 11,5). 
References to the word 'dream' were made by 6 of the 15 children, e. g., "I 
dream about holidays in bed", (11,5); "I had a bad dream about ghosts", 
(8,1); and "I had a dream about school", (15,5). Two examples were 
rejected-"I was dreaming", and "dream in bed". 
From the sample of children with Down's Syndrome, the word 'wonder' 
was reported to be used the least frequently (3 out of the 15 children; 
20%). Four parents provided examples, but one was rejected as the word 
'wonder' was used reciting a verse from a Nursery Rhyme. The three 
accepted uses were "I wonder what Nanny is doing", (16,4); "I wonder if 
grandma is coming for lunch", (11,5); and "I wonder what this is", (19,1). 
Although age did not seem to be significant at the 2-word level, at the 3- 
to 4-plus word level, age seemed to have a more direct relationship to 
children's use of internal state terms. Table 10 shows the children's 
internal state use according to age. At the 3-to 4-plus word level, the 
results indicate a trend for the older children in the group to be using 
more internal state words than the younger children. This is not 
surprising, for if children's use of internal state language is related to their 
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exposure to such terms in their linguistic environments, as was proposed 
by Furrow et al (1992), Moore et al (1994) and Beeghly et al (1986), then 
the older children will have had greater experience of internal state 
reference. However, the table also reflects the individual differences 
typically seen in the development of children with severe learning 
difficulties (and perhaps, to a lesser extent, in groups of non-learning 
disabled children). One of the two children aged 7 years 6 months is 
reported to be using 12 internal state words; the other only 2. However, 
closer examination of the questionnaire responses of these two children 
does show that the child who was observed to use less internal state 
language was assessed by parents and his teacher as being at the 3-word 
expressive level; and the other child who used 12 internal state words was 
at the 4-plus word level. The examples of children's language from both 
questionnaires demonstrate the difference between the children in terms 
of maturity and linguistic expression. A larger sample of children at the 
3-word and 4-plus word level would be needed to explore the relationship 
between increased internal state use and more developed linguistic 
expression (4-plus word as opposed to 3-word level). Limited numbers 
of children at the 3-and 4-plus word level meant that these two groups 
were collapsed into one group. However, table 10 shows that parental 
reports on the 6 children assessed as being at the 3-word level did show 
less internal state usage among these children than among the 9 children 
at the 4-plus word level. It is also noticeable that with the exception of 
one child, aged 8.1, it was the younger children in this sample who were 
assessed as being at the 3-word level. 
6.8 Summary findings (children with Down's Syndrome) 
Table 11 shows the results of all groups of children with Down's 
Syndrome. This shows that children with more advanced language 
abilities, as measured by parental and teacher's description of being at a 
1-word, 2-word, 3-or 4-plus word level of expressive language, were 
using more internal state language relating to perception and cognition. 
Figure 7 shows a graphical representation of the results across language 
levels. 
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Table 10 Internal state words used by children with Down's Syndrome at the 3/4- 
plus word level. 
A 4,2 4,4 5,0 6,6 7,6 7,6 7,9 8,1 11 5 1461U 1 15,5 16,4 16,10 19,1 19,3 
Lang 
level 
3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 
see           
     
hear             
kaw             
feel           
f get 
rem.        
   
think         
 
mean     
   
dr. m    
   
wish  
   
unds. 
     
- 
 
hope 607 
SS 
     
trick          
 
mista      
  
Won.   
 
belve     
Table 11 Down's syndrome children's use of internal state terms. 
1 word 2 word 3 /4+ word 
number 12 14 15 
age-range 3,3-12,1 41-11111 4.2-19.3 
mean a Re 629 7,0 109 
see 0 57 100 
hear 0 21 80 
know 0 0 80 
feel 0 8 67 
for et 0 0 60 
remember 0 0 67 
think 0 8 60 
mean 0 0 47 
pretend 0 0 47 
dream 0 0 40 
wish 0 0 33 
understand 0 0 40 
hope 0 0 33 
guess 0 0 33 
trick 0 0 67 
mistake 0 0 47 
wonder 0 0 20 
believe 0 0 33 
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6.9 Discussion 
In this study, parental reports of non-learning disabled children's 
spontaneous use of 18 internal state words indicated, not surprisingly, an 
increase in internal state reference between the ages of 1-5 years. A 
small proportion of 1-year-old children (all aged over 18 months) were 
reported to be using internal state language relating to perception ('see' 
and 'feel'), but none of this group was using any metacognitive language. 
Words relating to perception ('see', 'hear' and 'feel') were reported to be 
the most common use of internal state terms in 2-year-olds; however, 
metacognitive words were shown to be used by some 2-year-olds, 
particularly 'know' and 'think' (used by roughly a third of the sample). 
Findings from 3-and 4-year-olds show a gradual increase in use of 
targeted internal state words, with the vast majority of 5-year-old children 
using all 18 of the metacognitive words. 
Results from parental reports of spontaneous internal state word use 
among children with Down's Syndrome showed that the children who 
had more advanced expressive language abilities, in terms of whether 
they were described as being at the 1-, 2-, 3-or 4-plus word level, were 
using more internal state language. None of the Down's children in the 
sample at the one-word level was using any of the targeted internal state 
words. Some of the Down's children at the 2 word-level were using 
internal states referring to perception (the word 'see' being used by just 
over one half of the sample), but with the exception of one child using the 
word 'know', none of the rest of the children at the 2-word level was 
using any metacognitive words. The majority of children at the 3/4+ 
word level were using perception words. In this group, all the internal 
state words were reported to be used by at least a minimum of 3 of the 
children (the-word 'wonder' was the least frequently reported, but even 
then, this was heard from 20% of the sample). 
In the Down's group of children at the 3/4+ word level, as with the non- 
learning disabled group, age seemed to have an effect on internal state 
use; the older children were the children reported to be using more 
internal state words. However, the small number of children in groups in 
this study means that these findings must be regarded as tentative. 
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Comparison of the data on spontaneous use of internal state terms by 
non-learning disabled children and children with Down's Syndrome 
reveals some interesting preliminary findings. Figure 8 shows a graph of 
internal state use by the 3-year-old non-learning disabled group and the 
Down's children at the 3/4+ word level. The internal state words on the 
'x' axis are ranked in descending order of percentage use according to the 
findings of the non-learning 3-year old group. If one places a ruler 
vertically at the mid-point of the graph, alongside the word 'mean' on the 
'x'-axis, it can be seen that consistently less of the Down's group are 
reported to be using the internal state words on the left hand side of the 
graph than the non-learning disabled 3-year-olds ('see' to 'mean'). 
However, after the word 'mean', with the exception of the word 'wonder', 
this trend is reversed for the words on the right hand side of the graph, - 
there are more Down's children reported to be using these internal state 
words than the non-learning disabled children. This could be because the 
words on the right hand side of the graph have been shown to be the 
words less frequently heard among the 2-, 3-and 4-year-olds from the 
mainstream sample (the reader might like to refer back to figure 6). The 
words on the right hand side of this graph (figure 8), i. e., 'trick', 
'understand', mistake', 'wonder' 'dream' 'wish', 'guess', 'hope' and 'believe' 
are the words which are heard less in the sample of non-learning disabled 
children; even the 5-year-olds were not all using the words 'trick', 
'mistake', 'wonder' and 'believe'. The reason why there may be 
proportionately more Down's children at the 3/4+ word level using these 
(more difficult19) words (the words towards the right hand side of the 
graph) may be because they are much older than the non-learning 
disabled sample; their ages run from 4 years 2 months to 19 years 3 
months. These older Down's students would be expected to have had 
more experience of what may be regarded as the more 'difficult' internal 
state words (in terms of hearing them being used), and therefore more of 
them would be expected to be heard using them. In fact table 10 shows 
that it is the older Down's children who are using more of the internal 
state terms. The majority of non-learning disabled 3-year-olds are 
reported to be using the words on the left-hand side of figure 8, from 
19 'Difficult' and 'easy' are used here for convenience, - it is not proposed that findings from this study enable individual words to be rated in terms 
of complexity (e. g., metacognitive complexity) or age of acquisition. 
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'see' to 'mean' and then there is a drop from 61% ('mean') to 43% ('trick') 
and then a steady decline in proportions of children using 'understand' to 
'believe'. It is proposed that more non-learning disabled 3-year-olds may 
be using more of the 'easier' words on the left-hand side of the graph than 
the Down's group because the younger Down's children aged 4,2-7,6 
(who are also reported to be at the 3-word level rather than the 4-plus 
word level) are bringing down the general percentage score of the Down's 
group. 
However, when it comes to the more 'difficult' words on the right-hand 
side of the graph (figure 8), fewer 3-year-olds are reported to be using 
them. Further research would need to be undertaken using larger 
numbers of children in different age groups to ascertain whether these 
words do appear later in children's vocabularies and whether these words 
are more complex in terms of their metacognitive content. 
Compared to the non-learning disabled 4-year-olds, far fewer Down's 
children were using the internal state words. Figure 9 shows the 
differences between these two groups. It can be seen that, although the 
numbers in each group are not the same, the internal state word use of the 
Down's children was closer related to the mainstream 3-year-old group. 
The disparity between internal state use of the mainstream 4-year-olds 
and the Down's children at the 3/4+ word level shows a less favourable 
picture of internal state use by the Down's sample. In schools for 
children with severe learning difficulties, children with language at the 
3/4+ level may be considered to be the more able children in the school. 
Even these relatively able children are heard to use less internal state 
language than a group of mainstream 4-year-olds. 
The paucity of internal state language among the Down's sample is even 
more surprising considering that some of the Down's children in the 3/4+ 
word level group would have been some of the older pupils in special 
schools (4 of them were over 16 years). However, three of the children 
in the Down's sample were reported to use all of the 18 targeted internal 
state words (ages 11,5 and 19,1). In the mainstream 4-year-old group 
there were also two children who were reported to use all of the 18 words 
(ages 4,5 and 4,7). 
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The results from this questionnaire-based study provide some information 
on internal state word use among Down's children with severe learning 
difficulties. It has revealed the individual differences among children's 
ability to refer to internal states. It has shown that some of the children 
with relatively good language skills, generally the older ones, are able to 
use internal state language relating to perception and metacognition. It 
has also shown that, compared to the non-learning disabled 4 year-old 
children in this sample, the Down's children were reported to make far 
less use of the 18 targeted internal state words. 
The next study investigates further the internal state word use of pupils 
with severe learning difficulties. This study introduces older students 
with severe learning difficulties to drama, with the intention of exploring 
their understanding and use of internal state terms. 
6.10 Study 5: Using drama with children with severe learning 
difficulties to focus their attention on internal states. 
6.11 General Introduction 
Study 2, in chapter 4, demonstrated the potential of using drama to 
encourage mainstream children to experience first-hand mistaken beliefs 
and thwarted desires. This investigation involves children with severe 
learning difficulty in drama with the aim of focusing their attention on 
their own and other people's internal states. The author's questionnaire- 
based study, described above, indicated that Down's Syndrome children 
with severe learning difficulties were using internal state language 
relating to perception and cognition, but this was in the main limited to 
children with good language skills, i. e., children with expressive 
language at the 3/4+ word level. However, when comparing the parental 
reports of these Down's children's internal state language with reports 
from parents of non-learning disabled 4-year-olds, analysis showed that a 
much lower proportion of Down's children were using the targetted 
internal state words than the 4-year-olds. 
The author's own experience of teaching children with special needs has 
indicated that, although many children with severe learning difficulties 
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can be assumed to have experienced states of emotion, for example, 
feelings of loneliness, frustration, jealousy, etc., they may not necessarily 
have the linguistic ability or the internal state vocabulary to express them, 
or indeed, in terms of receptive language, to attach a word to a feeling 
state. Hinchcliffe and Roberts (1987) suggested that this important area 
of language and communication may be neglected in the curriculum of 
children with severe learning difficulties because special schools have 
been too ready to imitate the curricula of mainstream schools. In 
mainstream schools, teaching the meaning of words relating to internal 
states is not seen as an explicit aim of the curriculum; children would be 
expected to develop that awareness incidentally, through ordinary daily 
life and social experience. Such incidental learning cannot be taken for 
granted in children with severe learning difficulties. Whether or not one 
agrees with Hinchcliffe and Robert's suggestion, it seems clear that the 
danger of social cognitive development being neglected in the education 
of children with severe learning difficulties is increasing, as special 
schools come under pressure to conform to the National Curriculum: 
Hinchcliffe (1994) points out that there is fleeting reference to internal 
state language in the National Curriculum Attainment Targets or 
Programmes of Study, again, because mainstream children develop such 
knowledge and understanding of internal states incidentally in everyday 
social interaction. It is also reasonable to assume that much of young 
children's early social-cognitive learning, particularly their understanding 
of internal state language, takes place in the home before children attend 
school (see Dunn 1988; 1991). It was stated earlier that maternal use of 
belief terms and the ways in which mothers direct children's attention to 
mental states have been shown to be significant predictors of their 
children's future understanding and use of belief terms (Beeghly et al., 
1986; Dunn et al., 1987; Furrow et al., 1992; Moore et al., 1994). 
If it can be assumed that much of the young child's early social-cognitive 
understanding takes place in the home, then the pre-school child with 
severe learning difficulties may not be developmentally receptive to such 
learning, e. g., to parents' and siblings' use of internal state language. 
Indeed, the research referred to earlier by Beeghly et al (1986) suggests 
that mothers of children with Down's Syndrome may not use as much 
internal state language to their young disabled children, thus further 
diminishing their chances of acquiring such language. This means that 
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the children may be at some disadvantage in acquiring the verbal means 
needed to discuss intentions, motivations, cognition and feelings with 
others. 
The study which follows investigates one possible way of giving children 
with severe learning difficulties a rich linguistic environment in terms of 
implicit and explicit reference to internal states. 
6.12 Rationale 
The experimental work detailed below attempts to explore the use of 
drama with a group of students with severe learning difficulties. The 
intention is to analyse the students' responses to dramatic contexts which 
attempt to focus their attention upon people's psychlogical states. In 
contrast to the experimental work undertaken with children reported so 
far in this thesis, this study adopts a qualitative research methodology. 
The researcher's intentions are to provide children with a dynamic 
learning context in which he improvises to the best of his ability to 
facilitate children's understanding of internal state language. The 
experimental context is interactive, where the emphasis is on researcher 
and children learning together. The approach acknowledges the 
importance of 'dynamic and participatory aspects' of social-cognitive 
understanding (Forrester, 1992), i. e., children learn about other people 
(their beliefs, desires and intentions) through participating in social 
interaction. It is through interaction with other people that children come 
to understand about their own and other people's mental states. 
In debriefing sessions after drama, rather as in study 2, the experimenter 
explores the students' understanding of the inferred states of mind of the 
actors. The students are encouraged to relate instances in their own lives 
when they themselves have experienced similar feeling states, and when 
they have identified these internal states in other people. The aim of this 
work is to provide the students with dramatic situations which draw the 
students' attention to people's internal states; to make them consciously 
aware of both their own internal states and those of other people. 
In this study, children with severe learning difficulty watch a series of 
dramatic plays which, in the first instance, are performed by the 
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experimenter and colleagues. The plays refer to short episodes of social 
interaction, in the main, between family members in the home. Often the 
scenes take place in situations of conflict, where the internal states of the 
story characters (both causal and intentional) are made explicit to the 
audience verbally and non-verbally, by strong facial expression, body 
language and intonation of voice. After each play, the experimenter 
talks to the children about what they have seen. He explores the 
children's understanding of the characters' intentions, desires and beliefs. 
Then the children themselves are gradually involved in the drama, 
playing some of the parts of the characters they have been introduced to. 
On some occasions the children are encouraged to improvise within the 
narrative structure, to change the course of events, or to provide their own 
version of the play's conclusion. Two of the plays that the children 
participate in are false belief stories. Here, the experimenter uses some of 
the techniques used previously with mainstream children in an earlier 
study (study 2). Children are 'split-briefed', that is briefed only about the 
part they are to play, and are left ignorant about other actors' intentions, 
desires or beliefs. This means that as the events unfold in the narrative, 
the children have a first-hand experience of false belief. For example, in 
narrative 10 (The Missing Marble), Janet, who plays a young sister, does 
not know that when she has left the room, her 'pretend' brother takes her 
marble out of her box and hides it somewhere else. This means that 
when Janet returns to collect her marble, she still thinks that it is in her 
toy box and is genuinely surprised at its disappearance. It is proposed 
that live simulations such as these, using drama, offer the researcher great 
potential to explore both the actors' and the observers' belief perspectives, 
i. e., their abilities to attribute beliefs according to what characters see, 
desire, intend and know. 
The story narratives used in this study are original and were devised by 
the author for this experimentation. Many of these narratives represent 
contexts which reflect conflict situations. Dunn's observations of young 
children in the home suggest that situations of conflict and threatened 
self-interest are significant contexts in which young children develop an 
understanding of the social world, particularly their awareness of 
psychological states (Dunn, 1991). The dramatic narratives, although 
brief, contain rich social interaction; they include characters deceiving 
each other, evading anticipated disapproval or trouble and pretence. The 
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narratives present characters who become jealous, envious, disappointed 
and embarrassed. They are visually very powerful; the actors (the 
researcher and colleagues) make explicit their feeling states, they give 
strong visual and auditory clues to their mental states (their intentions, 
desires and beliefs) by using strong gesture and facial expression and an 
exaggerated intonation of voice20. The language used in the dialogue is 
the kind of language used and heard in real life; it is deliberately not 
differentiated to the linguistic abilities of the children. In the author's 
experience, too much drama work with children with severe learning 
difficulties is unnecessarily simple and does not simulate real-life social 
interaction. In many ways, the narratives devised for this study resemble 
snippets of television "soaps", although the characters presented here are, 
in the main, children. However, there is a very important distinction 
between these narratives and television soaps. Soaps contain a melee of 
action, often with strands of different plots intermingled together, -a 
series of mini-plots often switching from one social context to another. 
For children with severe learning difficulties, differentiation of some of 
these sub-plots can be difficult2l. The narratives described below are 
context rigid, i. e., they are free-standing and coherent. In the main the 
action is set within the home and involves characters in situations of 
20 Many children with severe learning difficulties are very dependent 
upon these visual and auditory clues to meaning. This is because the 
majority of them have developmental delay in language and 
communication. Children who have difficulty understanding the spoken 
word will look for clues to the speaker's meaning by other contextual, 
auditory and visual clues. 
21 The author has successfully used short video extracts from popular 
television soaps to engage children with severe learning difficulties in 
discussion about the mental states of characters. However, the extracts 
selected by the author have been necessarily short, because there are few 
free- standing, coherent scenes in soaps which are free from interference 
of other sub- plots. In other words, the viewer's understanding of the 
intentions, desires and beliefs of the characters is dependent upon 
previous knowledge of the character. In the narratives designed for this 
study, children do not need to know much about the characters; they are 
not type- cast, the contexts in which the social interaction takes place are 
deliberately fixed. It is proposed that the inferential demands on the 
audience watching these short plays are less than for the viewer of 
television soaps. Another problem with using video extracts of television 
soaps is that they must really be used with children in school the following 
day from when they are screened. The more popular television soaps are 
broadcast two or three times a week. This means that the plot moves on 
rapidly and video- recordings of out of date extracts would be confusing to 
some children with severe learning difficulties because their knowledge of 
the current story line would interfere with the understanding of any 
previous action. 
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conflict, where the characters are trying to preserve their own interests, or 
are upset by a state of events. They are in the main short, but emotive. 
Each play has a clear beginning and an end and the experimenter 
introduces each one by briefly describing the main characters and setting 
the scene. 
The content of the narratives owes much to Dunn's (1991) longitudinal 
observation of young children's interaction in the home. Dunn devised 
four categories of young children's behaviour which demonstrated their 
understanding of the psychological world (what can be called their social - 
cognitive awareness). She examined the natural domestic contexts which 
appeared to afford children with rich opportunities for learning about the 
mental world. She identified the following four categories of young 
children's behaviour and communication. The first concerned the social 
contexts in which children actively try to alter other people's 
psychological states, for example teasing behaviour, comforting, helping 
and joking. The second category included children's explicit references 
to psychological states, where young children begin to use internal state 
vocabulary (see P. 131of this thesis). The third category includes children's 
behaviour when they try to avoid some kind of disapproval, either from 
parents or siblings. Here, Dunn discusses young children's behaviour 
which deliberately thwarts others' intentions, children's excuses to evade 
trouble or punishment and their fibs and lies. Finally, under a general 
category of 'pretence', Dunn identifies contexts of children's pretend play 
as a window into children's awareness of psychological states. 
The drama narratives in this study try to recreate some of the richness of 
this type of social interaction. The narratives are all set within the home 
and, as stated earlier, most of them involve some kind of conflict 
situation, for example a dispute, where a character tries to deceive 
someone, or manipulate another person for their own ends. 
The contexts of the narratives and social interaction between the main 
characters evoke strong emotions. The characters make these feeling 
states explicit using strong imagery. In some plays, the characters 
communicate their states of mind directly to the audience by expressing 
aloud their desires, beliefs and intentions (e. g., narrative 2, line 147). 
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6.13 General and specific aims 
The general aims of this study are a) to evaluate the potential of drama as 
a medium to focus children's attention upon their own and other people's 
internal states, and b) to investigate whether children's involvement in 
drama offers teachers/ researchers a more interactive and spontaneous 
means of investigating children's understanding of internal states. 
These aims, for the purposes of this study, are peculiar to working with 
children with severe learning difficulties, although both the methodology 
and the story scenarios may be seen to be useful when working with other 
groups of children with special needs22. 
In addition to these general aims, the more specific aims of this study are 
as follows: 
-to isolate and discuss instances when children, as a result of being 
involved in drama: 
1) attribute internal states (desires, intentions and beliefs) to story 
characters, 
2) successfully predict story characters' behaviour, according to their 
internal states, and, 
3) generalise the meaning of internal state terms by identifying such 
internal states in themselves or other people in real-life situations. 
These factors are analysed in the individual discussion sections, which 
follow each narrative. 
In addition, the investigator seeks to analyse the type of internal state 
language used by the students. The students' internal state usage will be 
22 These narratives may be useful when working with children with 
emotional and behavioural difficulties. Role- play (and the debriefing 
afterwards) may offer teachers a useful means of encouraging such 
children to think about the consequences of one's actions, to see the world 
from a different perspective and to talk about both their own and other 
people's internal states. 
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categorised into the following six sections (adapted from a previous study 
undertaken by the author, Hinchcliffe and Roberts, 1987). Table 12 
shows the 7 categories of language relating to internal states and 
conscious awareness to be used in this study. 
Table 12: Categories of words relating to internal states and conscious awareness. 
Character and behaviour language (categoryl) -language used to describe people's character and behaviour by reference to their internal 
states, i. e., greedy, honest, kind, cruel, etc. 
Attitude and emotion language (category 2) -refers to people's mental demeanour and feeling states, e. g., happy, sad, cross, angry, frightened, 
jealous, and lonely. 
Perception Language (category 3)-language which expresses 
perceptual experience, e. g., see, hear, feel (physically), smell and notice. 
Desire and volition language (category 4) -includes want, (would) like, 
wish, need, and prefer. 
Metacognitive language (category 5) refers to states of knowledge or 
awareness, e. g., know, think, believe and remember (or the lack of such 
knowledge, e. g., forget, "I don't know", "I don't understand", etc. ). 
Truth-value/ Reality language (category 6) -concerns a person's 
ability to offer judgements about statements or beliefs, e. g., right, true, 
wrong (all referring to statements) and pretend, joke and trick. 
Included in this section are words relating to knowledge of the distinction 
between appearance and reality, e. g., reallyand truly. 
Metalinguistic Language (category 7) includes words referring to the 
ways in which people use language, i. e., words which relate to language 
and its functions, e. g., words like promise, persuade, apologise and lie. 
Adapted from Hinchcliffe, V. and Roberts, M. (1987) Developing social 
cognition and metacognition, in B. Smith (ed. ) Interactive Approaches to 
the Education of Children with Severe Learning Difficulties, Westhill 
College, Birmingham. 
Categories 6 and 7, Truth-value/ Reality language and Metalinguistic 
language may not refer directly to internal states; however, both 
categories include words which demonstrate social -cognitive awareness. 
Language relating to 'truth' and 'reality' is significant because it shows a 
person's ability to reflect both upon language, to "take communications as 
cognitive objects and critically analyze them", (Flavell et al., 1981) and 
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upon people's beliefs or states of mind. Included in this category are 
words relating to knowledge of the distinction between 'appearance' and 
'reality'. 
Metalinguistic language (category 7) includes words which relate to 
language and its functions. Awareness of the ways in which people use 
language is an important aspect of social cognition. Cazden (1983) 
defines metalinguistic knowledge or awareness as "the ability to make 
language forms opaque and attend to them in and for themselves", and 
this is a "special kind of language performance, one which makes special 
cognitive demands.... " (page 303). 
To the author's knowledge there have been few studies which have 
looked in depth at the frequency and type of internal state language used 
by children with severe learning difficulties. This study, which uses the 
medium of drama to encourage children to focus upon their own and 
other people's internal states, represents an opportunity to investigate the 
type of internal state language used by students with severe learning 
difficulties. It must be noted that the students' language cannot be 
regarded as truly spontaneous, because the experimenter has provided the 
stimulus of drama and is deliberately steering the students to talk about 
the characters' intentions, desires and beliefs23. However, it will be seen 
from the experimenter's language in the debriefings, especially in the 
beginning stages, that he is more interested in investigating the students' 
perceptions of what has happened in the drama narratives; he tries to use 
open-ended questions and rarely puts words into the students' mouths. 
The investigation makes no claims for successfully teaching internal state 
vocabulary to members of the group; no pre-or post intervention tests will 
be conducted to assess whether such words are already within the 
vocabulary of the children involved, or whether intervention leads to the 
acquisition of 'targeted' words. Instead, the research described below 
attempts to meet the general and specific aims listed above. The research 
represents an attempt to provide students with contexts in which both 
adults and children can talk about how people's desires, beliefs and 
23 The author's previous investigation did tap children's spontaneous use of 
internal state terms. 
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intentions guide their behaviour. It is not proposed that the following 
ways of working with children are exemplary, except in the strict sense of 
being examples of what might be done. 
6.14 Subjects 
9 students (5 girls and 4 boys) attending a school for children with severe 
learning difficulties in West London participated in this study. The 
students were aged between 15 and 18 years of age and were all in the 
further education unit of the school. 
6.15 Procedure. 
The work described below took place in a classroom. The experimenter 
was joined by two colleagues, both teachers, one of whom was on 
placement in the school. She was a familiar figure to the students and 
had a particular interest in drama. A welfare assistant also attended the 
drama sessions. The experimenter had met some of the students on 
previous visits to the school. He orientated the students to drama by 
talking to them about their favourite "soaps", favourite characters, etc. In 
total, the students observed (and later participated in) 11 short narratives. 
The procedure for all narratives followed the same pattern. At the 
beginning of each play, the experimenter spoke to the students about the 
characters to be played and briefly described the scene. In order to 
prevent confusion in the students' minds as to when the three adults were 
playing parts and when they were being themselves (teachers), the adults 
explained to the students that they would put on their jackets when they 
were playing a character. This may have provided some of the students 
with a valuable visual clue to understand when the adults were in and out 
of role. This is discussed later. It will be seen that this proved to be a 
useful stage device, and may have gently eased the students into the 
representational nature of role-play (in narrative 9, when the students 
were invited to play the parts of certain characters, they all asked to put 
on a jacket or a cardigan). When the adults put on their jackets, the 
students were told that they were going to act. At the end of the action, 
the adults took off their jackets, 'reverted back to teachers', and engaged 
the students in a debriefing on what they had seen (and later, what they 
themselves had been involved in). 
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In narratives 9,10 and 11, the students were invited to participate in the 
action. In narrative 10, which is a false belief story scenario, two of the 
students playing parts were 'split-briefed'. This meant that they were only 
briefed about the parts that they were to play. In this way, one of the 
students (Janet in narrative 10, line 817) was able to actually experience 
false belief, and the observers and fellow actors were able to see her 
acting according to her mistaken belief, in this context looking for a 
marble in the wrong location (where she had last put it). It was at points 
such as these that the experimenter was able to ask belief questions in a 
much more spontaneous fashion than in previous investigations. 
In narrative 9, the students first watched the play being performed by the 
three adults. Three students were then invited to participate in a re-run of 
the story, playing the parts of the three adults. This was followed by 
another re-run, this time using three students to stand in for the adults. In 
this version, the three students were encouraged to improvise within the 
general story framework. The students' willingness and ability to 
improvise is discussed in relation to the appropriate narrative. 
For ease of reference and to orientate the reader to the children's 
responses during and after drama, each play will be examined 
individually in the order in which they were presented to the students. 
The dialogues in each play and the complete transcriptions of the 
debriefings are included in appendix 2. Each narrative will contain an 
introduction, which alerts the reader to the specific intentions of the 
researcher, a results section and a discussion. The results and discussion 
sections will provide evidence of how the general and specific intentions 
of the researcher have been met. Where appropriate, this will include 
analysis of the students' statements which pertain to verbal and non- 
verbal evidence of their ability to 1) attribute desires, intentions or beliefs 
to story characters, 2) successfully predict characters' behaviour 
according to their perceived internal states, and 3) generalise the meaning 
of the internal states attributed to characters by relating these internal 
states to real-life situations. 
The chapter concludes with a general discussion relating to the aims of 
the study. Specific instances of when and how students demonstrate 
179 
social-cognitive awareness in response to being involved in drama will 
then be used to evaluate whether drama represents a particularly useful 
medium in which to focus children's attention upon psychological states. 
6.16 Narrative 1: The Party 
Introduction 
As mentioned in the procedure, the experimenter orientated the students 
towards this first narrative by talking to them about their favourite soaps, 
favourite characters, etc. He then spoke to the students about the 
characters to be played and briefly described the scene. In order to 
prevent confusion in the students' minds as to when the three adults were 
playing parts, and when they were being themselves (teachers), the adults 
explained to the students that they would put on their jackets when they 
were playing a character. 
This first narrative is deliberately conceived to provide the students with 
a visually powerful story scenario to capture their attention. The aim is to 
present the students with a dramatic context in which they see a rapid 
build-up of excitement and expectation concerning a boy's desire to 
attend a friend's birthday party and an anticlimax of disappointment and 
dejection when his hopes are dashed. The experimenter's intention in this 
first narrative is to see how readily the students engage in the pretend 
story scenario. He also wants to discover if the students are able to 
identify and relate to a character's feeling of disappointment. Firstly, he 
is interested if any of the students use the term 'disappointed' to label the 
feeling state of the main character. He is also interested in whether the 
students are able to offer real-life examples of when they might have felt 
disappointed. 
Results and Discussion 
It was encouraging to see how quickly the students responded to the 
adults' change of role, from teachers to actors. From the students' 
perspective, it is possible that the visual clue of wearing jackets may have 
facilitated this transition. Evidence of the way some of the students enter 
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into the make-believe world of drama can be found towards the end of 
the first narrative, when Molly, David, Anna and Simon attribute a 
feeling of sadness to the principal character by saying "aaagh" (line 33 in 
appendix 2). Molly interjects and appropriately attributes a feeling of 
sadness to him. 
In the debriefing, the experimenter begins by asking questions which 
invite the students to recap on the narrative's main events. The students' 
responses generally indicate a good understanding of the story structure. 
In line 77, the experimenter asks a question about how he felt when he 
realised that he would not be able to go to the party. David and Anna 
reaffirm their earlier attribution of sadness to the principal character 
(lines 80 & 82). It is proposed that Simon was teasing when he stated 
that the principal character would be 'happy' when he knew that he could 
not go to the party (line 83). His facial expression and intonation of 
voice suggested this. When the experimenter questions Simon's 
response, David denies that the principal character would feel happy. 
The experimenter then probes whether any member of the group can 
provide the word 'disappointment' (line 88). Peter and David offer the 
word 'upset' (lines 91&92; David perhaps in imitation). It would be an 
assumption to suggest that the word 'disappointed' was not within their 
vocabulary (Peter uses it later, although it is just possible that he has 
learned the meaning of the word in this debriefing and then generalises it 
appropriately in response to another story context). Peter and David's 
proposal that the experimenter was 'upset' is appropriate in this context 
and therefore can be regarded as appropriate IS (internal state) 
attribution. 
It is unclear whether any of the students know the word 'disappointment' 
at this stage. The experimenter tries to encourage a member of the group 
to offer an example of when they might have felt disappointed about 
something (line 100). However, the students were either reluctant to do 
so, perhaps because of shyness (this was the first narrative), because the 
word was unfamiliar, or because they were unable to generalise the term 
to real life. Molly's comments (lines 109 &111) lead the conversation off 
at a tangent; however, they serve to break the silence. 
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The students' responses to the experimenter's questioning in this first 
narrative suggest that some of the students may have some difficulty in 
accurately labelling actors' internal states. This may be because some of 
them may not have the relevant internal state words in their vocabularies. 
However, it should not be assumed that because a person does not have 
the necessary vocabulary to accurately refer to another person's (or their 
own) internal state, this means that he or she does not have some 
awareness about it. Most children with severe learning difficulties can 
be assumed to have experienced a range of internal states. Indeed, their 
learning difficulties may have heightened some affective states, for 
example, frustration in not being able to communicate something of great 
importance. The transcriptions of the students' comments show how 
some of the children find difficulty in expressing some of the 'targeted' 
internal states. They can be seen to use more generic terms, e. g., internal 
states which convey nearly the same meaning (e. g., David, line 80). It 
will be seen in later debriefings that this appears to be the case, that some 
of the students seem to have difficulty in labelling internal states (e. g., 
David in narrative 6, line 502), and in instances when the students use 
non-verbal expressions to communicate feeling states (e. g., when Molly 
stamps her foot to express a character's anger, narrative 3, line 293). 
Table 13 shows the internal state language used by the students. The 
internal state words are shown in italics. 
Table 13: Students' IS language in 'The Party'. 
Molly/David/ 
Anna/ Simon: Aaagh (sympathetically). (IS attribution-general) 
Molly: He's sad. (IS attribution-general) 
Simon: You were asking if you could go to Sally's party? 
Anna: Ask Dad. 
David: Ask him. 
[Viv: Right, 'cause I couldn't get there. Now how did I feel? How do 
you think I feltabout that? ] 
David: Sad. (IS attribution-general) 
Ian: Sad. (IS attribution-general) 
Anna: Very sad. (IS attribution-general) 
[Viv: What's a word that means I was looking forward to something... 
(pause).. and then I was letdown (strong facial expression)? I 
was....? ] 
Peter: Upset. (IS attribution-general) 
David: Upset. (IS attribution-general) 
Molly: Ask mum party. 
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Included in the table are instances of when the students attribute internal 
states to story characters, but they use non-specific internal state 
language, terms which do not accurately describe the feeling state of the 
character, they represent a more general representation of mood. 
This type of internal state attribution is identified as 'IS attribution- 
general' and is shown in brackets. The experimenter's questions or 
comments are included in brackets, where necessary, to provide the 
reader with contextual information. 
Table 14 shows the internal state language used by the experimenter. 
Table 14: Adults' IS language in 'The Party' 
Viv: Right, 'cause I couldn't get there. Now how did I feel? How do 
you think I felt about that? 
Viv: Well, would I have felt happy? 
Viv: I think I would have felt happy If I had have been able to go to 
the party. 
Viv: What's a word that means I was looking forward to something... 
(pause).. and then I was let down (strong facial expression)? I 
was....? 
Viv: Upset, that's a good word. Anyone know what the word 
disappointed means? Have you heard the word disappointed? 
(silence) 
Viv: It means you were looking forward to something, and you would 
really like to do it, and then you can't do it (strong facial 
expression and gesture) and you become disappointed. (To 
Peter) You are absolutely right upset as well. Has anyone ever 
felt disappointed?... about ...... anything? 
(silence) 
Viv: Anyone had something happen to them recently which has made 
them disappointed? 
Viv: Anyone? You look; forward to something... and It doesn't 
happen? 
Viv: Yes, that's right, I wanted to go to a party. 
Viv: Yes, that's right. I asked mum if I could go to the party. 
In summary, considering this was the first performance, the students 
engaged well in the dramatic process. This early engagement in drama, 
in what Bruner (1986) calls 'the landscape of consciousness', i. e., what 
story characters 'know, think, or feel, or do not know, think, or feel' 
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(p. 14) may represent to them a powerful introduction to what Bruner calls 
the 'narrative mode of thought'. This will be expanded upon in the 
general discussion. 
Some of their comments suggest that they related to the feeling state of 
the main character, but many of them lack the specific internal state 
vocabulary to accurately express 'disappointment'. It could be that this 
difficulty experienced by some of the students meant that they were 
unable to generalise their understanding of the word to a real life context. 
For, in this narrative, the students did not respond to the experimenters' 
attempts to encourage them to relate an occasion in their own lives, when 
they experienced disappointment. 
6.17 Narrative 2: The Birthday Present 
Introduction 
The ability to appreciate our own and other people's internal states is 
critical to our understanding of human behaviour. Most people, most of 
the time, take account of the way people's inner psychological states 
affect their behaviour. But, because people's psychological states are 
covert and are not directly accessible to us, we can sometimes misjudge 
people's motives for behaving as they do, or incorrectly infer their 
internal states from their overt behaviour. People can deceive us and 
because none of us is truly telepathic, the best we can do is to infer the 
internal states of others, by appreciation of what they say or what they do. 
In everyday human interaction we are aware that people's behaviour in 
response to life events may not reliably indicate what they think about 
these same events. What people do and say in certain circumstances does 
not always provide us with reliable evidence about their inner 
psychological states. In this narrative, it is the experimenter's intention 
to explore the students' awareness of a contradiction between a 
character's overt behaviour (what he does and what he says) and what he 
is really thinking and feeling. The narrative presents the students with a 
context in which a character wishes to conceal his psychological states. 
The experimenter is interested in the students' reasoning about this 
character's intentions. 
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The Birthday Present' provides a context within which to discuss why a 
person should conceal his true state of mind-in this case a boy 
suppressing his feelings of disappointment in not receiving a camera from 
his father for his birthday. As already mentioned, there is contradiction 
between the protagonist's non-verbal behaviour (his initial and fairly 
fleeting expression of disappointment when he unwraps his present to 
find instead of a camera, a glasses case, line 149) and what he says ("Oh, 
that's really nice...... it's just what I wanted, linel50). In the introduction, 
the audience is told what the protagonist really wants for his birthday 
(lines 129-133). This is made even more explicit to the audience when 
the main character makes an aside to them as he unwraps his present with 
eager anticipation (line 147). The experimenter is particularly interested 
in whether the students can provide some reasons why the protagonist 
should disguise his internal state of disappointment. 
Results and Discussion 
During the action, it was evident from the exclamations of some of the 
students (line 151) that they were genuinely surprised when the main 
character unwrapped the present to find a glasses case. It is unclear from 
the video-and audio-recording exactly which students made this 
exclamation. Simon affirms that he was hoping to receive a camera 
(linel66) and adds that he was 'disappointed' (line 168). This is 
interesting, because during the debriefing of the last narrative, none of the 
students had used the word 'disappointed' to describe the internal state of 
the character unable to go the birthday party. This shows how wrong it 
would have been to assume that the word was not in the students' 
vocabularies. Although Simon had attributed a feeling state of 
disappointment to the boy, both he and Peter remembered that the boy 
had said "that's nice" and "it was great" (lines 171&172) after he had 
opened the present to find the glasses case. Neither Peter nor Simon 
immediately responded to the experimenter's question (line 173) "why 
did he say that? " However, close examination of the video-recording 
suggests that, if the experimenter had given the students more time, they 
probably would have provided a reason earlier than they did (line 175). 
The experimenter asked them whether they thought that he really meant 
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what he had said. Simon, Peter, Anna and David simultaneously 
responded 'no' (line 177). Then Peter offers his reason why the main 
character concealed his true feelings-"to be kind" (line 180). (It is 
difficult to determine whether Simon and Anna also really thought this or 
whether they merely repeated Peter's answer). Peter's statement is 
significant, for he is attributing (in a predictive fashion) a demeanour of 
kindness to the boy by inference; and he does this by making sense of his 
behaviour. From what he had said already, it seems that he has 
appreciated the contradiction between the character's covert feeling state 
and his ostensive behaviour24. In response to seeing what the character 
does and says, Peter makes sense of the boy's behaviour; he has correctly 
deduced that he acted in this way so as to not offend his father. In this 
sense, Peter is both making sense of the boy's behaviour by appealing to 
the boy's inferred internal state, and predicting the father's probable state 
of mind if the boy did not conceal his true feelings of disappointment. 
This is a useful example to demonstrate how internal states are causally 
related to the physical world of behaviour. This causal influence can go 
in two directions, from mind to world and from world to mind (Wellman, 
1993), i. e., mental states cause actions in the world and the world causes 
mental states. Peter's statements demonstrate that he (and, perhaps, also 
Anna and David) has some appreciation of the intentionality of the boy's 
behaviour (by calling upon his possible state of mind and his motives for 
acting in the way that he does). It is also quite probable that Peter can 
predict the father's probable state of mind (unhappiness) if the boy did 
not disguise his true feelings. In much of the experimental work 
described in earlier chapters, children were expected to predict story 
characters' behaviour from an appreciation of their mental state (Sally 
will look for the marble in the box because that is where she thinks it is). 
In this context, Peter makes sense of the boy's behaviour by predicting 
the possible effect of the boy's actions on the state of mind of the father. 
This direction of causal influence (mind to world) is more advanced than 
predicting behaviour by reference to mental states (world to mind). 
24 Sperber and Wilson (1986) state that recognising the intention behind 
ostension is necessary for efficient information processing. They add that 
a person who fails to recognise this intention may fail to notice relevant 
information. 
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The experimenter attempts to makes such reasoning explicit to the rest of 
the group (lines 193-201) and then, with his colleagues, proceeds to act 
out an alternative ending to the play, in which the boy does not disguise 
his true feelings and consequently upsets his father. Here, Peter, Anna, 
Janet and Molly appropriately attribute a state of upset or sadness to the 
boy's father. In the drama, the father's strong body language and facial 
expression help to make this explicit. 
Table 15 summarises all of the student responses which contain internal 
state language. 
Table 15: Students' IS language in 'The Birthday Present' 
Simon: You were hoping to get a camera. (IS attribution-specific) 
Simon: You were disappointed. And he gave you a glasses case. (IS 
attribution-specific) 
[Viv: So why did I say it? ] 
Peter: To be kind. (IS attribution-specific) 
Simon: To be kind. (IS attribution-specific/prompt) 
Anna: Kind (IS attribution-specific/ prompt) 
[Viv: 
.... because what would that do, If you said that? 
] 
Peter: Upset him. (IS attribution-specific) 
Simon: Upset. (IS attribution-specific/ prompt) 
Molly: Sad. 
Close examination of the video-recording shows the wealth of internal 
state language used by the experimenter (and colleagues) in focusing the 
students' attention on the story characters' internal states. Table 16 
contains all the adults' internal state references, both in the role-play and 
in the debriefing. 
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Table 16: Adults' IS language in "The Birthday Present' 
Viv: OK. Let's go back to the beginning of the story and remember 
what happened. Who was I playing in that story? 
Viv: Right, it was my birthday and I was expecting a birthday 
present. What was it that I was really hoping to get for my 
birthday? 
Viv: Yes, I was disappointed, wasn't I? What did I actually say to 
Dad? 
Viv: What I actually said was, "That's really nice, that's just what I 
wanted Did I really mean that? 
Viv: It wouldn't be very nice, would it, if I was to say to Dad, (strong 
facial expression, directed to Keith) "Well, thanks a lot, Dad- 
you can keep that. (Throws the wrapping paper towards Keith) I 
don't want a blinking glasses case! What do I wanta glasses 
case for? " I didn't say that, did I? 
Viv: (Nods) I wanted a camera, but, I didn't want to hurt Dad. I 
didn't want to offend him. There's lots of times in life when, 
perhaps, we don't say what we really think. I don't know 
whether that's ever happened to you-it's happened to me on my 
birthday on a few times, when, someone gives you something, or 
something happens and deep down you feel a bit disappointed, 
(pointing to Simon) as you said, but you don't actually say to 
someone, "that's not what I wanted, you can keep it"-because 
what would that do, if you said that? 
Viv: Oh, dad. What do I want a glasses case for? (pushes it away) 
I've got one of these, you know I've been looking forward to a 
camera. You could have at least bought me a camera for my 
birthday. 
Viv: In that version of the story, how do you think Dad felt? 
Viv: Yes, that wasn't very nice, was it? We may have done something 
like that, but we really should consider other people's feelings, 
shouldn't we? 
6.18 Narrative 3: The Borrowed Cardigan. 
Introduction 
In this narrative, the two experimenters play brothers. One of them 
borrows his brother's cardigan without asking. Unfortunately for him, 
while he is wearing it, he spills tea down the front of it. Soon afterwards, 
his brother enters looking for his cardigan and sees his brother wearing it, 
with a large stain down the front of it. The props in this play are 
minimal; there is no cardigan, cup or wardrobe, and the stain is 
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imaginary. The actors use mime and strong visual and auditory clues, for 
example, one of the brothers adopts a very nervous voice and sheepish 
actions when he finally shows himself, wearing the imaginary stained 
cardigan. The other brother's anger is shown both in his voice and body 
language, when he shouts and stamps his foot. 
In this play, the experimenter's intentions are threefold. First, he is 
interested to see how readily the students enter into a make-believe 
context which uses very few props. Secondly, he wishes to find out if the 
students attribute appropriate internal states to the two characters, e. g., 
anger, fear, shame, etc. Thirdly, the experimenter is interested to see if 
the students are able to relate any real-life experiences in which they can 
identify similar feeling states of anger, etc. in either themselves or in 
other people. In other words, can the students generalise the meanings 
of internal state terms to real-life situations? This was attempted in the 
first story narrative, 'The Party' (line102), when the experimenter invited 
any of the students to share an occasion when they had felt 
disappointment. None of the students offered an example from real life 
on this occasion, possibly because it was early in the proceedings. 
Results and Discussion 
There is evidence of the students' involvement in the dramatic context 
very early on in the action (see transcripts in appendix 2). The 
experimenter was holding up an imaginary cardigan, but this did not 
prevent Molly or David from entering into the pretence. Molly makes an 
anticipatory exclamation of possible trouble (line 236) when the brother 
declares that he is going to take it and wear it. David turns to the welfare 
assistant who is sitting next to him and suggests that he should have 
asked. After the misdemeanour, one of the brothers arrives looking for 
his cardigan. He invites audience participation by asking if anyone has 
seen it. Some of the audience deny that they have seen it, but others give 
away the location of the brother, who is hiding from him. In the 
debriefing, Janet, who has remained quiet up to now, demonstrates her 
understanding of the plot (lines 263&265). Anna's responses are 
interesting in that they show how effectively she uses gesture to 
compensate for her expressive language difficulties (lines 273&276). 
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The experimenter spontaneously uses the word 'embarrassed' (line 290) 
to describe why he hid from his brother (this word does not appear in any 
of the students' responses, afterwards). Molly's non-verbal response (line 
293) to the experimenter's question about how one of the character's felt 
when he saw his brother wearing the cardigan is interesting. She 
expresses his internal state using a gesture (stamping her foot). It is 
possible that either Molly identified with the brother's anger, but could 
not find the word to express it, or perhaps she may not have the relevant 
internal state in her vocabulary to express his feeling (she does use the 
word 'sad' spontaneously later, which may be regarded as a very general 
approximation to the feeling state of anger. Later she does use the word 
'cross', but only in repetition (line 306). Earlier, the author of this thesis 
proposed that many children with severe learning difficulties can be 
assumed to have experienced some internal states, at least in some 
rudimentary form. However, some of these children, perhaps like Molly, 
may lack the linguistic skills to express them. In the author's opinion, 
this is why intervention which helps to make children consciously aware 
of such internal states, by providing structured teaching contexts which 
highlight and help the children to identify and express them, can be seen 
to be beneficial for children with severe learning difficulties. 
Returning to the analysis, Peter responds to the experimenter's question 
(line 294) by saying that his brother felt 'angry'. Simon mimics the 
brother's question when he sees the cardigan (line 295). Anna also 
provides the word 'angry'. The experimenter then tries to encourage the 
students to relate any real-life experiences in which they may have felt 
similar internal states. Simon is probably talking about a racing car in a 
computer game when he states that he became angry with his computer. 
David relates an experience when he became angry with one of his 
parents when asked to tidy up his bedroom. Table 17 includes all the 
students' responses which relate to internal state terms. The students' 
general and specific internal state attribution is included in parenthesis, as 
is their internal state generalisation. Table 18 contains the adults' internal 
state language. 
In reference to the experimenter's intentions, many of the students 
demonstrated that, even with minimal props, they readily entered into the 
role-play situation. The students identified above were able to attribute 
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appropriate internal states to the two characters, one student using gesture 
and facial expression to express anger. Two of the students were seen to 
generalise the meaning of 'anger' to real-life contexts. 
Table 17: Students' IS language in The Borrowed Cardigan' 
Janet: You nicked-took his cardigan without asking. 
Molly: (stamps her foot). (IS attribution-general) 
Peter: Angry. (IS attribution-specific) 
Anna: Angry. (IS attribution-specific/ prompt) 
Molly: Sad. (IS attribution-general) 
Molly: Cross. (IS attribution-specific/ prompt) 
Simon: 1 get very angry with the computer. (IS generalisation) 
David: 1 got angry in my house. About keeping my room. "I don't want 
to do it. It's not my job. " (IS generalisation) 
David: I like a mess. 
Simon: I like mine in a tip. It's all over the place. 
Table 18: Adults' IS language in 'The Borrowed Cardigan' 
Viv: Now, lets think back. What happened in that story? What 
happened in the beginning? 
Viv: Yes, I was feeling rather embarrassed about the fact that I had 
taken his cardigan. When Keith came and actually sawme 
wearing his cardigan, how did he feel? 
Viv: Yes, angry. How did you know he was angry. 
Viv: Why was he angry? 
Viv: Yes Molly, banged his feet. He was very cross. Did you see his 
face? 
Viv: So he was feeling very cross 
Viv: Has anyone felt very angry recently? 
Viv: I got very angry this morning when I was driving my car. 
Someone pulled out in front of me and I had to stop very 
suddenly. 
Viv: You got angry with the computer? 
Viv: So you got angry when it didn't work properly? 
Viv: Tell me a bit more. Who gets cross? 
Viv: You get cross because you're asked to tidy up your bedroom? 
Viv: (laughs) I bet that goes down well. What do you think of that 
Margarita? 
Margarita (exp. ): My mum sometimes asks me to tidy up my room and sometimes I 
get cross, because I like it in a mess. 
Viv: Well, that's interesting. (to David) Do you likeyour bedroom to 
be in a mess? 
Viv: That's a very good point. He thinks It's nice to keep your 
bedroom tidy because then you can find things. 
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6.19 Narrative 4: The Lie 
Introduction 
In this narrative, the main character accidentally breaks his mother's 
favourite vase and then lies to her by saying that their dog jumped up and 
knocked it off the table. In the debriefing, the experimenter investigates 
the students' understanding of the concept of lying. He does this by 
inviting them to provide real-life examples of when they or other people 
may have told a lie. So, working along similar lines to the last narrative, 
the experimenter is interested in whether the students can generalise the 
meaning of internal state words by providing examples from real life 
when they have experienced such internal states. From time to time, the 
experimenter substitutes the word 'fib' for lie in case the students are 
more familiar with this term25. 
In order to lie, a person must have a degree of metalinguistic awareness. 
Metalinguistics relate to language and its functions. Clearly, awareness 
of the ways in which people use language is an important part of their 
social-cognitive awareness. In terms of social-cognitive development 
'lies' are an interesting linguistic act because they involve manipulating 
other people's beliefs intentionally. If a lie is meant as a genuine act of 
deception, the deceitful speaker must have some understanding of how 
his or her deceitful utterance will influence the listener's beliefs. Lies are 
probably the earliest spontaneous signs of a child's ability to attribute 
first-order beliefs to another person, 'I will say X to make her think Y'. 
Dunn's (1991) anecdotal and observational data indicate that children 
start to lie and deceive from about the age of 2 years 6 months (although, 
at first, they may not be very good at it). Sodian and Frith (1993) state 
that a distinction must be made between 'genuine lies', i. e., false 
utterances that are made with the intention to deceive, and other forms of 
25 Deception as it relates to lying may be regarded as a continuum, where 
the severity of the deceptive act may hypothetically be ranked in terms of 
its premeditation and social consequence. For example, a 'white lie' may be 
seen as less serious than a deliberate abdication of the truth for personal 
gain. 'Fibs' will undoubtedly be construed differently from lies. In this 
experiment, however, a 'fib' is seen as a synonym for a 'lie'. 
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deception, including mistakes, 'pseudo' lies and other forms of affective 
responses for manipulating behaviour which, rather than intentionally' 
deceive, may serve to escape blame, or deny knowledge, e. g., saying that 
he or she didn't do something to escape blame or punishment. In the 
narrative described below, the boy's lie can be construed as a 'genuine 
lie', because, although the intention is to escape blame, there is a 
deliberate intention on the boy's part to alter his mother's state of mind. 
The boy does not intend to be truthful; he knows that what is being said is 
something false. His intention is to deceive the listener. This may be 
represented as A (the deceitful speaker) wants B (the listener) to 
(wrongly) believe X, or, in the story presented below: 'the boy wants his 
mother to (wrongly) believe that the dog broke the vase'. 
The purpose of this narrative, like the others, is to encourage the students 
in the debriefing session to discuss why the characters behave in the way 
they do, what they think, feel and intend. More specifically, the 
experimenter is interested to find out the students' appreciation of the 
boy's intentions when he lies, and their general understanding of lies and 
deception. This is investigated further in later narratives. 
Results and Discussion 
The experimenter begins by inviting the students to relate the main events 
of the story. Simon establishes that the boy 'lied' (line 377). Anna, David 
and Janet (line 371) state that the boy had not told the truth. Simon offers 
an appropriate motive for the boy's lie, "because you did not want to get 
yourself into trouble" (line 376). David, in response to the experimenter's 
question of why the boy lies, refers to the broken vase. He states that if 
he were in that situation, he would "clear it up" (line 381). Peter states 
that he would "own up to it" (line 383, a metalinguistic expression). The 
experimenter involves his colleagues in the discussion (note Margarita 
and Viv's reference to 5 internal state terms, - cross, honest, upset, angry, 
believe, lines 389-399). David refers to a lie that his welfare assistant 
may have told (line 402. He refers to this again in narrative 7, line 587, 
when he intimates that his welfare assistant had told a lie saying that she 
had a sore throat to get out of something, - his precise meaning remained 
unclear). 
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David also refers to a recent event in a popular soap (lines 412-418, - 
unfortunately this was not followed up). Simon relates a lie he told 
recently at his grandmother's house (line 420-421). There may some 
confusion in Simon's mind about when a lie should be more appropriately 
construed as a joke. Lies and jokes are related, in that, whether lying or 
joking, the speaker does not intend to be truthful. However, there is a 
distinction on the basis of the speaker's intention concerning the listener's 
belief (Leekam, 1991). This distinction depends upon the second-order 
intentions of the speaker. Leekam writes, "for the deceitful speaker, the 
sole aim is to deceive the listener, whereas for the joking speaker the 
ultimate goal is not to deceive, but to be disbelieved. The speaker's 
intention to deceive is therefore defined in terms of what the speaker 
wants the listener to think. The deceitful speaker wants the listener to 
think that the statement is true while the joking speaker wants the listener 
to know that the statement is false, " (page 160). 
From what Simon says, it seems more likely that he is referring to a joke; 
however, this difference may be considered to be trivial. He later 
correctly identifies that the boy in The Birthday Present' told a "fib" to 
his father when he said that he liked his present. 
Table 19 shows the internal state language used by the students in 
response to this narrative. It can be seen that the students were a little 
unforthcoming in their general discussion about 'fibs' and 'lies'; however, 
it must be recognised that this is a rather sensitive topic and, although 
there were two school staff members in the group, the experimenter and 
his colleague were not familiar adults to the students. As a result of this, 
midway through the debriefing, the experimenter and colleagues 
probably tried too hard to elicit from them references to the psychological 
states of the story characters. This meant that they themselves used a 
high proportion of internal state references. This accounts for the 
imbalance of internal state use between students and adults. 
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Table 19: Students' IS language in 'The Lie' 
Simon: You're watching television. 
Molly: Looking at TV. 
Simon: You said your dog did it? You lied. (IS attribution-specific) 
[Viv: Why did I tell a lie? ] 
Simon: Because you didn't want to get yourself into trouble. 
[Viv: Okay, you'd clean it up... and then what would you do? ] 
Peter: Own up to it. 
Simon: At my Nan's I told a lie then, I said someone has thrown a paper 
airplane out of the window and there weren't. (IS 
generalisation) 
[Viv: 
....... In a way, when Keith was my dad and he gave me that 
present....... ] 
Simon: You told a fib..... (IS generalisation) 
Table 20 shows the internal state language used by the adults in the 
debriefing. In retrospect, perhaps, the experimenter would have done 
better to have waited a little longer for responses to his questions and not 
diverted some of these questions to his colleagues. 
Despite this imbalance of student/ adult internal state usage, the 
experimenter can be seen to have achieved his intentions: three of the 
students demonstrated a generalised understanding of the meaning of lies. 
One student provided a real-life example of when he had told a lie. 
Another student referred to a television soap in which a character had 
lied. He later intimated that his welfare assistant had lied on an occasion. 
All these examples show the students' metalinguistic awareness of what 
lying is. 
In attempting to devise a narrative which offered students a context in 
which to discuss lies, characters' motives, etc., the researcher became 
aware of how complex people's deceptive behaviour is (in real life) and 
how the language which we use to describe deception has different 
shades of meaning in terms of the intentions and possible consequences 
of people's deceptive behaviour. It is only when we attempt to define or 
quantify it, that we realise how complex this is. In other words, all of us 
may have an incomplete understanding of the subtle components of 
deceptive behaviour. People's deceptive behaviour may be seen as placed 
at different points on a continuum, and this continuum may have 'fibs' 
and 'white lies' on one side and 'premeditated lies' on the other. It is 
likely to be with reference to people's intentions and motives, that we 
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determine where their deceptive acts are placed on this continuum. The 
salutary lesson from all of this is that it is not just people with learning 
disability who may find these things difficult to understand. 
Table 20: Adults' IS language in 'The Lie' 
Viv: Now, let's think back. What was the first thing that happened? 
Viv: I wanted to watch television. 
Viv: Yes, I lied, didn't I? Because I said that Chappy the dog jumped 
up and knocked the vase off the table. Was that true, what I 
said? 
Viv: No, I told a lie 
Viv: Why did I tell a lie? 
Viv: Yeah, I said the dog did It when I actually did it? What would 
you do if you were in that situation, what would you do? 
Viv: You'd own up to it. That's an interesting way of putting It- 
owning up to it........ do you think that Mum would have been that 
cross? Did I do the right thing by lying, do you think? 
Viv: Margarita, if you had really have been by mother, would you 
have been cross with me. What would you have said if I had 
gone out in the kitchen and said, "Mum, I've just had an 
accident, I've broken your best vase". 
Margarita: I don't think I would be cross if you were honest about it. I 
would be a little upset...... 
Margarita: 
.... but I wouldn't be angry with you. Viv: Did you believe me, when I said that Chappy the dog had jumped 
up and knocked the vase off the table? 
Margarita: Not really. 
Viv: Has anyone told a little lie recently? I have. 
Viv: (to assistant) Have you told a little lie, a fib? 
Viv: Keith, have you told a fib recently? 
Keith: When I was at school the other day, somebody said to me, "How 
are you? " And I said, "I'm fine" and I wasn't, because I felt 
horrible. So that was a fib. 
Viv: Has anyone else told a fib? 
Viv: Did he tell a fib? 
Viv: Yes, because I said I really liked it and that's what I really 
wanted I told that fib because I didn't want to upset him. 
6.20 Narrative 5: The Doughnut. 
Introduction 
In this narrative, and the one following, the investigator is interested in 
the students' understanding of 'jealousy'. In this story, similar to The 
Birthday Present', the experimenter investigates whether the students can 
differentiate between a character's overt behaviour (what he says and 
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what he does; and his (inferred) mental and affective state (what he thinks 
and what he feels)26. The narrative involves two brothers. One of the 
brothers is praised and rewarded with a doughnut by his mother for 
helping her with the housework; the other brother looks on with extreme 
jealousy. The jealous brother makes out that he does not like doughnuts, 
when, in reference to the events immediately prior to this, it can be 
inferred that this is not the case; that he is just saying this. As in previous 
plays, the actors provide strong non-verbal clues to help the students 'see 
through' the protagonists' behaviour and make appropriate inferences as 
to their internal states. 
Results and Discussion. 
In the debriefing, after some revision of the main events, the 
experimenter asks if the students had noticed the jealous brother's facial 
expression. Anna states that he was 'upset' (line 460). This may 
represent another example of how some of the students may not have the 
appropriate internal vocabulary to accurately describe other people's 
feelings. In response to the experimenter's question 'Why? ', Janet does 
use the word jealous' (line 462). Almost simultaneously, Simon affirms 
that he was 'jealous'. Janet responds to the experimenter's invitation to 
explain the meaning of 'jealous' by saying that "someone else gets 
something" (line 465). This is an appropriate response and it is a pity 
that the experimenter did not encourage her to expand upon this. 
However, her comment, as it stands, can be interpreted as being rather 
incomplete and it does show the difficulty that some of these students 
have in spontaneously providing a definition of an internal state word27. 
The experimenter then invites the students to remember exactly what the 
jealous brother had said. Simon states that he said that he did not like 
26 This is rather more than what Donaldson (1978) calls the meaning/ 
message distinction ; however, a person's identification of a) the 
meaning/message distinction and b) an inferred contradiction between an 
overt behaviour and psychological states both draw upon social cognitive 
awareness. 
27 Hinchcliffe and Roberts (1987) propose that, for the student with severe learning disabilities, their difficulty in understanding and producing a 
definition of a word was not limited to internal state words. They stated 
that, generally speaking, pupils could by degrees, grasp the meaning of an 
unfamiliar word from a number of examples of its use, but, found great 
difficulty with the degree of abstraction involved in defining a word. 
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doughnuts, and then proposes that he did not really mean this; that he 
really would have liked one (lines 470&472). In retrospect, it was a pity 
that the experimenter did not encourage Simon to expand upon this; 
however, at the time, the experimenter felt that he had correctly inferred 
that the brother had said this because he was jealous. In other words, 
Simon had made sense of the brother's behaviour by appreciating his 
internal state. Tables 21 and 22 show the students' and the adults' internal 
state language, respectively. 
Table 21: Students' IS language in 'The Doughnut' 
Anna: Upset (IS attribution-general) 
Janet: Jealous. (IS attribution-specific/prompted) 
Simon: Because you were jealous. (IS attribution-specific) 
Simon: "I didn't like them". 
Simon: No, you wanted it. 
Table 22: Adults' IS language in 'The Doughnut' 
Viv: Did you see my face? 
Viv: I was jealous? What does jealous mean? 
Viv: Right. Someone else gets something and you really want It... and 
you feel jealous about him having something. OK... you said I 
was jealous because I didn't get a doughnut, what did I actually 
say to him? 
Viv: Do you think I meant that? 
The experimenter's intentions may be seen to be achieved; in response to 
the drama, one of the students spontaneously used the word 'jealous' to 
attribute an appropriate internal state to one of the characters and another 
student used the term after this. This student was able to infer that what a 
character said probably did not accord with what he really thought. 
6.21 Narrative 6: The Sweetheart 
Introduction. 
This is a very short narrative, with very little dialogue. Understanding of 
the dramatic context is very reliant upon interpretation of the characters' 
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non-verbal behaviour. The narrative explores further the students 
understanding of 'jealousy'. The play portrays a character who becomes 
jealous of the attentions paid to a friend by a girl whom he admires. 
Results and Discussion. 
Some of the students' responses in the debriefing (except Simon's), 
demonstrate further that, although they understand the sequence of events 
and are able to relate in some manner to the main character's feelings of 
jealousy, they find it difficult to call upon the appropriate internal state 
word to accurately communicate this feeling state. David uses the word 
'upset' (line 502), and Molly describes him as feeling 'sad' (fine 503). The 
experimenter was surprised that Janet (or Simon), who used the word 
correctly in the previous narrative, did not offer the word 'jealous'. The 
experimenter even paused to look at Janet to encourage her to respond 
(line 504). Only after offering the initial letter j' did Simon provide the 
word (line 506). Anna correctly calls upon the word 'jealous', but this 
could be through repetition. 
Tables 23 and 24 show the students' and adults' internal state language. 
Closer inspection of the video does not help the experimenter to 
understand why Janet or Simon did not use the word 'jealous' in this 
context. It was assumed that this narrative represented a more familiar 
context, from the students' perspective, to attribute a feeling state of 
'jealousy' than the previous narrative The doughnut' (which, arguably, 
may be more correctly identified as 'envy' rather than' jealousy'). 
Table 23: Students IS language in 'The Sweetheart' 
Simon: You thought that she was going to kiss you. (IS attribution- 
specific) 
Anna: (points to Keith & Margarita) Say 'hi' like that (mimes embrace) 
and you upset. (IS attribution-general) 
David: Upset (IS attribution-general) 
Molly: Sad, 
Simon: Jealous. (IS attribution-specific) 
Anna: Jealous. (IS attribution-specific/prompted) 
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Table 24: Adults IS language in 'The Sweetheart' 
Viv: I thought when she was coming towards me, she was going to kiss 
me..... and what did she do? 
Viv: Yes and kissed Keith. And how did I feel. 
Viv (waits): OK. I was feeling ....... (waits) what was the word we talked about 
last time beginning with 'j'... 
Viv: Yes, I was jealous of Keith. What I really wanted was for her to 
come over to me and give me a kiss. But It didn't happen did it? 
6.22 Narrative 7: The Broken Window 
Introduction 
This is another short narrative in which one of the characters feigns 
illness to avoid trouble. Two brothers are playing football when one of 
them kicks the ball through a window. Inside the house, when he meets 
his mother, instead of owning up to the accident, the boy pretends that he 
is ill in order to go up to his bedroom, to delay facing up to the possible 
consequences of his actions. The intentions of the experimenter in this 
play, are to explore further the students' appreciation of pretence and 
telling lies. In The Lie', the experimenter investigated the students' 
appreciation of a person's intentions when he told a lie to get out of 
trouble. In this play, the experimenter has similar intentions, first of all 
he seeks to find out if the students recognise that the boy is trying to 
deceive his mother into thinking that he is ill, and secondly, whether they 
appreciate why he does this. Similar to previous narratives, the 
experimenter also encourages the students to identify occasions in their 
own lives when they may have tried to deceive someone in an attempt to 
get out of trouble. 
Results and Discussion. 
At this point in the proceedings, the experimenter was aware that there 
was one student, Isha, who seemed to be engaged by the drama (he 
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laughed at appropriate points, and seemed to be interested in what his 
peers had to say), but he had not, by this time, said more than one word 
(narrative 3). The experimenter commenced the debriefing by 
encouraging him to participate. His answers in lines 542,544 and 546 
demonstrate that, in response to closed questions, he could identify the 
main sequence of events. He says very little after this, but it is significant 
that, although his language may have been developmentally less 
advanced than most of his peers, and he was not as forthcoming, he still 
engaged and participated within the dramatic process. In response to 
actors using minimal props, his responses indicate that he had an 
appreciation of pretence; he did not really see a window broken, but he 
was able to represent this in the make-believe world of drama and role- 
play. He was able to engage in what Bruner (1986) calls the 'narrative 
mode of thought'. 
Janet takes over from him. She states that when the boy goes into the 
house, she says that he does not feel well (line 556). Anna states that he 
says he is unwell. In response to the experimenter's question about 
whether he was really feeling unwell, Peter states that he says this 
because he was 'trying to get out of it' (line 567). Here, to be absolutely 
sure of what Peter meant by this, the experimenter should have asked 
Peter about what he was trying to get of. Instead, the experimenter asks 
Peter how he was trying to get out of it. Peter answers: "by pretending 
that he wasn't very well, " (line 569). It is clear that Peter not only 
recognises the deception, but also appreciates the motives behind the 
boy's deceptive behaviour. 
For the benefit of the other students, the experimenter then invites Keith 
(one of the actors) to make explicit his intentions. It is proposed that 
encouraging actors to reveal their thoughts and intentions in this way 
following drama, may help some students to attend to how people's 
psychological states 'drive' behaviour and how an appreciation of their 
internal states can help to explain and predict behaviour. 
Molly's single word utterance (line 574) serves to draw people's attention 
to the mother's probable internal state (if the boy had not been deceitful). 
Her one word statement, in response to Keith's preceding comments, 
offer some indication of her understanding of the events, and perhaps 
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more importantly, demonstrate how she has successfully predicted how 
the mother would react if/ when she finds out about the broken window. 
It is significant that Molly's statement was not influenced by what anyone 
else had said, for up to this point, no-one had mentioned the causal effect 
of the events upon the mother's future internal state. 
Keith's affirmative comments recognise Molly's line of thinking (line 
575) and the experimenter reinforces the belief structure of the story by 
saying that the boy was telling a 'fib' and pretending to be feeling unwell 
(line 580). Peter states that he was "putting it on" (line 582). 
David's comments are interesting. The experimenter asks if any of the 
students, in real life, have ever pretended that they have been unwell. To 
his welfare assistant's amusement, David seems to refer to an occasion 
when she feigned illness (line 587). It is unclear exactly what he is 
referring to; however, what he does say indicates that he has some 
appreciation of the function of 'pretending' in the context of opting out of 
something. David's comment shows that he is able to generalise the 
internal state of pretence to a real-life context. (This relates back to what 
David was referring to in narrative 4, line 402). 
Tables 25 and 26 contain the students' and adults' use of internal state 
vocabulary. 
Table 25: Students' IS language in The Broken Window' 
Janet: Not feeling very well. (IS attribution-specific) 
Peter: By pretending that he wasn't very well. (IS attribution- 
specific) 
Molly: Cross. (IS attribution-specific) 
Peter: Putting it on. (IS attribution-specific) 
David: Pretend you got a sore throat. (IS generalisation) 
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Table 26: Adults' IS language in 'The Broken Window' 
Viv: And what do you think about that? Do you think that he wasn't 
feeling very well? 
Viv: By pretending that he wasn't very well. Right. What do you 
think, Keith? 
Keith: I was trying to get out of It, that's quite right. And I was 
pretending. 
Keith: Cross? Well I thought mum was going to be cross, that's true. I 
thought mum was going to be really, really angry, so I tried to 
get out of it. 
Viv: Yeah, he got out of it by saying that he didn't feel very well and 
he had a lay down upstairs. But we don't think that was 
actually true, we think that he was telling a fib-pretending that 
he wasn't very well. 
Viv: Yes, putting it on, that's right. Has anyone done this, pretended 
that they were unwell to get out of something, ... perhaps you 
may have been worried about something,... anyone done 
that?...... (David points to assistant) ... I knowI have. Assistant: I'm trying to think of the situation.... 
Assistant: Oh, I was pretending to have a sore throat, was I, so I could have 
a sit down? 
Viv: I remember the first holiday I had, when I went away camping, I 
missed my mum and dad, because it was the first time I had 
gone away-I actually pretended that I wasn't very well-because 
I thought that maybe that would mean that they would send me 
home. 
6.23 Narrative 8: The Missing Toast. 
Introduction. 
This narrative explores the students' understanding of a character's false 
belief. Children's understanding of false belief has been the focus of 
much of the experimental work in this thesis. This false belief story is 
very simple: a character makes himself some toast. He puts some bread 
in the toaster and then goes outside for a short time while it is browning. 
In the meantime his brother sees the toast in the toaster, helps himself to 
it and leaves the scene. The first brother then returns to find that his toast 
is missing. The students' appreciation of the character's surprise and his 
mistaken belief are explored in the debriefing. This is done in a relatively 
spontaneous manner; in a more spontaneous manner, perhaps, than in 
previous investigations. In this narrative, the students' understanding of 
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false belief is investigated almost incidentally. Most of the preceding 
narratives explored the students' understanding of characters' desires, 
beliefs and intentions. Their attention had been focused upon the various 
characters' internal states during debriefings, and it is proposed that, by 
this time, the students were used to predicting and explaining behaviour 
by reference to their internal states. This false belief scenario was 
deliberately set within a series of other narratives which encouraged 
students to discuss people's intentions, desires and beliefs. The intentions 
were to see how readily the students could represent the story character's 
false belief and justify his behaviour and expression of surprise in 
reference to his mistaken belief. Again, as in previous narratives, the 
actors used very strong clues to their mental states, e. g., the first brother's 
look of surprise was exaggerated when he discovered the toast was 
missing from the toaster. 
Results and Discussion. 
In this debriefing, there is further evidence of the students' difficulty in 
finding the right word to express a story character's internal state. Janet 
states that the first brother looked 'upset', when he returned to find his 
toast missing (line 631). This may be considered appropriate, however, 
in the context of this narrative, 'upset' does not conjure up quite the right 
image of the boy's state of mind. Similarly, Molly's response 'sad' (line 
633) may also indicate her restricted vocabulary of internal state words, 
and even Peter's offering 'grumpy' (line 635) suggests a similar paucity of 
words on which he could draw. The experimenter provides a clue to the 
word 'surprised' by asking if the boy expected to find his toast missing. 
Simon correctly identifies the boy's false belief, saying that he "thought 
that it was there still" (line 638). This statement demonstrates first-order 
false belief attribution, because Simon was able to successfully 
differentiate the boy's (false) belief from his own belief (the reality 
condition), i. e., 'the boy thought that the toast was still in the toaster, but I 
know that it is not there because his brother has taken it' (see pof this 
thesis for the significance of this distinction). The experimenter provides 
the word 'surprised' to describe the boy's mental state. Simon 
immediately provides the justification (line 645). David also successfully 
represents the boy's mental state immediately prior to his discovery (line 
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651). This response of David's suggests that he was able to attribute first- 
order belief to the story character. 
Tables 27 and 28 show the students' and adults' internal state language in 
this narrative. 
Table 27 Students' IS language in 'The Missing Toast' 
Janet: You looked upset (IS Attribution-general) 
David: Upset. (IS Attribution-general) 
Molly: Sad (IS Attribution-general) 
Peter: Grumpy. (IS Attribution-general) 
Simon: You thought it was in there still. 
Table 28: Adults IS language in The Missing Toast' 
Viv: Again, let's remind ourselves what happened first of all. 
Viv: I was getting ready to go out.... and I thought! had time to make 
some toast. 
Viv: Did I expect my toast to disappear? 
Viv: I thought it was In there.... yeah.... so what had happened when I 
had gone out? 
Viv: So when I came back, I was surprised.... 
Viv: .... so the look that I had on my 
face was one of surprise. I was 
surprised about what had happened. Now, where did I think the 
toast was, when I came back? 
Viv: When I was outside, did I know that my brother had taken the 
toast out? 
6.24 Narrative 9: The Dirty Coffee Cups 
Introduction. 
In this narrative, for the first time, the experimenter invites some of the 
students to directly participate in the, role-play. However, before this, the 
intention is to see how readily the students attribute a demeanour of 
'laziness' to a character whose verbal and non-verbal behaviour in role- 
play explicitly demonstrates this. There are two principal reasons why 
the experimenter wanted to directly involve students in role-play. The 
first centres upon the social-cognitive demands of role-play. It is 
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proposed that in order for a person to engage in role-play, i. e., to assume 
another role, he or she must have some appreciation of the assumed 
character's perspective. Role-play involves some degree of social 
cognition-at a rudimentary level it may involve an awareness of how 
another person behaves; at a more advanced level, it may involve an 
appreciation of how another person thinks. When experts are involved in 
role-play, for example at drama school, they can be said to 'live' the part 
that they take on: not only do they play the role of a character; they often 
become the character, they see the world from the character's perspective, 
and they may even try to think like the assumed character. For the novice 
role-player, role-play becomes more like pretence, very similar in fact to 
the way young children play 'mothers and fathers'. They may act in a 
mother-like fashion, they may say things that mothers typically say, etc. 
This type of role-play still involves representation; it still reflects the 
player's awareness of the way people behave, what they say, etc., in other 
word it still demonstrates the person's social-cognitive awareness. 
If role-play involves improvisation, i. e., there is no script, greater 
demands are placed upon the player's representational abilities, for the 
player has to spontaneously respond (to what other players do and say) in 
a way that she perceives a mother would respond. Improvisation forces 
the player to play the part as she perceives best. Scripts, on the other 
hand, are perhaps more constraining on individual interpretation: the 
player has to assume the role as it is perceived by the script writer, 
although, when the player is in role (on the stage), she ultimately assumes 
ownership of this role, and plays it as she sees fit. 
Of course, the representational demands of playing a role depend upon 
the role that a person is expected to play. If a person is to play a familiar 
role, e. g., a mother, in improvised role-play, it is feasible that the 
assumed characters' intentions, desires and beliefs (her internal states) are 
one and the same as the player's. In other words, the player may not have 
to attribute psychological states to the assumed (pretend) character that 
they themselves do not share28. The player may play the part of a 
mother, in the on-going context of a make-believe scenario, as if she was 
28 This is very different from a person attributing internal states to a story 
character who does not share the same conceptual or perceptual viewpoint 
as they themselves have, as in the false belief story scenarios described in 
earlier chapters. 
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a mother. On the other hand, if a person is expected to play a less 
familiar role, for example, a role that is outside the player's experience, 
then the representational demands may be greater. For example, if a 
player has to play the part of a psychotic murderer, then the player must 
act, think, deliberate, etc. in a way which may be very different from his 
normal behaviour. The type of role does make different demands upon a 
person's representational abilities; however, it is proposed that any form 
of role-play involves social cognition, i. e., cognition about what people 
might do, what they might think, etc. 
The second reason why the experimenter involves the students in role- 
play is to investigate how they engage within it. How readily will they 
participate? Is improvisation too ambitious for students with severe 
learning difficulties? How much adult help will they need? Are they 
able to use non-verbal as well as verbal communication, e. g., facial 
expression and intonation of voice? In addition to these questions, the 
experimenter is interested in how well they are able to respond to the 
challenge of portraying a 'lazy' character. In the narrative, they see a 
character who cannot be bothered to clear away his dirty coffee cups. 
The experimenter is interested to see if the students can use role-play to 
portray 'laziness' in a different way. This would provide an interesting 
insight into the students' understanding of this internal state. 
Results and Discussion. 
In the debriefing, Simon appropriately describes the main character's lazy 
demeanour by saying, "He couldn't be bothered to clear them up" (line 
691). The experimenter focuses their attention on the main character's 
lethargic posture. Simon mimics this and Janet finally describes him as 
"lazy". Simon and Peter provide appropriate explanations of the term 
(lines 710 &711) and Janet calls Simon a "lazybones". Molly similar, to 
other occasions in previous debriefings, says that he is "sad" (line 717). 
This is rather curious, - for whereas on previous occasions, her non- 
specific (general) use of 'sad' was appropriate to convey the mood of 
'disappointed' (narrative 1, line 34) and 'upset' (narrative 2, line 223), on 
this occasion, her use of 'sad' does not capture the mood of the person. It 
is possible that 'laziness' as conveyed by the character's posture and 
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actions, is an unfamiliar abstract entity to Molly, or that the character's 
dramatic presentation of 'laziness' was not exemplary of her interpretation 
of the term (she may have understood 'laziness in a context more familiar 
to her) 29. 
The experimenter then leads the students into gradual participation in 
role-play. He asks if there is another way to show someone to be lazy. 
Peter suggests someone 'staying in bed' (line 723). The experimenter 
suggests that someone can play this part, and Simon suggests that 
someone else could play the part of someone attempting to get him or her 
up. Janet suggests that this person could be the mother and she is trying 
to get someone up for work or school (line 735). The experimenter then 
invites participants and helps to set the scene. Molly (line 746) suggests 
that there should be a father involved. The experimenter then encourages 
them to plan some structure on which they can improvise (line 758) and 
helps with some of the general dialogue. Janet's suggestions about what 
she is to say show great imagination (lines 760&765). Their 
improvisation (lines 769-775) is coherent and shows great potential for 
future work in this area. Although it is short, the video recording of their 
action reveals their ability to use facial expression and intonation of voice 
(Simon's statement that he was not going to school was said in a very 
lethargic manner and Janet's instructions were very matriarchal). David's 
improvised solution to the problem was very spontaneous. His mime of 
filling a receptacle with water and throwing it over Simon was well 
executed (and very humorous) and provided further evidence of the 
students' ability to improvise and use mime. This work has shown how 
readily some of these students engaged in role play. As a small group, 
they were able to portray laziness in an appropriate way. It would be 
interesting to see how they could portray other internal states using 
drama. 
Tables 29 and 30 show the students' and adults' internal state language. 
29 It is also possible that she had become conditioned to respond 'sad' to all 
scenarios. 
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Table 29 Students' IS language in 'The Dirty Coffee Cups' 
Janet: Lazy (IS attribution-specific) 
David: Lazy, lazy. (IS attribution-specific/prompt) 
Janet: Lazybones! (pointing to Simon) He's a lazybones. (IS 
generalisation) 
Molly: He's quite sad (IS attribution-general) 
Janet: Lazybones, get up. 
Table 30: Adults' IS language in 'The Dirty Coffee Cups' 
Viv: What does it mean to be lazy? 
Viv: You just sit there, waiting for things to be done for you.... I'm a 
bit lazy sometimes.... expecting people to clear up after me.... 
Viv: Is there another way that we can play a part and show that 
someone is lazy? Who would like to show a lazy person..... show 
someone being lazy? 
Viv: You want to play mum, all right come over here. Now, who wants 
to play someone being lazy? 
Viv: Good, you're going to do some acting. 
Viv: (to Janet) Now, you and dad can think about what you are going 
to say. 
JViv: Good, (to David) now, you could say something about Simon, you 
could say that he has been getting a bit lazy, lately.... 
Viv: We're going to leave you (gesturing to Janet, David and Simon) to 
do some acting together. Have a go. 
6.25 Narrative 10: The Missing Marble (1) 
Introduction. 
This is the second of the false belief narratives. The story scenario is the 
first two scenes of the doll's house story used in studies 2 and 3. In this 
narrative, like the previous one, some of the students are invited to 
participate. The experimenter chose the four most vocal students to play 
the main characters and Molly to play the mother (mainly because she 
would not have easily accepted not taking part). Janet was 'split-briefed', 
a technique used in study 2. This meant that she would genuinely 
experience first-hand a mistaken belief that the marble was not still in the 
box. It also meant that the students in the audience could answer the 
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belief question in reference to Janet's mistaken belief. If Janet did not 
know of the marble's transfer from the box to the vase (because she was 
actually out of the room when Simon moved it and she was not present 
when Simon was briefed), then the observers can genuinely respond to 
the belief question in reference to her real state of mind. The 
experimenter's intention is to ask the observers (the students who were 
not involved in the action) a first-order false belief question. This belief 
question corresponds to the first-order belief question in previous studies, 
i. e., "When Janet comes back, where will she look for the marble? ". The 
experimenter also seeks to ask Janet a similar first-order belief question. 
This will be asked at the time when she finds the marble in the vase, 
"Where did you think it (the marble) was? " In context, this is a natural 
question to ask (she thought the marble was in the box) and the 
experimenter will invite her to report on her own, 'genuine' false belief. 
In addition to investigating the students' responses to the two first-order 
belief questions described above, it is feasible that discussion centred 
upon the different perceptual and conceptual viewpoints of characters at 
critical times in the story may help to focus the students' attention on how 
appreciation of people's internal states can explain behaviour. 
Results and Discussion. 
The experimenter was struck by how well the students were able to 
improvise. The briefings were brief and gave minimal support in order 
not to constrain the students. Simon's opening lines where he refers to 
dropping the marble were spontaneous and feasible. Molly's three-word 
imperative, with facial expression and gesture, was impressive. The 
experimenter's memory, reality and belief questions to the audience were 
expressed as naturally as possible (and they felt this way as he said them). 
David responds correctly to all three (also using gesture, lines 803-809). 
Anna simultaneously responds correctly to the belief question (line 809). 
Inspection of the video-recording confirms this as simultaneous. This 
indicates successful first-order belief attribution on the part of David and 
Anna. Simon also responds correctly to the belief question and provides 
appropriate justification, "because she put it there" (line 812). Peter 
agrees with this (line 813). Janet's following actions then bear out their 
inferences. Janet's 'split-briefing' meant that she was unaware of what 
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had happened during her absence. When she sees the marble in the vase, 
she is genuinely surprised (line 818). In response to the experimenter's 
first-order question, Janet is able to identify her own previous false belief 
(line 822). She is also able to infer that her brother had moved the marble 
in her absence (line 824). It is proposed that even for the students who 
could correctly predict Janet's behaviour according to her false belief, 
actually hearing Janet report on her previous belief fulfils a valuable 
function, - it confirms their conception of Janet's state of mind which, up 
to that point, was speculative; it is not possible to directly access another 
person's beliefs and desires. Encouraging some students to infer their 
peers' mental states and asking others to make explicit their beliefs in 
contexts such as these may provide them with valuable practice in 
'mentalising'. 
Table 31 shows the successful responses of the students to the memory, 
reality and first-order false belief questions. It is proposed that involving 
students with severe learning difficulties in role-play is a useful medium 
in which students can explore their own beliefs (including false beliefs), 
desires and intentions and those of other people. This investigation has 
also shown again how readily this group of students with severe learning 
difficulties will engage in role-play. 
Table 31: Students' successful responses to memory, reality and 1st-order false belief 
questions. in 'The Missing Marble' (1) 
Viv: Where did Janet put the marble in the beginning? (memory 
question) 
David: (points to toy box) In the games..... ' 
Viv: In the toy box, yes... Where's the marble now, really? (reality 
question) 
David: (points to vase) In the vase  
Viv: When Janet comes back (points outside) In a minute, where will 
Janet look for the marble? 
Anna and Davi d (simultaneously pointing to toy box): 
In there. . '(successful first-Order belief attribution) 
Simon: (points to toy box) In there. Csuccessful first-order belief 
attribution) 
Viv: She will look in the toy box.... why will she look there? 
Simon: Because she put It there? (justification) 
Peter: She put it there. (justification) 
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6.26 Narrative 11: The Missing Marble (2) 
Introduction. 
In this narrative, the students use glove puppets to tell a variation of the 
Doll's House story. The experimenter is interested in how the students 
relate to glove puppets; whether they would spontaneously manipulate 
them in a symbolic fashion, manipulating them 'in role' and treating them 
as thinking entities. Using glove puppets to tell a story with teenage 
students is not considered to be age-inappropriate. In other cultures, e. g., 
in India, puppets represent a familiar medium in which to recount stories, 
particularly folk-tales, among both children and adults. The staff of the 
school had no objections to using them, and the students appeared to have 
no misgivings. 
In this session, the experimenter explores further the students' 
understanding of false belief. In a previous study (investigations 1 &3), 
he had used glove puppets in a rather more contrived manner, in 
experimental contexts which were more akin to test situations. In this 
study, the experimenter uses the puppets to investigate the students' 
understanding of false belief in a more spontaneous and interactive way. 
The puppet story builds upon the belief structure of the previous story. 
Both stories involve a character mistakenly thinking that a marble is 
located in the place in which she had previously left it. The puppet 
version of the false belief story offers the students who were able to 
appreciate the false belief of one of their friends in the previous narrative 
an opportunity to generalise this understanding to a puppet character. In 
this version of the story, the experimenter investigates some of the other 
students' understanding of false belief, particularly those who have been 
less forthcoming. In order to encourage the involvement of more 
students, the use of puppets offers a number of methodological 
advantages. Puppets take up less room than real actors, and the action is 
more tightly focused in terms of physical space. This means that the 
observers can get closer to the action. The students are in closer 
proximity to the experimenter, which means that he is more aware of 
their presence and their level of participation. In contrast to previous 
experimental work, in this narrative the students are encouraged to 
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control the puppets. This frees the experimenter to attend more closely to 
individual students' reactions. Allowing the students to manipulate the 
puppets may also engage their attention more fully. 
The experimenter begins by giving the puppets to David. 
Results and Discussion 
In the first part, David recalls the main sequence of events from the 
preceding narrative. He correctly answers the memory and reality 
questions (lines 894-896). He then successfully responds to the first- 
order false belief question (line 902). Replaying the video-recording at 
the point when Anna returned (Keith had stayed outside with her until the 
marble was transferred), her facial expression indicated that she knew 
what had gone on in her absence with Sally. Anna manipulated the 
puppet so that Sally looked first in the box (line 910) and then looked in 
the tin. In retrospect, the experimenter could have asked the students 
why she looked in the box first of all to encourage them to provide some 
justification of Sally's behaviour. 
In part two, the experimenter involves Danny who has been very passive 
up to this point. The experimenter varies the location of the transferred 
marble (putting it in Danny's pocket), then asks Molly the memory, 
reality and belief questions. Molly responds correctly to the memory 
question (line 933) and the reality question (line 935), but fails the belief 
question, offering the reality condition (line 939). Further investigations 
would need to be done to state with any conviction that Molly is unable 
to represent first-order false belief; however, it is feasible that this is the 
case. 
It would have been very appropriate to have asked Nancy why Sally 
would look under the chair (after line 969) instead of allowing Betty to 
return physically demonstrate where she was to look. However, at this 
point, the end of the school day was approaching and the experimenter 
was running out of time. 
Table 32 shows the students' responses to the experimenter's memory, 
reality and false belief questions. 
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Table 32: Students' responses to the memory, reality and false belief questions in The 
Missing Marble (2). 
Part One 
Viv: (to David) Now where did Mike put the marble in the beginning? 
(memory question) 
David: This one (points to box).  
Viv: And where's the marble now, really? (reality question) 
David: Here (points to tin).  
Viv: Now, who's going to get Sally? 
Viv: (to David) When Sally comes back, where will she look for the 
marble? (belief question). 
David: This one (points to the box).  
Part Two 
Viv: (Turns to Molly) Molly, where did Mike put the marble in the 
beginning? (memory question) 
Molly: (points to box) There  
Viv: And where's the marble now, really? (reality question) 
Molly: (points to Danny's pocket) Pocket.  
Viv: Now let's ask Sally to come in..... (As Anna comes in with Sally, 
Viv asks question to Molly) ... Now where will Sally look for the 
marble? (belief question) 
Molly: Pocket. X 
Part Three 
Viv: Now, Nancy, where did Sally put the marble in the beginning? 
(memory question) 
Nancy: (after pause) In box.  
Viv: Yes, in the box.... and where's the marble now, really? (reality 
question) 
Nancy: (points under the chair) Under the chair  
Viv: (nods) And when Sally comes back in a minute, where will she 
look for the marble? (belief question) 
Nancy: (points under the chair) Under the chair x 
The experimenter gave a copy of the video-recording to the teacher who 
was involved in some of the drama so that she could replay the video to 
the students, stopping it at critical points, and talking to the students 
about what they had seen and what they had said. According to this 
teacher, this revision of both the role-play and the debriefings provided 
the teacher and students with further opportunities to talk about internal 
states. 
6.27 Summary findings 
Table 33 shows the frequency and type of internal state language used by 
students in the debriefings in the first 9 narratives. Narratives 10,11 and 
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12 are not included because of the different format used; student 
involvement in these narratives resulted in a different type of debriefing. 
The frequency with which each student uses the internal state words is 
shown in parentheses. The letter 'p', shown in parentheses, serves to 
indicate when the internal state word is prompted, i. e., when either 
another student or the experimenter uses the same word immediately 
prior to the student's utterance. It can be seen from table 33 that in 
response to the narratives and experimenter questioning in debriefings, 
the majority of internal state references from students related to 'attitude 
and emotion' language. None of the students used internal state 
vocabulary relating to 'truth-value/ reality' language. References to the 
other 4 types of internal states were fairly evenly distributed. 
Table 33: The frequency and type of internal statewords used by students in 
debriefings in the first 8 narratives. 
student att. /emot. char. /beh. perception desire/vol metacog. metalin . truth/real 
Simon happy_ nice watch want(3) hope lie (2) 
disappoint 
-ed 
kind (p) like (2) think (2) fib 
angry 
upset( 
jealous (2) 
Peter upset kind retend own-up 
angry _putting 
on 
grumpy 
Anna angry kind 
upset (2) 
'ealous 
David angry lazy want pretend 
upset (2) like 
Janet jealous lazy (2) feel 
(unwell) 
upset 
Moll sad (5) look 
cross 
cross 
Table 33 represents the range and frequency of language relating to 
people's internal states in response to the stimulus of drama, the 
experimenter's line of questioning and his prompting of student 
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discussion towards psychological and affective concerns. In other words, 
this represents the students' internal state vocabulary when their attention 
has been focused upon social-cognitive entities. Table 34 shows the 
range of different words used by the 8 students during debriefings in the 
first 8 narratives. 
Table 34: The range of different internal state words used by all students in debriefings in the first 8 narratives. 
att. /emot. char. /beh. perception desire/vol metacog. metalin . truth/real 
happy nice watch want hope ask 
disappoint 
-ed 
kind look like think lie 
angry lazy feel 
unwell 
pretend fib 
jealous putting on own-up 
upset_ 
grumpy I 
sad 
cross 
Lj- 3 3 2 4 4 0 
It would seem, from first impressions, that the students' internal state 
language is fairly limited. However, it must be noted that both the 
narratives and the experimenter's questioning focused upon 'targeted' 
internal state terms, e. g., 'disappointment', 'jealousy', etc. Adult and 
student discussion centred upon fairly narrow topics relating to chosen 
internal state terms. In other words, there was not much licence for 
discussion about other psychological states. Even when the experimenter 
encouraged them to relate the meanings of 'targeted' words to everyday 
life (internal state generalisation), the students' language would still be 
expected to reflect the same terms. Table 35 shows the frequency and 
type of internal state words used by the experimenter and his colleagues 
during the debriefings. It can be seen that although the frequency of 
selected internal state terms was quite high (it was the intention of the 
experimenter and. his colleagues to deliberately reinforce the 'targeted' 
internal state vocabulary), the range of internal state words is not 
extensive. Again, this is because discussion and questioning in the 
debriefings centred upon the 'target' internal state words. 
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Table 35: The frequency and type of internal state words used by the adults in the 
first 8 narratives. 
att. /emot. char. /beh. perception desire/vol metacog. metalin . truth/real 
feel (12) nice (2) see (3) like (4) think (25) means (5) really (3) 
(mean) 
happy honest watch want (15) know S ask (2) true (3) 
look fwd. 
to (4) 
lazy (7) feel 
unwell 2 
surprise 
4 
offend actually 
(2) (mean) 
let down expect(3) lie 6 
upset 4 act (2) fib (7) 
disappoint 
-ed 7 
remember 
(2) 
own up (2) 
feelings hope pretend(6) 
embarrass 
-ed 
consider put on 
an 9 Interest remind 
cross (9) believe 
fine 
horrible 
feel 
-jealous 
(5) 
worried 
14 3 3 2 10 9 3 
6.28 General discussion 
The research detailed above provided students with a series of dramatic 
contexts in which they could talk about people's desires, beliefs and 
intentions. Through the medium of drama, a group of students with 
severe learning difficulties were presented with a series of narratives. 
Each narrative and its debriefing has been analysed to present evidence of 
how the researcher's general and specific aims have been achieved. The 
general aim of this study concerned the potential of using drama as a 
medium to focus the students' attention upon people's internal states (both 
their own and other people's). It is proposed that the students in this 
study have been shown to respond to the 'narrative mode of thought' 
(Bruner, 1986). Even the less able students (for example Isha, in 
narrative 7) were able to respond to the actions of actors using very few 
props, to engage in the make-believe world of drama. Other students 
were shown to enter into what Bruner (1986) calls the 'the landscape of 
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consciousness', i. e., they demonstrated an awareness of what story 
characters 'know, think, or feel, or do not know, think, or feel' (p. 14). 
The second general aim concerned whether children's involvement in 
drama offers teachers/ researchers a more interactive and spontaneous 
means of investigating children's understanding of internal states. 
Evidence for this, perhaps, is more subjective. Reflecting upon the 
different ways the author has worked with pupils, the personal experience 
of the researcher leads him to conclude that the more interactive, dynamic 
approach adopted in this study allowed him to respond more intuitively to 
the social-cognitive awareness of the pupils. This way of working with 
pupils was his preferred way of investigation, and this may stem from his 
teaching background. It was felt that the more directive, researcher-led 
methodology utilised in studies 1,2 and 3 did not permit the researcher to 
respond intuitively to the students' perspective30. In the test context, 
there were many occasions when the experimenter became frustrated 
(because of the need to stick to the procedure) when he could not follow 
up some of the children's responses. In this study, the experimenter 
begins by controlling the proceedings, but he very quickly transfers the 
balance of power over to the students. He first provides the stimulus by 
presenting the children with brief narratives set within drama, but he then 
allows the students to take the lead. The researcher improvises and 
interacts within the learning process as it develops. His intentions are 
clear. In this study he wanted to focus the students' attention upon 
people's internal states by encouraging them to relate to the characters' 
situation, and to help them become aware that people's behaviour relates 
to their psychological states; what people say and what they do depend 
upon what they desire, believe and intend. But the form and direction of 
his intervention are spontaneous and cannot be pre-determined. The 
researcher has to 'think on his feet', to improvise and read the situation, 
what Schon (1983) calls 'reflection within action'. 
In many respects, in this type of research, the researcher's role becomes 
similar to the teacher's: he respects what the pupils have to say and he 
responds to their levels of awareness. It is proposed that the interactive 
30 The procedure in study 2 did have room in the debriefing for this 
'reciprocity'; however, the children's ceiling response to the belief 
questions made this virtually redundant. 
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and flexible approach used in this study offered the researcher more 
opportunities to find out what students know about internal states. This 
allowed him to respond by building upon their existing knowledge and 
making them consciously aware of psychological states. It is feasible 
that the 'participatory' framework used in this study is more akin to the 
ways that people learn about the social world. One of the intentions was 
to provide dramatic contexts which reflect familiar conflict situations, 
where characters try to deceive, manipulate and serve their own interests. 
It was agued that these live, dramatic narratives have a number of 
advantages over other narrative media, e. g., televised "soaps", videos and 
books. Narratives like the ones devised for this study can be 'purpose- 
written' for the task. They can be 'free-standing', i. e., the contexts can 
have fixed boundaries to help focus the children's attention on the salient 
information. They can be set within the experience of the student group 
and they can incorporate powerful non-verbal clues to facilitate children's 
understanding of both dialogue and plot. 
In the results and discussion sections relating to individual narratives the 
author provided evidence of how the narratives and debriefings led to 
students' attribution of internal states to story characters, successful 
prediction of their behaviour according to internal states and 
generalisation of internal states. The narratives, to a greater and lesser 
degree, enabled the students to demonstrate their social-cognitive abilities 
in these three areas. It was evident from many of the debriefings that 
students could identify in some way with the internal states of story 
characters, but they appeared not to have the specific internal state 
vocabulary at their command. 
Central to the development of this chapter is the author's belief that many 
children with severe learning difficulties may be disadvantaged by having 
limited internal state language. It is proposed that children may benefit 
from being involved in the type of activity described in this chapter, 
where they are exposed to rich social-cognitive language and where their 
attention can be focused upon people's psychological states. 
The author has been careful not to assume that the students in this study 
did have limited internal state vocabularies, even though this is the 
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author's opinion. It would be incorrect to infer that on the occasions 
when students did not use specific and relevant internal state language (in 
response to the drama and the experimenter's questions), this was because 
they did not have such language at their disposal. Longitudinal 
observation of these students in naturalistic contexts over a long period of 
time would be necessary to ascertain the internal state vocabularies of 
these students. 
However, on many occasions, students struggled to find specific internal 
state language, and instead used general internal state terms which did not 
quite capture the true psychological states of the characters (for example, 
Molly in narrative 3, line 293; Anna in narrative 5, line 460 and David in 
narrative 1, line 92). It is possible that drama represents a curriculum 
activity in which students attention can be focused upon internal states 
and the meaning of such language can be taught. The representational 
nature of drama and role play offers a medium in which this can be done. 
Indeed, the versatility with which David and Janet improvised in 
narrative 9, lines 769-776 and Simon and Molly in narrative 11 shows 
the potential of involving young people with severe learning difficulties 
in improvised role-play. This in itself offers students valuable 
opportunities for social-cognitive learning, for role-play can involve 
representation of what people in certain situations might say and feel, and 
how they may behave. 
It was stated earlier that curriculum activity in special schools does not 
specifically focus upon children's social-cognitive development. Drama 
may represent one of the few media in schools which concerns itself with 
social-cognitive understanding and awareness. However, comparison 
and further investigation of other school-based activities would need to 
be undertaken to add weight to this assumption. 
The methodology used in this study to investigate pupils' understanding 
of first-order false belief differs from the methodology used in studies 1 
and 3. The researcher's intentions were to steer away from the test 
situation, to encourage student participation and to allow the researcher 
flexibility to improvise according to the students' responses. Narratives 
10 and 11 used the method of 'split-briefing' piloted in study 2: students 
were placed in situations where they themselves experienced false beliefs 
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and other students were encouraged to predict their classmates' behaviour 
according to these mistaken beliefs and to justify their behaviour 
according to their beliefs and desires. Student responses during these 
narratives demonstrated their ability to appreciate first-order false belief 
in these participatory contexts. It is possible that involving students with 
severe learning difficulties in false belief narratives (in similar ways as 
reported in narratives 10 and 11) may provide the researcher/ teacher 
with more spontaneous and meaningful contexts in which to facilitate 
children's understanding of conceptual role-taking. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
7.1 The development of the research 
In the preface to this thesis, the author likened his research activities to a 
research journey to find relevant ways of applying 'theory of mind' 
research to children with severe learning difficulties. His experimental 
work began by using more traditional and empirical research methods 
and ended by using phenomenological approaches. Throughout this 
journey, the author's long-term aim was to provide children with severe 
learning difficulties with meaningful contexts in which to investigate 
their understanding of people's psychological states. The author's 
experimental work began by working with non-learning disabled 
children. It seemed logical to learn more about the way young non- 
learning disabled children approached conceptual role-taking tasks before 
commencing similar work with children with special needs. The first 
empirical study involved 3-, 4- and 5-year-olds in three adaptations of the 
'Sally Anne' false belief task (Baron-Cohen, 1985). This test represents a 
simple, yet illuminating experimental context in which children's ability 
to appreciate first-order belief can be investigated. Dennett (1978) 
proposed that understanding false belief might constitute a 'litmus test' of 
a theory of mind, in that it demonstrates a person's ability to distinguish 
unambiguously between someone's (true) belief and someone else's 
different (false) belief. Study 1 showed how resilient the 'Sally Anne' 
task was to simplification. The first three investigations demonstrated 
how attempts to reduce the inferential demands of the task failed to 
improve young non-learning disabled children's abilities to predict a story 
character's behaviour according to her false belief. Substituting real 
people in place of puppets and providing children with a series of 
perceptual and conceptual prompts did not significantly improve 
children's performance. Results from this study generally supported the 
findings from the literature that it is not until children reach the age of 4 
years, that they begin to successfully attribute first-order false belief in 
similar experimental contexts. 
This first study represented an important first stage in the development of 
the author's research. In this study the author chose to work within a 
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formal quantitative paradigm. The first investigation consisted of a 
replication of the 'Sally Anne' task. The author's aims were two-fold. 
Firstly, he wanted to see if Baron-Cohen's findings about when (at what 
age) children begin to represent first-order false belief were generalisable 
to other groups. Secondly, the author wanted to see for himself the 
difficulties that young children experience when faced with this task; how 
they responded to the formal, experimental context. His review of the 
literature had indicated a consensus of opinion about the robustness of the 
false belief task in terms of its representational complexity. The process 
of working with children in this first study (together with his knowledge 
of the literature) led to the formulation of author's hypotheses in 
investigations 2 and 3; namely, that the substitution of real people in 
place of dolls and the provision of a series of perceptual and conceptual 
prompts would lead to improved performance. This inductive-deductive 
model of research within a scientific framework represented an important 
first-step in the author's familiarity with the complexity of the false belief 
task. It demonstrated the back-and-forth movement that Mouly 
describes, where the investigator first operates inductively from 
observations to hypotheses, and then deductively from these hypotheses 
to their implications (Mouly 1978). 
Statistical analysis led him to reject these hypotheses; the subsequent 
modifications to the original task in order to reduce its computational 
complexity were found not to significantly improve children's 
performance. 
The discussion which followed the first study raised a number of 
questions about whether a test scenario was really the best way of 
enabling children to demonstrate their abilities to represent first-order 
false belief. However, in terms of the sequence of the author's research, 
these questions (which had a considerable bearing on the author's 
thinking and subsequent research within a more phenomenological 
approach) could only be contemplated after the researcher had worked 
with the groups of children in the way that he did, as a detached, 
objective observer within a formal empirical framework. In the first 
study, the author's research questions and hypotheses warranted an 
objective empirical approach. There was a need for consistency within 
the specified procedure. The author kept a tight control of the 
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experimental context in order to permit reliable analysis of whether his 
manipulation of the independent variables demonstrated change in 
children's performance. It is proposed that the research methodology in 
study 1 (and study 3 which used a similar procedure with children with 
severe learning difficulties) was appropriate to the task at hand. 
Nevertheless, the process of working with children using a scientific 
method did alert the researcher to the constraints of a test situation. 
Findings from study 1 did reveal an inability on the part of the younger 
children to attribute first-order belief, but this may have been due to their 
response to the contrived experimental context. Donaldson's (1978) 
views about the way young children strive to make 'human sense' of the 
unfamiliar task come to mind, - these children may have been able to 
represent first-order false belief in more naturalistic contexts, e. g., in the 
home. Dunn's longitudinal observations (Dunn 1987; 1988; 1991) of 
young children's spontaneous behaviour in the home provides a more 
optimistic picture of their ability to appreciate people's internal states. 
The home may represent the best environment in which to observe 
children's true abilities to attribute first- and second- order belief. This 
point is revisited later. 
In the discussion following study 1, the author expressed his frustration 
about assuming a detached, objective role within the constraints of a test 
situation. When children responded incorrectly to the belief question, he 
could see possible ways of helping them to decentre. There were 
opportunities when he could have asked them to justify their answers to 
the belief questions, - this may have drawn their attention to the story 
characters' different perceptual and conceptual perspectives. However, 
the empirical research methodology adopted in this study did not (quite 
reasonably) permit this, - within the test situation, this type of 
intervention would be seen to be outside the experimenter's remit and 
would have invalidated his findings. The researcher's teaching 
background heightened this feeling of frustration; working within a test 
context necessarily led to missed learning opportunities. Working within 
this rigid framework served to highlight the potential of using a false 
belief story scenario outside a test situation, within a more 
phenomenological style of enquiry. This motivated the author to devise a 
more interactive and participatory medium in which a false belief story 
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scenario could be used to help children learn about representational 
states. 
In study 2, the, author devised his own false belief story scenario which 
involved 6- and 7-year-old non-learning disabled children in drama. 
Using techniques of 'split briefing' and 'off-staging' children were placed 
in situations where they had first-hand experience of false belief. The 
procedure was, more flexible and the researcher's role became less 
detached and more spontaneous, ready to respond to the children's lead. 
The research contained elements of quantitative and qualitative methods 
of enquiry. Children were asked a series of control and belief questions 
which revealed their understanding of first- and second-order false belief, 
but in what was considered to be a more meaningful and natural context 
than in the previous study. In addition, children were offered 
opportunities in debriefing sessions to talk about their beliefs, desires and 
intentions. The children saw video playback of their actions and heard 
each others' answers to the experimenter's questions, identifying 
occasions when they responded according to their false beliefs. In these 
plenary sessions, children were encouraged to talk about their own and 
other people's perceptual and conceptual viewpoints. Flavell stated: 
e 
".... our own perspectives produce clear signals that are much 
louder to us than the other's, and they usually continue to ring in 
our ears while we try to decode the other's. It may take 
considerable skill and effort to represent another's point of view 
accurately through this kind of noise, and the possibility of 
egocentric distortion is ever present. " (Flavell 1985, page 46). 
The plenary sessions were designed to help reduce this 'egocentric 
distortion', - to encourage children to appreciate each other's different 
belief positions and to learn that beliefs are people's representations of 
reality, and that these representations may not accord with reality. As it 
turned out, the 6 and 7 year-old children in this study had little difficulty 
in answering questions of first- and second-order belief during interview 
and in response to a video re-enactment of the story a week later. The 
children's 'ceiling' performance meant that the debriefing session had a 
relatively low emphasis. However, this study confirmed the author's 
belief that drama represents a powerful medium in which to focus 
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children's attention on mental states and that working with children in a 
more dynamic and interactive way afforded greater potential for children 
to learn about the mental world. In the second study the author had 
moved beyond the formal test situation. The design allowed him to 
identify instances when children could attribute first- and second-order 
belief (in response to his belief questions) but in addition to this, he had 
introduced research considerations more akin to qualitative research 
methods, e. g., analysing children's discussion, looking at how they help 
each other's understanding, interpreting how children make sense of what 
they have experienced. In the second study, the balance of power had 
moved further into the children's domain, - children were more 
instrumental in their own learning and the researcher was less directive 
and more responsive. 
The preliminary work with non-learning disabled children in the first two 
studies served to inform, focus and refine the author's subsequent work 
with children with severe learning difficulties. The same two false belief 
story scenarios were used in study 3 to investigate the abilities of children 
with severe learning difficulties to attribute first- and second-order false 
belief. Similar to study 1, the researcher adopted a more empirical style 
of enquiry, his intentions were' to investigate if children with severe 
learning difficulties were able to represent first- and second-order false 
belief. There have been few studies which have specifically investigated 
the conceptual role-taking abilities of children with severe learning 
difficulties. Just over half of the children involved in this study (13 out 
of 24 children) were able to successfully attribute first-order false belief, 
and roughly 20% (5 out of 24 children) were able to attribute second- 
order false belief. The results of this study showed a general trend 
towards better performance among children with higher scores on the 
Raven's and TROG assessments, but a clear relationship between 
children's performance in belief attribution tasks and their scores of 
mental age using the Raven's test was not reliably shown. 
Study 4 was a questionnaire-based investigation into children's 
spontaneous use of 18 'targeted' internal state words among non-learning 
disabled children aged 1-5 years and children with Down's Syndrome 
aged 3-19 years (attending schools for children with severe learning 
difficulties) 
. Over a period of one month, parents were asked to write 
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down sentences and phrases in which children used the targeted internal 
state words. Results showed that certain metacognitive words ('wish', 
'understand', 'guess', 'wonder' and 'believe') were not used by the 2-year- 
old non-learning disabled children and that the words 'guess', 'trick', 
'mistake', 'wonder' and 'believe' were reported to be used by about half of 
the 4-year-olds. A general finding was that the metacognitive words 
were among the least frequently reported words across the age ranges. 
None of the children with Down's Syndrome at the single word/sign level 
were heard to be using any of the 18 internal state words. At the 2-word 
level, approximately half of the Down's children (8 out of 14) were 
reported to be using perception language ('see', 'hear' and 'feel'), but only 
one child was reported to be using one of the other internal state words 
from the other categories (the word 'think'). Three of the Down's children 
(out of 15) at the 3/4+ word level were reported to be using all of the 18 
internal state words. At the 3/4+ word level, the older Down's children 
were reported to be using more of the internal state words. Although the 
sample sizes were relatively small and therefore findings must be 
regarded as tentative, the children with Down's Syndrome at the 3/4+ 
word level were reported to make less use of the 18 targeted internal state 
words compared to the non-learning disabled 4-year-olds. 
The final study investigated further the abilities of children with severe 
learning difficulties to use internal state language. It also revisited some 
of the issues raised in study 2, evaluating the potential of drama as an 
interactive medium in which to focus children's attention on their own 
and other people's psychological states. In this study, the style of research 
can be seen to have moved further outside the positivist scientific 
paradigm and further into the phenomenological (qualitative) domain. 
The researcher's intentions were to provide children with a dynamic 
learning context in which he improvised to the best of his ability to 
facilitate children's understanding of internal state language. In this 
study, the researcher improvised and interacted within the learning 
process as it developed. His intentions were clear. Using drama as a 
stimulus, he wanted to investigate children's understanding of internal 
states. He wanted to focus the students' attention upon people's internal 
states by encouraging them to relate to the story characters' situation, and 
to help them become aware that people's behaviour relates to their 
psychological states; what people say and what they do depend upon 
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what they desire, believe and intend. Using simulations of everyday life, 
which Cohen and Manion (1989) describe as 'social episodes', the author 
used ethogenic methods to analyse children's non-verbal and verbal 
language. From this he was able to identify occasions when the students 
were able to make reference to their own and other people's 
psychological states. 
In contrast to the empirical methods adopted in studies 1 and 3; the form 
and direction of the author's intervention was spontaneous and could not 
be pre-determined. The students' responses and the outcomes of the work 
were less predictable. The researcher had to 'think on his feet', to 
improvise and read the situation, what Schon (1983) calls 'reflection 
within action'. The experimental context was interactive, where the 
emphasis is on researcher and children learning together. The approach 
acknowledges the importance of 'dynamic and participatory aspects' of 
social-cognitive understanding (Forrester, 1992). 
The author introduced the students to a series of original playlets and 
used debriefings as a context in which to investigate their understanding 
of characters' internal states. Analysis focused upon the students' verbal 
and non-verbal responses to a series of playlets. The author identified 
and discussed instances when children, as a result of being involved in 
drama: 1) attributed internal states (desires, intentions and beliefs) to 
story characters, 2) successfully predicted story characters' behaviour, 
according to their internal states, and, 3) generalised the meaning of 
internal state terms by identifying such internal states in themselves or 
other people in real-life situations. In addition, the investigator analysed 
the type of internal state language used by the students. The students' 
internal state usage was categorised according to criteria developed by 
the author in a previous study (Hinchcliffe and Roberts, 1987). The 
investigation made no claims for successfully teaching internal state 
vocabulary to members of the group; no pre-or post intervention tests 
were conducted to assess whether such words were already within the 
vocabulary of the children involved, or whether the intervention led to the 
acquisition of 'targeted' words. Instead, the research attempted to meet 
the general and specific aims as stated. 
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All of the children were shown to respond to the actions of actors using 
very few props and most of the children demonstrated an awareness of 
characters' desires, beliefs and intentions. In two of the narratives, 
several of the students were shown to successfully attribute first-order 
false belief to story characters. Students also showed a great interest in 
participating in role play and some demonstrated great ability to 
improvise. In debriefings, some children were shown to struggle to find 
specific internal state language to describe and explain characters' actions 
and to talk about their own psychological states. - Some students tended to 
use general internal state terms which did not quite capture the true 
psychological states of the characters. The author proposed that drama 
represents a curriculum activity in which students attention can be 
focused upon internal states and the meaning of such language can be 
taught. The representational nature of drama and role play affords 
children with an ideal medium in which this can be done. It also offers 
the researcher a flexible context in which he or she can improvise to the 
best of his ability to facilitate children's understanding of internal states. 
7.2 Critical review of the methodology 
In this thesis the author's experimental work incorporated traditional 
empirical research methods and' more interactive, phenomenological 
styles of enquiry. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
have their place in educational research. The researcher should be aware 
that there are a variety of approaches to choose from and that the 
selection of methodology should suit the task at hand, i. e., the nature of 
the enquiry rather, than researcher's preferred way of working. Study 2 
incorporated a combination of styles, - features of both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis were identified (although the latter assumed a 
relatively low profile because of the children's ceiling performance in the 
quantitative analysis). Cohen and Manion (1989) recommend flexibility 
in the selection of research methodology. Comparing educational 
research with the social sciences they quote Merton and Kendall (1946): 
"Social scientists have come to abandon the spurious choice between 
qualitative and quantitative data: they are concerned rather with that 
combination of both which makes use of the most valuable features of 
each. The problem becomes one of determining at which points they 
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should adopt one, and at which the other, approach. " (In Cohen and 
Manion, 1989 page 42). 
The author's research commenced using empirical methods. As 
previously stated, the researcher's intentions in studies 1 and 3 warranted 
a systematic, controlled methodology, where the researcher became a 
detached, objective (but participant) observer. Objectivity is a mandatory 
feature of empirical research; there could be a multiplicity of causes for a 
given occurrence, (including the behaviour of the researcher him or 
herself), so the researcher is concerned with consistency, standing back 
from the proceedings to isolate and test the effect of alleged causes as 
they relate to his hypotheses. The first study involved children in a test 
situation. This type of empirical research can reveal interesting findings 
about the social-cognitive abilities of children. The 'Sally-Anne' task 
provided a simple (and from the children's perspective, interesting) 
context in which to test children's understanding of first-order false 
belief. The story scenario and procedure offered an experimental context 
in which variables could be manipulated to test the author's chosen 
hypotheses. In study 1, the author's hypotheses were rejected (using real 
people and the provision of perceptual and conceptual prompts did not 
significantly improve young children's abilities to predict behaviour 
according to first-order false belief). However, as previously stated, the 
researcher needs to be cautious about generalising his findings. It would 
be an assumption to claim that the younger subjects in this study could 
not predict peoples' behaviour according to first-order belief. Outside the 
contrived experimental context, for example in more naturalistic settings, 
the children who failed the belief questions in study 1 may well be able to 
represent first-order false belief. It was proposed that observation of 
young children's spontaneous behaviour in the home may reveal a more 
optimistic picture of their conceptual role-taking abilities. 
Researchers utilising systematic empirical research methods must also 
guard themselves from what Cohen and Manion describe as 
'quantification', - when quantitative research 'becomes an end in itself' 
(Cohen and Manion 1989, page 25). In relation to the author's first study, 
it would be feasible (but not desirable) to devise a series of permutations 
of the false belief task to test a series of recursive hypotheses in an 
attempt to improve children's performance. In this event, questions could 
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justifiably be raised about the experimental findings becoming 
increasingly trivial and far removed from the world of the classroom. An 
analogy to this in special education is when behavioural teaching 
becomes an end in itself, - when teachers become so engrossed with 
behavioural-product approaches, e. g., checklists of finely graded 
behavioural objectives, that they lose sight of the relevance of the work to 
the child. 
In the author's opinion, the real value of these test scenarios for children 
with severe learning difficulties lies in the ways in which they can be 
adapted to provide children with exciting and innovative new teaching 
contexts. With the interests of these children in mind, it is not sufficient 
to involve them in test situations which serve merely to confirm their 
social-cognitive difficulties. What is needed is imaginative 
reconstruction of these experimental scenarios to change them from test 
contexts to learning contexts; from 'closed' assessment (assessment for its 
own sake) to 'open' assessment (assessment leading to intervention). 
Too frequently, in the author's opinion, researchers visit special schools, 
involve children in conceptual role-taking tasks, and leave with files full 
of data about the difficulties that many of these children experience with 
such tasks. This way of working does little to bridge the gap between 
research and practice. Far better to involve the school staff in the work at 
the early stages, to elicit their partnership and to allow them to guide the 
experimental work. In this way, 'theory of mind' research will become 
less concerned with assessment, and more to do with intervention. It is 
the author's opinion that many of the conceptual role-taking tasks 
designed by developmental psychologists over the last few years can be 
adapted for use as teaching contexts in schools for children with severe 
learning difficulties. 
In the author's later experimental work, the research methodology moved 
further towards a phenomenological approach. In study 5, the researcher 
became less concerned with objectivity and interacted spontaneously with 
his subjects. Using drama to focus the students' attention upon people's 
psychological states, the researcher strived to understand and explain 
what was unique and particular to these individuals rather than being 
concerned with what was general and universal (Burrell and Morgan, 
231 
1979). The researcher tried to discover how the students interpreted the 
playlets which they saw performed, how they understood and predicted 
the story character's behaviour according to their desires, intentions, 
beliefs and feeling states. Analysis of the students' non-verbal and verbal 
language provided some evidence of their abilities to appreciate people's 
psychological states, but the researcher's findings were regarded as 
tentative; he acknowledged the speculative nature of the enquiry and the 
difficulty of interpreting subjective meanings. In providing the students 
with a series of short 'social episodes', the researcher attempted to share 
the subjects' frame of reference by responding intuitively to their 
experience. The researcher responded to the students' lead in debriefings 
and improvised to the best of his ability. However, he was aware of the 
effect that he was having on the proceedings, that his decisions of when 
to prompt, when to change tack, etc., must have influenced the students' 
responses and commentary and made the process of analysing and 
reflecting upon the students' experience difficult. 
In interpretative paradigms of research, particularly when researchers are 
working in experimental contexts which are spontaneous and highly 
emotive, e. g., study 5, researchers need to be aware of the power that they 
have to impose their interpretations of situations and events upon their 
subjects. For, example, in study 5, narratives 4 and 7 focused upon 
deception. In the discussion of narrative 4, the author described the 
different shades of meaning of deception according to the intentions and 
possible consequences of people's deceptive behaviour. ,A person's 
judgement of when a lie is considered to be 'right' or 'wrong' is subjective 
and researchers should be cautious about how they communicate their 
own value positions. 
In the final study, working within an interpretative paradigm seemed a 
reasonable way in which the researcher could realise his stated intentions. 
The flexible approach seemed to offer the students opportunities to 
demonstrate their social cognitive awareness. This approach 
acknowledged the importance of 'dynamic and participatory' aspects of 
social-cognitive understanding (Forrester, 1992), and, in many ways, 
placed greater emphasis on the way children begin to learn about people 
(their beliefs, desires and intentions) through social interaction. This 
takes us back to Hobson's 'person-related' meanings (Hobson, 1993) 
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described in chapter 1, where, according to Hobson, children's 
engagement with other people's emotional attitudes towards people, 
objects and events are seen to constitute the building blocks for children's 
understanding of psychological states. 
7.3 Implications for future research 
Research into the social-cognitive development of children with severe 
learning difficulties is still in its infancy. In mainstream schools, 
awareness of mental activities, e. g., language relating to internal states, is 
not generally seen as an explicit aim of the curriculum; children would be 
expected to develop this awareness incidentally, through ordinary daily 
life and social experiences. It is likely that much of non-learning 
disabled children's social-cognitive awareness,. particularly their 
understanding of internal state language, takes place in the home before 
children begin to attend school. Parental reports of children's 
spontaneous use of 18 'targeted' internal state words (some of which were 
metacognitive words, which have been shown to develop later in 
children's vocabularies, Shatz, 1983; Bretherton and Beeghly, 1982) 
showed that the majority of 5-year-old children were heard to use all of 
the target words. In special schools, the author would like to see 
development of children's social-cognitive awareness as an explicit aim 
of the curriculum. In chapter 6, the author discussed how the National 
Curriculum may have diverted teachers attention away from important, 
but hitherto-unexplored, areas of specific difficulty for children with 
severe learning difficulties, e. g., social cognition. Researchers and 
teachers have a responsibility to devise curricula which may help to 
accelerate children's progress in these areas. 
The findings from the experimental work with learning-disabled children 
reflect the great range of individual differences in the abilities of children 
with severe learning difficulties to appreciate people's psychological 
states. Some of the children were able to attribute first-and second-order 
false belief and had relatively wide vocabularies of internal state words. 
Others, at least in the investigative contexts described in this thesis, had 
more limited internal state vocabularies and were shown to experience 
difficulty in representing other people's psychological states. In the 
drama work, some of these children appeared to be able to relate to the 
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feeling states of the story characters, but had great difficulty finding 
appropriate internal state language to label them. Language clearly plays 
an important part in a person's social-cognitive understanding, - the 
ability to draw upon internal state vocabulary clarifies our thinking about 
people's behaviour, and, in many ways, offers a fuller understanding of 
the social world. 
Research into the social-cognitive development of children with severe 
learning difficulties presents considerable problems, - social cognition 
deals with intangible entities, which cannot be directly perceived or 
demonstrated, - thoughts, feelings, wishes, intentions, attitudes, 
knowledge, etc. However, even the most severely intellectually disabled 
child can be assumed to have experienced these things within themselves, 
at least in some rudimentary form. All children feel such emotions as 
anger, frustration, loneliness, happiness, and so on. The experimental 
work described in this thesis has been concerned with attempting to make 
children consciously aware of some of these mental events and activities, 
both within themselves and within other people. 
Arising from this thesis, there seem to be four possible avenues for future 
research: 
Firstly, the technique of 'split-briefing' in drama could be developed 
further to offer younger non-learning disabled children 'first-hand' 
experience of false belief. Study 2 involved 6-and 7-year-old children. 
5-year-old children's understanding of second-order false belief could be 
investigated using the same story scenario or a simpler version. Children 
with severe learning difficulties could also be involved in a similar 
procedure, placing more emphasis on video-recording of individual 
children's responses to belief questions between scenes and play-back 
during de-briefing. 
Secondly, internal state language could be the focus- of further 
investigation. In chapter 6, Beeghly et al. 's (1986) study was reviewed 
concerning the internal state language used by mothers to their children 
with Down's Syndrome. Their findings indicated that the mothers of 
children with Down's Syndrome used proportionately fewer internal state 
utterances than did mothers of non-learning disabled children matched 
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for linguistic ability and mental age. Beeghly et al. speculated that 
mothers of children with Down's Syndrome may have used less internal 
state language because of low expectations of their children. It would be 
interesting to investigate the internal state language used by teachers to 
their pupils with severe learning difficulties. It is possible that like 
parents, teachers may consciously restrict their use of internal state 
language because they feel it is beyond the comprehension of their pupils. 
Research could focus on the frequency of internal state reference by 
special school teachers and mainstream teachers. Research could also 
centre upon which curriculum activities appear to elicit more internal 
state language from both teachers and pupils. 
Thirdly, further research could focus on the complexity of specific 
internal state words. As indicated above, the literature seems to suggest 
that metacognitive words are among the last category of internal state 
words to emerge in the language of young children. The present author's 
questionnaire-based study indicated that some metacognitive words (e. g., 
'wonder', 'believe', 'wish' and 'guess') were less frequently used by non- 
learning disabled and learning disabled children. Research could centre 
upon how and when children use metacognitive language, what children 
understand about metacognitive words and the different 'layers' of 
metacognitive implication attached to individual words. 
Finally, the narratives conceived by the author for the final study could 
be made into short video stories. These might represent a useful resource 
for researchers and teachers to investigate and develop children's internal 
state language and illustrate the meanings of certain social-cognitive 
terms. In his research activity, the author has found drama to be a 
powerful medium in which to focus learning disabled children's attention 
upon the mental world. Much of the drama that the author has observed 
in schools for children with severe learning difficulties has been, in his 
opinion, unnecessarily simple and at times superficial, - again, perhaps 
because of poor expectations among some teachers. The author's final 
study demonstrated how students with a range of different abilities can 
enter into what Bruner calls the 'narrative mode of thought' (Bruner 
1986). Even the less able students engaged in the make-believe world of 
drama, responding to the actions of actors using very few props. Other 
students were shown to enter into what Bruner (1986) calls 'the landscape 
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of consciousness', i. e., they demonstrated an awareness of story 
characters desires, beliefs and intentions. Some teachers may be less 
imaginative and ambitious in drama because of lack of experience or 
training. In the words of Dorothy Heathcote "Educational use of drama 
has a long way to travel" (Heathcote et al 1988, page 31). The 
Programmes of Study (Speaking and Listening) in the Revised Orders for 
English in the National Curriculum (DFE 1995) place greater emphasis 
on drama and improvisation at Key Stages 1-4. It is hoped that this thesis 
has demonstrated the unique merits of drama to children's social 
cognitive development and that recent legislation will induce teachers to 
assign to drama greater emphasis than was afforded by previous National 
Curriculum Orders. 
0 
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Appendix 1: Role briefings for doll' house story (study 2) 
Mike's briefing 
Scene 1 
You are playing marbles in the living room with your sister Sally. One of 
the marbles rolls under the sofa. You look for it and find a big 'special' 
marble that you lost a few weeks ago. It's your marble, your Dad gave it you 
last Christmas. Sally says it's her marble and that she bought it from the 
sweet shop. You start to fight over this marble. You don't want Sally to 
have it. However, Sally snatches it from you and puts It in her toy box 
which is in the corner of the living room. You get upset by this and 
continue to argue with her that she has taken your marble. 
Mum comes in to see what all the noise is about. She gets cross with you 
and Sally. She sends Sally outside to play in the garden and tells you to 
clear up your toys which are scattered over the living room floor. Sally 
and Mum go out and leave you on your own in the living room. You are 
still angry about Sally taking your marble. In fact you are so angry that 
you decide that Sally is not going to have your marble. You take the marble 
out of Sally's toy box and hide it in a vase on the window- ledge. You can 
retrieve the marble later. 
You leave the living room and go up to play in your bedroom. 
Scene 3 
Later that day after tea, you are sitting with Sally, Mum and Dad watching 
'Top of the Pops'. At the end of 'Top of the Pops' you and Sally have to go up 
to bed. You say goodnight to everyone and go up to your bedroom. You are 
very tired and you fall asleep quickly. 
Scene 4 
But in the middle of the night you wake up. You suddenly remember about 
the marble. You get out of bed and creep downstairs to find it. As you get 
downstairs, you see Sally in the living room. She has also got up in the 
middle of the night to fetch the marble. Before you are able to say or do 
anything, you hear Dad behind you. He has heard some noises downstairs 
and has come down to see what's going on. He sees you and Sally and tells 
you both off. He sends you both straight back up to bed. 
Scene 5 
You lie awake in bed thinking about your marble. 
Sally's briefing 
You are playing marbles in the living room with your brother Mike. One 
of the marbles rolls under the sofa. When Mike looks for it he finds a big 
'special' marble that you lost a few weeks ago. It's your marble, you bought 
it in the sweet shop down the road. Mike says it's his marble and that Daddy 
gave it to him. He must be mistaken. You start to fight over this marble. 
You don't want Mike to have it. You snatch the marble away from Mike and 
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put it in your toy box which is in the corner of the living room. Mike 
continues to argue with you saying it is his marble. 
Mum comes in to see what all the noise is about. She gets cross with you 
and Mike. She tells you to go out and play in the garden and tells Mike to 
clear up the toys on the living room floor. You go out into the garden to 
play. 
Scene 2 
You come back into the living room with some flowers that you have picked 
in the garden. You go over to the window-ledge to put them in a vase. As 
you are about to put them in, you are surprised to see your marble in the 
bottom of the vase. Michael has obviously taken it out of your toy box and 
hidden it there. You take the marble out of the vase and put it in a dish on 
the sideboard while you put the flowers in the vase. However, you are so 
busy arranging the flowers that you forget about the marble. You leave 
the marble in the dish on the sideboard and go out in the kitchen to find 
Mum. 
Scene 3 
Later that day after tea, you are sitting with Mike, Mum and Dad watching 
'Top of the Pops'. At the end of 'Top of the Pops' you and Mike have to go up 
to bed. You say goodnight to everyone and go up to your bedroom. You are 
very tired and you fall asleep quickly. 
Scene 4 
But in the middle of the night you wake up. You suddenly remember about 
the marble. You get out of bed and creep downstairs to find it. As you get 
half-away across the living room, you hear a noise behind you. You turn 
around and see Mike watching you from the doorway. But before you are 
able to do or say anything, you both see Dad coming down the stairs. He has 
heard some noises downstairs and has come down to see what's going on. 
He sees you and Mike and tells you both off. He sends you both straight 
back up to bed. 
Scene S 
You lie awake in bed thinking about your marble. 
Mum's briefing 
Scene 1 
You are on the telephone when you hear Sally and Mike arguing in the 
living room. You put the 'phone down and go in the living room to see 
what all the noise is about. You see Sally and Mike squabbling on the floor. 
You tell them both off and send Sally out to play in the garden. You tell 
Mike to tidy up the toys left on the living room floor. You go outside with 
Sally. 
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Scene 3A 
You are sitting watching 'Top of the Pops' with Sally, Mike and Dad. It is 
time for Sally and Mike to go up to bed. They both go upstairs and after 
watching a film, you and Dad also go up to bed. 
Dad's briefin 
Scene 3 
You are sitting watching 'Top of the Pops' with Sally, Mike and Mum. It is 
time for Sally and Mike to go up to bed. They both go upstairs and after 
watching a film, you and Mum also go up to bed. 
Scene 4 
It's the middle of the night. You are woken up by some strange noises 
coming from downstairs. You go downstairs to see what's happening. As 
you get downstairs you see Mike and Sally in the living room. You tell them 
both off for getting up in the middle of the night and send them straight 
back to bed. 
TQm the cat's briefing 
Scene 3 
You come into the living room and jump up on to the sideboard. You 
accidentally tread on a dish. You 'knock a marble out of the dish and it falls 
to the floor. You see it roll under a table. You jump down, walk across the 
living room floor and go out into the kitchen to eat your dinner. 
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Appendix 2: Transcriptions of drama narratives (study 5) 
Narrative 1: The Party 
S Viv (to himself): I wonder if Mum will let me go to Sally's party? I really want to 
go to Sally's party on Saturday night, but I can't get there. 
(enter Mum) 
Viv: Mum, can I go to Sally's party on Saturday night? I really want 
1O to go to her party. Mum: Oh, Viv-you'll have to ask your dad about that because he might 
be using the car. 
Viv: But he won't be using the car on Saturday night. 
Mum: I don't know-he might have to work on Saturday night. You'll 
15 have to ask him when he gets in. Viv: OK. When is he coming in? 
Mum: He should be in very soon, now. 
(Exit Mum) 
Viv (to himself): I really hope I can go. 
ýý (enter Dad) Dad: Hello, there. 
Viv: Hi, Dad. Dad, is there any chance that I can go to Sally's party 
on Saturday night? 
Dad: Saturday? 
Viv: Yes, I really like Sally. I really want to go to her party. Is 
there any chance that you can take me in the car? 
Dad: Well, I'd love to take you, but I can't. I'm working on Saturday 
night, I'm sorry. I'm sorry but I can't take you. 
Viv: So, I can't go (very dejected). 
Dad: No, sorry. 
Viv: (hands in pockets, very dejected)., 
(exit Dad) 
Molly/David/ 
Anna/ Simon: Aaagh (sympathetically). 
Molly: He's sad. 
Debriefing 
40 Viv: Now, we've got our jackets off and we want to talk about what we 
did and what we said when we were acting. Who would like to 
say something about what we just did? 
Audience (silence) 
45 Viv: What happened? What happened in the story? David: Were talking. 
Viv: Yes, we were talking. 
Simon: You were asking if you could go to Sally's party? 
Viv: Right, yes-I was asking if I could go to Sally's party, who was I 
$O asking? 
David: (pointing to Margarita) 
Your mum. 
Viv: Yes, Margarita was my mum in the story. And what did my mum 
say? 
SS Simon & Peter (simu ltaneously) 
See Dad 
Dad 
Anna: Ask Dad 
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Viv: Yes, she said I would have to ask Dad. Because he was the only 
person who could drive me to the party. Then what happened? 60 David: Ask him 
Simon: Dad came in. 
Viv: Dad came in. 
David: Ask him. 
Viv: Yeah, and what did he say? 65 Molly: Car. 
Peter: He needed the car. 
Anna: He needed the car, use it. 
Molly: Needed the car. 
Viv: Why did he need the car? 70 Peter: Work. 
Viv: Yes, right. He was working late on Saturday night. And 
therefore, could I go to the party? 
Peter: No 
75 
Anna: No 
David: No 
Molly: No 
Viv: Right, 'cause I couldn't get there. Now how did I feel? How do 
you think I felt about that? 
80 David: Sad. 
Ian: Sad. 
Anna: Very sad. 
Simon: (smiles) Happy. 
Viv: Well, would I have felt happy? 85 David: No. 
Viv: I think I would have felt happy if I had have been able to go to 
the party. 
Viv: What's a word that means I was looking forward to something... 
(pause).. and then I was let down (strong facial expression)? I 90 
was....? 
Peter: Upset. 
David: Upset. 
Viv: Upset, that's a good word. Anyone know what the word 
disappointed means? Have you heard the word disappointed? 9ý (silence) 
Viv: It means you were looking forward to something, and you would 
really like to do it, and then you can't do It (strong facial 
expression and gesture) and you become disappointed. (To 
100 Peter) You are absolutely right upset as well. Has anyone ever felt disappointed?... about ...... anything? 
(silence) 
Viv: Anyone had something happen to them recently which has made 
them disappointed? 
105 (silence) ' Viv: t Anyone? You look forward to something.... and it doesn 
happen? Peter? 
Peter: (shyly) No. 
110 Molly: ' Talking. Viv: Yes. 
Molly: You said you go party. 
Viv: Yes, that's right, I wanted to go to a party. 
Molly: In car. 
1S 
Viv: Yes, that's right. I asked mum if I could go to the party. 
Molly: Ask mum party. 
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Viv: And mum said? 
Molly: She said, "no". 
Viv: She said perhaps you can go to the party, if Dad can take you in 
the car. Shall we do it again. Shall we do this story, again? 120 Anna: Yes. 
David: Yes. 
Narrative 2: The Birthday Present 
125 
Introduction 
Viv: I'm going to play the part of a boy. And it's my birthday. 
And Keith is going to play my Dad. Do you know what [ really 130 
want for my birthday, when I play this part? 
Peter (audience): No? 
Viv: I really want a camera. I've been dying to have a camera for 
ages. Now watch carefully to see what happens. 
135 (Viv & Keith put jackets on. Enter Dad). 
Viv: Hi Dad! Did you have a good day at work? 
Keith: Yes, thanks. 
Viv: I don't suppose you know what special day it is today? 
Keith: Special day, is it a special day, today? 140 Viv: Oh, it's your 
Anna (audience): (calls out) Birthday 
Keith: Birthday, I knew really, I was just kidding. 
Viv: And you do know what I really want for my birthday? 
Keith: Well, I've got a present here for you-a special birthday present. 145 (takes a wrapped present out of his pocket and gives it to Viv). 
Happy Birthday, I hope you like it. 
Viv: (said to audience, and not for Keith's ears) It's a camera, I can't 
wait (unwraps the present in front of Keith. Sees in fact that it 
is a glasses case. Says with a certain amount of conviction, but 150 
with a faltering voice) Oh, that's really nice, Dad. 
[Exclamations of "oh' from several students] Thanks, it's..... 
(stammers a little) it's just what I wanted. Thanks, Dad. 
Debriefing 
155 
Viv: OK. Let's go back to the beginning of the story and remember 
what happened. Who was I playing in that story? 
Simon: A boy. 
Anna: Boy, it was birthday. 160 David: A boy. 
Viv: (nods) A boy-and it was my birthday. 
Anna: Birthday present. 
Viv: Right, it was my birthday and I was expecting a birthday 
present. Was was it that I was really hoping to get for my 165 birthday? 
Simon: You were hoping to get a camera. 
Viv: And what happened? 
Simon: You were disappointed. And he gave you a glasses case. 
Viv: Yes, I was disappointed, wasn't I? What did I actually say to 170 Dad? 
Simon: That's nice. 
Peter: Said it was great. 
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Viv: 
Simon 
175 viv: 
Simon/ Peter/ 
Anna/ David (sim. ) 
Viv: 
180 Peter: 
Simon: 
Anna: 
Viv: 
185 
190 
195 
200 
Anna: 
David: 
Viv: 
Simon: 
David: 
Viv: 
Yeah. Why did I say that? 
Because..... (does not continue) 
What I actually said was, "That's really nice, that's just what I 
wanted. Did I really mean that? 
No. 
So why did I say it? 
To be kind. 
To be kind. 
Kind. 
it wouldn't be very nice, would it, if I was to say to Dad, (strong 
facial expression, directed to Keith) "Well, thanks a lot, Dad- 
you can keep that. (Throws the wrapping paper towards Keith) I 
don't want a blinking glasses case! What do I want a glasses 
case for? I didn't say that, did I? 
No 
No. 
Why didn't I say that? 
You wanted..... 
Camera. 
(Nods) I wanted a camera, but, I didn't want to hurt Dad. I 
didn't want to offend him. There's lots of times in life when, 
perhaps, we don't say what we really think. I don't know 
whether that's ever happened to you-it's happened to me on my 
birthday on a few times, when, someone gives you something, or 
something happens and deep down you feel a bit disappointed, 
(pointing to Simon) as you said, but you don't actually say to 
someone, "that's not what I wanted, you can keep it"-because 
what would that do, if you said that? 
Peter: 
Simon: 
205 Viv: 
210 
215 
220 
225 
Upset him. 
Upset. 
Yes, watch this... 
[Repeat episode but this time Viv rejects present] 
Viv: Oh, dad. What do I want a glasses case for? (pushes it away) 
I've got one of these, you know I've been looking forward to a 
camera You could have at least bought me a camera for my 
birthday. 
Keith: (looks dejected, puts hands in pockets, shrugs head down and 
turns away. 
[Some 'Aaarghs' from students] 
Viv: In that version of the story, how do you think Dad felt? 
Peter: Upset. 
Anna: Sad 
Janet: Upset. 
Molly: Sad. 
Viv: Yes, that wasn't very nice, was it? We may have done something 
like that, but we really should consider other people's feelings, 
shouldn't we? 
Anna: Umm. 
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Narrative 3: The borrowed cardigan 
Viv: I really like Keith's cardigan. I think it's a really nice 
cardigan. I don't suppose he'll mind if I took from his wardrobe 
235 and wore it? 
Molly: Ah! (hand on mouth) 
Viv: He won't mind if I take it. 
David: (turning to assistant) He got ask. 
Viv: (takes cardigan out of wardrobe) He won't mind if I wear this. 240 (Puts on cardigan) It fits really nicely. Oh, yes, this is really 
nice. (Picks up cup and pretends to drink-then spills tea down 
front of cardigan) Oh, no. Strewth! That's done it, I've made a 
stain right down the front of Keith's cardigan. I don't know 
what to do with it, now. 245 (enter Keith. Viv hides behind cupboard) 
Keith: Anyone seen my cardigan? 
Students: No. 
Keith: I want to wear it, you see. I think I'll ask my brother Viv. 
Where is he? 
250 Students (point to Viv) Here! 
Viv: (sidles out from behind cupboard, nervously: ) 
Hi, Keith. 
Keith: (sternly) What are you doing wearing my cardigan? 
Viv: (nervously) Well........ 
255 Keith: And what's that... (angrily, pointing to the stain)... lookl 
Viv: (sheepishly) I didn't mean to... 
Keith: (stamps his foot in anger) Ughh! 
Debriefing 
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Viv: Now, lets think back. What happened In that story? What 
happened in the beginning? 
Janet: You nicked-took his cardigan without asking. 
Viv: Right. And where did I take it from? 
265 Janet: From his wardrobe. 
Viv: From his wardrobe, right. Then what happened? 
Molly: Gone 
Viv: And then what happened? 
Anna: You tea. 
270 David: You had/spilt tea. 
Viv: I was wearing his cardigan. I made myself a cup of tea and then 
what happened? 
Asha: Down here (points to her jumper) 
Viv: Yes, I spilled some tea down his cardigan. Did I try to get the 
275 tea off? 
Anna: (rubbing chest) Tissue. 
Viv: Yes, [ tried to wipe it off, but... 
Simon: Stain. 
280 Viv: Yes, it left a stain. Then what happened? 
Peter: He tried to find it. 
Viv: Yes, Keith came in and tried to find his cardigan. And did he 
find it? 
Anna: No. 
285 Viv: And what did I do? 
Anna: Hide. 
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Viv: Why did I hide? 
Simon: Because you did not want to show him what happened. 
290 Viv: Yes, I was feeling rather embarassed about the fact that I had 
taken his cardigan. When Keith came and actually saw me 
wearing his cardigan, how did he feel? 
Molly: (stamps her foot). 
Peter: Angry. 
295 Simon: (angrily) "Why you wearing my cardigan? " 
Anna: Angry. 
Viv: Yes, angry. How did you know he was angry. 
Peter: Stamped his foot. 
Molly: Sad. 
300 Viv: Why was he angry? 
Molly: Banged his feet. 
Viv: Yes Molly, banged his feet. He was very cross. Did you see his 
face? 
Simon: It was very red. 
305 Viv: So he was feeling very cross. 
Molly: Very cross. 
Viv: Has anyone felt very angry recently? 
Simon (puts hand up) No. 
Viv: I got very angry this morning when I was driving my car. 
310 Someone pulled out in front of me and I had to stop very 
suddenly. 
Simon: I get very angry with the computer. 
Viv: You got angry with the computer? 
Simon: Kept falling off the track. 
315 Viv: So you got angry when it didn't work properly? 
Simon: Yes. 
David: I got angry in my house. About keeping my room. "I don't want 
to do it. It's not my job. " 
Viv: Tell me a bit more. Who gets cross? 
320 David: Me. 
Viv: You get cross because your asked to tidy up your bedroom? 
David: Yeah. 
Viv: And what was it you said, "It's not my job? " 
David: It ain't my job. 
325 Viv: (laughs) I bet that goes down well. What do you think of that 
Margarita? ' 
Margarita (exp. ): My mum sometimes asks me to tidy up my room and sometimes I 
get cross, because I like it in a mess. 
Viv: Well, that's interesting. (to David) Do you like your bedroom to 
330 be in a mess? 
David: I like a mess. 
Simon: I like mine in a tip. It's all over the place. 
Peter: And then you can't find anything. 
Viv: That's a very good point. He thinks it's nice to keep your 
335 bedroom tidy because then you can find things. 
340 Narrative 4: The Lie 
Viv: 5.30, it must be time for Neighbours. (Goes over to the 
television and turns on the television. At the same knocks a 
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vase off the coffee table. Strewth. How did that happen. It's 
345 mum's favourite vase, the one dad bought her for Christmas. 
Mum's going to go mad! (Enter mum) 
Mum: Oh, there you are. (sees the broken vase on the floor). What's 
happened? 
Viv: It's your vase. Chappy the dog jumped up onto the table and 
350 knocked it off. It's nothing to do with me-the dog did it. 
Mum: So where is Chappy, now? 
Viv: I don't know. He ran out into the garden. 
Debriefing 
355 
Viv: Now, let's think back. What was the first thing that happened? 
Simon: You're watching television. 
Molly: Vase. Looking at TV. 
Viv: I wanted to watch television. 
360 Simon: Knocked the vase. 
Viv: Yes, when I went over to turn the television on, I knocked over 
the vase. Whose favourite vase, was it? 
Simon: Your mum. 
Viv: Then what happened? 365 Simon: Then your mum came back and said, "What's that on the floor? " 
Viv: And what did I say? 
Simon: You said your dog did it? You lied. 
Viv: Yes, I lied, didn't I? Because I said that Chappy the dog jumped 
up and knocked the vase off the table. Was that true, what 1 
370 said? 
Anna, David, Janet: No. 
(simult. ) 
Viv: No, I told a lie. 
Students: Lie. ° 375 Viv: Why did I tell a lie? 
Simon: Because you didn't want to get yourself into trouble. 
Viv: David, why did I tell a lie? 
David: The thing fall down. 
Viv: Yeah, [ said the dog did it when I actually did it? What would 380 you do if you were in that situation, what would you do? 
David: Clear it up. 
Viv: Okay, you'd clean it up... and then what would you do? 
Peter: Own up to it. 
Viv: You'd own up to it. That's an interesting way of putting it- 38S owning up to it. Sometimes it's actually better to say that 
you've done something... do you think that Mum would have been 
that cross? Did I do the right thing by lying, do you think? 
Students: No. 
Viv: Margarita, if you had really have been by mother, would you 390 have been cross with me. What would you have said if I had 
gone out in the kitchen and said, "Mum, I've just just had an 
accident, I've broken your best vase". 
Margarita: I don't think I would be cross if you were honest about it. I 
would be a little upset....... 395 Viv: Because it was your favourite vase... 
Margarita: 
.... but I wouldn't be angry with you. Viv: Did you believe me, when I said that Chappy the dog had jumped 
up and knocked the vase off the table? 
Margarita: Not really. 400 
Viv: Has anyone told a little lie recently? I have. 
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David: (pointing to the assistant) You. 
Viv: (to assistant) Have you told a little lie, a fib? 
Assistant: Oh, yes. 
405 Viv: Sometimes we do, don't we. 
Simon: To get out of it. 
Viv: Keith, have you told a fib recently? 
Keith: When I was at school the other day, somebody said to me, "How 
are you? " And I said, "I'm fine" and I wasn't, because I felt 
410 horrible. So that was a fib. 
Viv: Has anyone else told a fib? 
David: He got a job and he leave it. 
Viv: Is this someone you know or is it a story? 
David: In telly. 
415 Viv: Oh, on the telly. 
David: The barman he boss him around and bottle and bar-he clean It 
up, "No, you clean it up, "..... 
Viv: Did he tell a fib? 
David: (incomprehensible) 
420 Simon: At my Nan's I told a lie then, I said someone has thrown a paper 
airplane out of the window and there weren't. 
Students: (laugh) 
Viv: That's a good one. In a way, when Keith was my dad and he gave 
me that present....... 425 Simon: You told a fib..... 
Viv: Yes, because I said I really liked it and that's what I really 
wanted. I told that fib because I didn't want to upset him. 
430 Narrative 5: The doughnut 
(Viv and Keith, brothers-sitting watching television) 
Keith: Ok, what's on telly? 
435 Viv: Nothing much. 
(Enter Mum, carrying a real doughnut on a plate) 
Mum: Keith, thank you so much for helping me with the hoovering 
today, you did such a good job. 
Viv: (green with envy) Tchh. 
440 Mum: Have this doughnut for doing such a good job. 
Keith: Thanks, mum. 
(Exit Mum) 
Viv: Creep. I don't like doughnuts anyway. 
445 Debriefing 
Viv: What was going on, there then? 
Anna: Watching television. 
Janet: Your mum came in with a doughut. 
450 Viv: Yes, then what happened. 
Janet: Gave the doughnut to Keith. 
Viv: Yes, then what did she say to him? 
Molly: Thank you. 
Simon Thank you for helping. 455 V iv: Yes, thank you for doing the hoovering. Had he done a good job? 
Students: Yes. 
Viv: And was that why he was getting a doughnut? 
Janet: Yes. 
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460 
465 
470 
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Viv: And what about me. Did you see my face? 
Anna: Upset. 
Viv: Why? 
Janet: Jealous. 
Simon: Because you were jealous. 
Viv: I was jealous? What does jealous mean? 
Janet: Someone else gets something. 
Viv: Right. Someone else gets something and you really want it... and 
you feel jealous about him having something. Ok... you said I 
was jealous because I didn't get a doughnut, what did I actually 
say to him? 
Simon: "t didn't like them". 
Viv: Do you think I meant that? 
Simon: No, you wanted it. 
Narrative 6: The Sweetheart 
[Viv and Keith chatting to each other] 
Viv: I really like Margarita, I think she's smashing. I don't know 
whether she likes me, but I think she's great. 
(enter Margarita) 
Margarita: Hi! 
(walks towards Viv with her arms outstretched. Viv looks very excited, thinking she is 
going to put her arms around and kiss him. Walks straight passed Viv and puts arms 
485 around Keith. Viv looks very put out, hands on hips). 
Keith: Oh, hello there! (embrace and kiss. VIv looks on very jealously) 
Debriefing 
, 
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Viv: So, what happened there? 
Simon: You thought that she was going to kiss you. 
David: Got another man. 
Janet: She hugged the wrong person. 
Anna: (points to Keith & Margarita) Say 'hl' like that (mimes embrace) 
and you upset. 
Viv: I thought when she was coming towards me, she was going to kiss 
me..... and what did she do? 
Simon: Straight past you. 
Viv: She went straight passed me.... 
Anna: Kiss him. 
Viv: Yes and kissed Keith. And how did I feel? 
David: Upset. 
Molly: Sad. 
Viv (waits): Ok. I was feeling ....... (waits) what was the word we talked about last time beginning with 'j'... 
Simon: Jealous. 
Anna: Jealous. 
Viv: Yes, I was jealous of Keith. What I really wanted was for her to 
come over to me and give me a kiss. But it didn't happen did it? 
Students: No. 
Narrative 7: The Broken Window 
515 (Viv and Keith playing football out in the garden) 
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535 
Viv: Don't kick it too hard. You remember what happened last time 
when we played ball. 
Keith: We broke a window. 
Viv: No, you broke the window. Take it easy, if anything happens to 
that shed window, then you can tell dad about it. 
Keith: i won't 
(Keith kicks the ball and it smashes the shed window) 
Keith: Oh, no! 
Viv: You've done it again. I keep telling you to take it easy; you've 
smashed another window. Well, that's nothing to do with me. 
You're going to have to tell dad. The money will have to come 
out of your pocket money, not mine. 
Keith: Oh, no. 
(Indoors. Mum sees Keith look worried) 
Mum: Are you alright, Keith? 
Keith: Well actually... 
Mum: What's the matter? 
Keith: Well, I don't feel very well. Can I go and lay down for a while? 
I'm feeling very poorly. 
Mum: Well of course, if you're not feeling very well. 
Debriefing 
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Viv: Let's have someone different. We were two brothers and we were 
playing....? 
Isha: Football. 
Viv: Football, yes-out in the? 
Isha: In garden. 
Viv: In the garden, and what happened? 
Isha: Accident. 
Viv: An accident, what sort of accident? 
Isha: Crashed. 
David: In the window. 
Viv: Yes, Keith kicked the ball and it smashed the shed window. 
Isha: Window. 
Viv: And then what happened? 
Janet: You have to pay with your pocket money. 
Viv: Yes, it was actually Keith who smashed the window. What did 
he do, when we went into the house, what happened then? 
Janet: Not feeling very well. 
Viv: Who asked him? 
David: (Points to Mum) 
Janet: Mum. 
Viv: She said, "are you alright? " What did he say? 
Peter: No. 
Anna: No. Not well. 
Viv: He said he wasn't very well and could he go and have a lay own. 
Molly: Bed. 
Viv: And what do you think about that? Do you think that he wasn't 
feeling very well? 
Peter: No, he was trying to get out of it. 
Viv: How was he trying to get out of it, then? 
Peter: By pretending that he wasn't very well. 
Viv: By pretending that he wasn't very well. Right. What do you 
hink, Keith? 
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Keith: I was trying to get out of it, that's quite right. And I was 
pretending. 
Molly: Cross. 
575 Keith: Cross? Well [ thought mum was going to be cross, that's true. I 
thought mum was going to be really, really angry, so I tried to 
get out of it. 
Viv: Yeah, he got out of it by saying that he didn't feel very well and 
he had a lay down upstairs. But we don't think that was 
S80 actually true, we think that he was telling a fib-pretending 
that he wasn't very well. 
Peter: Putting it on. 
Viv: Yes, putting it on, that's right. Has anyone done this, pretended 
that they were unwell to get out of something, ... perhaps you 585 may have been worried about something,... anyone done 
that?...... (David points to assistant)... I know I have. 
David: (pointing to assistant) you got a sore throat. 
Assistant I pretended that I got a sore throat? 
David: Pretend you got a sore throat. 
590 Viv: And what good would that have done her? 
Assistant: 1'm trying to think of the situation.... 
David: (points to the door) Sick 
Assistant: Oh, I was pretending to have a sore throat, was [, so I could have 
a sit down? 
595 David: Yeah. (some students laugh) 
Viv: I remember the first holiday I had, when I went away camping, 1 
missed my mum and dad, because it was the first time I had 
gone away-I actually pretended that I wasn't very well-because 
I thought that maybe that would mean that they would send me 
600 home. 
605 
Narrative 8: The Missing Toast. 
Viv: Now, what do I need to do before I go out?... wash my hair... umm I 
think I've just got time to make myself some toast. (puts some 
bread in the toaster, gets a plate ready... then looks at his watch) 
Shouldn't take long (then leaves the room). 
610 (enter Keith) 
Keith: Right then, do you know, I'm really hungry (sees the toast In the 
toaster)... and there's some toast (rubs his hands together over 
toast).... just what I fancy. Let's get a plate...... umm look at 
that..... spread on the butter .... I'm gonna have this toast (takes it 615 out with him) 
(enter Viv, whistling. Walks over to the toaster, great suprise when he sees the toast 
has gone) 
Viv: What's happened to my toast? 
Students: (laugh) 
620 David: He's pinched it. 
Debriefing 
625 Viv: Again, let's remind ourselves what happened first of all. 
Janet: You were getting ready to go out. 
Viv: I was getting ready to go out.... and I thought I had time to make 
some toast. 
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Janet: When you went out the toast had gone. 630 Viv: Yes, so when I came back in, how did I look? 
Janet: You looked upset. 
David: Upset. 
Molly: Sad. 
Viv: Umm.... 
635 Peter: Grumpy. 
Viv: Did I expect my toast to disappear? 
Janet: No. 
Simon: You thought It was in there still. 
Viv: I thought It was in there.... yeah.... so what had happened when I 640 had gone out? 
Simon: Your brother had took It. 
Anna: Took it the toast ... (pointing towards where Keith had taken It) 
out there. It's gone. 
Viv: So when I came back, I was surprised.... 645 Simon: That It'd gone. 
Viv: .... to find my toast had gone..... 
Anna: Yeah. 
Viv: .... so the look that I had on my face was one of surprise. I was 
surprised about what had happened. Now, where did I think the 650 toast was, when I came back? 
David: In the toaster. 
Anna: In the toaster. 
Viv: When I was outside, did I know that my brother had taken the 
toast out? 
655 (simultaneously) 
Peter: No. 
David: No. 
Simon: No. 
Anna: No. 
660 
Narrative 9: The Dirty Coffee Cups 
665 
(Keith in the living room watching television, lots of dirty cups are lined up on the 
floor) 
Keith: Right it must be time for Neighbours (turns on the television 670 and lounges right back in the chair, legs outstretched, hands 
behind his head). 
(enter Viv) 
Viv: Don't you think it's about time that you cleared this mess up? 
(points to the line of dirty cups) 675 Keith: What mess? 
Viv: How many cups have you got there? 
Keith: (pensively, counting) Six! 
Viv: You not going to leave them there until mum gets home? 
Keith: (gesturing with his arm) Oh, just leave it, leave it.... let's watch 680 Neighbours. 
Viv: Ok, (sits down) you're the one who's will get into trouble. 
(watches television). Don't you think that you should do 
something about these cups? 
Students: Yes. 
685 Keith: (again 
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lethargically) Oh, leave them. 
Debriefing 
690 Viv: What happened in that story? 
Simon: He couldn't be bothered to clear them up. 
Viv: Yes, he had all his cups on the floor.... and he just left them 
there. 
Viv: What did Keith say? 
695 Peter: Leave it. 
(simulataneously) 
Janet: Leave it. 
Anna: Leave it. 
David: Leave It. 
700 Viv: And how was he sitting on that chair? 
Simon: (stretching back on his chair) Like this. 
Viv: Yes, stretched back. How did he look? 
(no response) 
Viv: (to Janet) You're right in saying that he couldn't be bothered... 
705 Janet: Lazy 
David: Lazy, lazy. 
Viv: Lazy.... he was being a lazy bones wasn't he? 
David: (laughing) Lazybones. 
Viv: What does it mean to be lazy? 
710 Simon: You just sit there and do nothing. 
Peter: Not bothered to do anything. 
Viv: You just sit there, waiting for things to be done for you.... I'm a 
bit lazy sometimes.... expecting people to clear up after me.... 
Simon: Yep (with amusement). 
715 Janet: Lazybones! (pointing to Simon) He's a lazybones. 
(laughter) 
Molly: He's quite sad. 
Janet: Everyone do it for him. 
720 Viv: Is there another way that we can play a part and show that 
someone is lazy? Who would like to show a lazy person..... show 
someone being lazy? 
Peter: Stay in bed. 
David: Stay in bed. 
725 Viv: Staying in bed, right. Can we get anyone else involved? 
(no response) 
Viv: You could stay in bed.... you don't want to get up..... you could 
play that part. Can we get anyone else to play a part? 
Simon: Get up. 
730 Viv: Yes, we could have another person saying, "come on, get up" 
Janet: This is mum. 
Viv: What would she say, then? 
Janet: Lazy bones, get up. 
Viv: Yeah, say a bit more, anything else? 
735 Janet: Get up for school..... Or get up to go to work. 
Viv: Which would be better? 
Janet: School. 
Viv: You want to do the school. Let's try it out, we've got something, 
here. Anyone want to play a part? 740 Janet: Me, murr 
Viv: You want to play mum, alright come over here. Now, who wants 
to play someone being lazy? 
(Anna points to Simon, gets up and comes to front) 
270 
Viv: Good, you're going to do some acting. 
745 (Viv puts two easy chairs together to make a bed) 
Viv: Let's say that this is a bed (Simon lays down on the bed) 
Molly: Dad. 
Viv: What are you going to say to Simon? 
Janet: (to Simon) Lazybones get up. 
750 Viv: Good. Can you say something else? 
Molly: Dad. 
Viv: You want a dad to be in this? 
Molly: Yeah. 
Viv: Who's going to play dad? 
755 Anna: Peter. 
Peter: What about David? 
(David come out to front) 
Viv: (to Janet) Now, you and dad can think about what you are going 
to say. 
760 Janet: Got to get him up for school, because he's late for school. 
Viv: Good, (to David) now, you could say something about Simon, you 
could say that he has been getting a bit lazy, lately.... 
David: Lazy. 
(students, laugh) 
765 Janet: He never has breakfast.... 
Viv: We're going to leave you (gesturing to Janet, David and Simon) to 
do some acting together. Have a go. 
(Janet and David approach Simon, Janet tugs on Simon's wrist) 
Janet: Come on, get up! 
770 Simon: No, I'm not going to get up for school. 
(Janet begins to tug him rather vigorously) 
Viv: Don't pull him too hard. Say something else to him. 
Janet: (to David) Say something to him. 
David: Water. 
775 Janet: Get some water (students pretend to get some water and throw it 
over Simon). 
Narrative 10; The Missing Marble (1) 
780 (Sally and Mike briefed separately) 
(Keith briefs Sally outside) 
Viv: (to everyone, just as Sally is about to enter) Do we know what 
Sally has been told to do? 
(together) 
78.5 David: No 
Anna: No 
Simon: No 
(enter Sally) 
(Janet and Simon play marbles. One of the marbles rolls under the settee. Simon looks 790 under the settee). 
Simon: What's this? There's my marble I lost. Looking for it for 
ages... must have dropped it or something. 
Janet: (grabs marble from Simon) That's my marble! 
Simon: No, that's my marble! 795 (both start to struggle. Janet puts marble in her toy box) 
Mum (Molly): (to Janet, pointing to the door. ) Go garden play. 
(exit Janet, with Keith. Keith briefs Janet) 
(Simon takes the marble from toy box and puts it in the vase) 
800 (Viv intervenes.... ) 
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Viv: (to audience) Where did Janet put the marble in the beginning? 
David: (points to toy box) In the games.... 
Viv: In the toy box, yes... Where's the marble now, really? 
David: (points to vase) In the vase. 805 Viv: When Janet comes back (points outside) in a minute, where will 
Janet look for the marble? 
Anna and David (simultaneously pointing to toy box): 
In there. 
Simon: (points to toy box) In there. 
810 Viv: She will look in the toy box.... why will she look there? 
Simon: Because she put it there? 
Peter: She put it there. 
Viv: Now, let's see what happens, next (signals to Keith to enter with 
Janet) 
815 (Janet enters with some flowers. She goes over to the vase and sees the big marble. 
Takes it out of the vase). 
Janet: (genuine surprise) My marble. 
(Viv intervenes) 
820 Viv: Where did you think it was? 
Janet: In the box. 
Viv: (points to vase) How did it get there? 
Janet: Brother. 
Viv: Did you know that it was In there? 
825 Janet: No. 
David: No. 
Viv: Let's see if we can remember the story. What happened In the 
beginning. 
Peter: Playing marbles. 
830 Viv: They were playing marbles. Then what happened? 
David: (points to mocksettee) There. 
Viv: Yes, one of the marbles rolled under the settee. And what did 
Simon find? 
David: Big marble. 
835 Viv: Yes, the big marble. Then what happened? 
Seely: Fight. 
Viv: Yes, because Simon said it was his marble, but Janet said It was 
her marble. So what did Janet do with the marble? 
David: Box. 
840 Viv: Yes, and then what happened? 
(no response) 
Viv: Who came in because of all of the noise? 
Anna: Mum, stop fighting. 
Viv: And she told Janet to go out in the ....... 1 845 Anna: Garden. 
Viv:, And when she was gone, while she was away, what happened 
then? 
David: (points to Simon) Hide it. 
Viv: Yes, while Janet was gone, he took the marble out of the toy box, 850 and where did he put it? 
David: Vase. 
Viv: And then what happened? 
(no response) 
Viv: What happened when Janet came back in? 855 David: Flowers. 
Viv: What did she do with the flowers? 
David: In the vase. 
Viv: That's right, she put them in the vase..... and what did she find? 
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Peter: Marble. 
860 David: Marble. 
Viv: And what did she think had happened? 
(no response) 
Viv: Janet when you found the marble, what did you think had 
happened? 
865 Janet: Brother. 
Narrative 11: The Missing Marble 2 (puppets) 
870 Part One 
(David is wearing hand puppets. There are two small recepticles with lids on the floor 
in front of him; a box (non see-through) and a tin. 
Viv: Now, this time, instead of using real people, we are going to use 
875 some puppets to tell the story. Let's call our puppets Mike and 
Sally. Which puppet do you think is Mike (David moves the 
male puppet)... and is Sally? (David moves the female). Now, it's 
the same story, Sally and Mike are playing marbles, make them 
play marbles. (Viv assists) One of the marbles rolls under a 
880 chair and Mike finds the big special marble. Make Mike find 
the big marble. Now Mike says it is his marble, but Sally says 
it's her marble so they begin to argue (David makes the puppets 
fight, saying, "it's my marble. ") 
Sally's got the marble and she puts it in her toy box (assists 885 David). And then Sally goes outside to play on the 
playground...... (David takes Sally just outside the classroom, 
on the floor. David returns and Viv asks David... ) Now what do 
you think Mike is going to do? 
David: Hide it. 
890 Viv: Go on then. 
(David takes marble out of the box and puts it in the tin) 
Viv: (to David) Now where did Mike put the marble in the beginning? 
David: This one (points to box). 
Viv: And where's the marble now, really? 
895 David: Here (points to tin). 
Viv: Now, who's going to get Sally? 
(Anna gets up and goes to get Sally. Keith goes with her to stall her return until the 
questions are asked). 
Viv: (to David) When Sally comes back, where will she look for the 
900 marble? 
David: This one (points to the box). 
Viv: Let's see where Sally will look for the marble...... (indicates for 
Anna and Keith to come in) 
(Anna and Keith enter, Sally on Anna's hand). 905 Anna: (making Sally wave) Hello. 
David: (making Mike wave back) Hello. 
Viv: Sally wants her marble. Where's she going to look first for her 
marble? 
Anna: (takes Sally over to the box, opens lid) Gone. 910 David: Yes. 
(Janet claps) 
Viv: Yes, it's gone. 
915 ........................................ 
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Part Two 
(Danny manipulates Mike, Anna manipulates Sally) 
Viv: Now, we have to remember who's who. Anna, who have you got? 
920 Anna: Sally 
Viv: (points to Mike) And, Danny, what's his name? 
Danny: Mike. 
Viv: Yes, his name's Mike...... (encouraging Danny and Anna to move 
puppets down to the marbles on the floor).... and Mike and Sally 
925 are playing marbles........ Now Sally puts the marble in the box 
(Anna does this) and then Sally goes outside on the playground 
(exit Anna and Keith)...... (helping Danny to manipulate the 
puppet) and then Mike takes the marble out of the box and puts 
it in Danny's pocket. 
930 Viv: (Turns to Molly) Molly, where did Mike put the marble In the 
beginning? 
Molly: (points to box) There. 
Viv: And where's the marble now, really? 
Molly: (points to Danny's pocket) Pocket. 
935 Viv: Now let's ask Sally to come in..... (As Anna comes In with Sally, 
Viv asks question to Molly)... Now where will Sally look for the 
marble? 
Molly: Pocket. 
Viv: I'm not sure...... Let's see where Sally will look for the marble.... 
940 (Anna lifts the lid of the box ) 
Anna: Not there. 
(some students laugh) 
Viv: So where is the marble? 
David: (points to Danny's pocket) In his pocket. 
945 Viv: In his pocket, well done. 
Part Three 
950 
(Nancy manipulates Mike; Betty manipulates Sally 
(repeat up to when Betty exits with Sally.... ) 
Viv: Now, when Sally is outside (helps Nancy to manipulate puppet), 
955 Mike takes the marble out of the box and hides It 
somewhere.... you choose where to hide it..... (Nancy looks around 
and ignores David's gestural prompt to put it In her 
pocket.... puts the marble under the table)..... Ok, that's 
good.... Now, Nancy, where did Sally put the marble In the 
960 beginning? 
Nancy: (after pause) in box. 
Viv: Yes, in the box.... and where's the marble now, really? 
Nancy: (points under the chair) Under the chair. 
Viv: (nods) And when Sally comes back In a minute, where will she 
965 look for the marble? 
Nancy: (points under the chair) Under the chair. 
Simon: No. 
Viv: Will she? 
(Nancy nods) 
970 Viv: Ok, lets see what she does..... 
(Betty enters with Sally) 
Viv: Hello Sally. 
David: Hello Sally. 
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Viv: Now you're looking for your marble, aren't you? So where are 
975 you going to look for your marble? 
Betty: (making out that Sally is looking-goes towards box and lifts 
lid). It's missed. 
(students laugh) 
Viv: It's missing. 
980 Betty: It's missed. 
Viv: Can anyone tell Sally where her marble is. 
Janet: Under the chair. 
David: Under the chair. 
(Betty and Sally loo k under the chair) 
985 Betty: Aha, I got It. 
Viv: Well done. Let's give them a clap. 
275 
